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Introduction

In March 1993. the United States Navy and Marine Corps established the
Naval Doctrine Command as the primary authority for the development of naval
concepts and integrated naval doctrine. It has several specific roles-serving
as the coordinating authority for the development and evaluation of Navy

service-unique doctrine. providing a coordinated Navy-Marine Corps voice in
joint and combined doctrine development. and ensuring that naval and joint
doctrine are addressed in training and education curricula and in operations.
exercises. and war games.

Although this was the first time the sea services had established a formal

command to prepare and publish multi-service naval doctrine, it was not the
first time that either service. or navies in general. had formal written doctrine.

In the minds of most serving officers, however, doctrine was something new
for the fleet. Newport Paper Number Nine is the first of two publications in this
series which will present the story of naval doctrine's history and theory for use
in war colleges, command and staff colleges. professional schools, and other
centers of excellence. The major message of these pages is that naval and navy
doctrine is not new and there is value today in reviewing the lessons of past
doctrinal development experiences.
Under the leadership of the Naval Doctrine Command's first commander,
Rear Admiral Frederick Lewis. U.S. Navy, the Command set out to examine
history to learn the lessons of naval doctrine development from the past. This
effort was not an attempt to publish history, as such. Instead. it was directed
primarily as a study of history from the perspective of doctrine-a term
generally not found in the index pages of naval historical studies. Our own navy
and four European navies were selected for in-depth analysis. primarily because
the history of these navies is well-documented and it was relatively easy to fmd
the evidence of past doctrinal development once researchers became familiar
with the concept.
Newport Paper Number Nine contains the results of research conducted on
the navies of the United States, Great Britain. France, Italy. and Spain. Each
has a unique story to tell, and each story has value for us today. This paper
concludes with an interpretive essay on the relationship of doctrine to technol
ogy. particularly revolutions in military affairs (RMAs). It questions the ground
forces-oriented RMA paradigm and makes a strong case for the uniqueness of
naval warfare.

A forthcoming Newport Paper. which continues with two additional inter
pretive essays on the theory of military and naval doctrine and two essays that
express the need for doctrine. takes the lessons learned from all these studies
and provides the u.s. Navy and Marine Corps with the issues that must be
addressed in naval doctrine publications of today.

We at the Naval War College are pleased to assist the Naval Doctrine

Command through original research. doctrinal development. instruction on
doctrine and its history, and publication of materials such as these which can

be used as readings to support teaching. The formation and use of doctrine must
be a dynamic and interactive process involving active debate and discussion of

issues on the pages of our professional j ournals. We in Newport are committed
to supporting that professional dialogue and await your contributions .

. R. Stark

Rear Admiral. U.S. Navy
President. Naval War College
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Doctrine and Fleet Tactics in the Royal Navy
James J. Tritten

THE

u.s. NAVY was characterized in a recent

RAND Corporation study

as "the supra-national institution that has inherited the British navy's
t
throne to naval supremacy." Given the legacy of traditions that have passed
from the Royal Navy to the U.S. Navy, one cannot consider naval doctrine in
the U.S. Navy without first conducting an analysis of how naval doctrine
2
evolved in Great Britain. This paper reviews and analyzes doctrine in the
British navy. It concludes with an assessment of the doctrinal process in the
Royal Navy and with potential lessons for the U.S. Navy today.

First Stirrings: The Navy Royal

and Private Enterprise

The Royal Navy's entree into the world of written doctrine commenced with
King Henry Vill, who took a great interest in the development and enhancement
3
of a fighting "Navy Royal" in addition to a merchant fleet. Henry was aware
of the Spaniard Alonso de Chaves' first written substantive naval doctrinal

Quatri partitu en cosmografia practica, also known as Espejo de
navegantes [Seaman's Glass], published in 1538.4 Henry issued a set of written

work,

fighting instructions to develop the combat performance of his fleet. Based upon
the Spanish model, they improved upon use of the artillery concept and the
5
This doctrinal

taking of the weather gauge (or upwind side) during battle.

principle endured until the end of the age of sail. Henry's instructions were
reissued in 1544 and provided for the integration of sailing ships and rowed
galleasses in a combined arms battle fleet.

During the reign of Henry VIII , the embryonic navy developed the concept

of the "capital ship" with smaller supporting ships and auxiliaries and a
shipbuilding base. During the reign of subsequent monarchs, the navy acquired
slowly many of the characteristics of a modem composite fleet-one designed

to perform a variety of tasks and command local waters. This fleet was the tool

that allowed England to enter the international conflicts of the sixteenth century.
The development of the "Navy Royal" was enhanced by the experiences of

English privateers and semi-pirates, who experimented with the use of artillery
at sea to engage larger ships and convoy escorts. In subsequent engagements

The Newport Papers

the naval broadside was perfected. There were signs that an infonnal line ahead
was developing into doctrine as early as the Annada battle ( 1588), but in
general, coherent naval doctrine had to await the fonnation of a truly modem
fleet during the Commonwealth. Ordinarily, commanders of this era did not act
as components of an integrated fleet but rather as individual entrepreneurs
whose primary motivation was the pursuit of prize money.

Anglo- Dutch Wars
The anny-dominated English Commonwealth government followed the
Dutch lead in mandating escons for merchant ships. The Convoy Act of 1 650
established a requirement for naval protection of shipping, which eventually
resulted in confrontation with French and Moslem privateers and Holland.
Many of the naval engagements during the subsequent Anglo-Dutch Wars
( 1652-1674) were fought against Dutch convoys.
Three of Oliver Cromwell's best anny colonels were asked to serve as
seagoing generals to lead the navy. Cromwell distrusted the monarchist tenden
cies of naval officers and, of course, he himself was of the anny. The massing
of so many cannons at sea allowed for new tactical opportunities, and they were
recognized in revisions to the tactical procedures of the day.6 Early cannon were
notoriously inaccurate, hence the earliest doctrine was to amass offensive
flrepower close together in line ahead so that a devastating broadside could be
delivered. If artillery became the "king of battle" ashore, the broadside became
the sine qua non of battle afloat; and just as flrepower bred linear tactics ashore,
it led to similar developments at sea.
In addition to tactical improvement, the seagoing generals recognized also
the need to improve battle management. They provided some degree of order
to the general chaos of early privateering sailing ship tactics, which was brought
about by, essentially, "mimicking the leader," whereby captains watched and
confonned to the maneuvers of the leader (e.g., if he closed to engage, they all
did). The English seagoing generals developed well-structured plans for
managing as many as a hundred ships in battle, many of them privateers, and
they saw the need to experiment with tactics and the overall battle plan before
engaging in combat. The context for most battles was defense of and attack on
convoys.
This period also marked the introduction of a new professional officer corps
in England and a centralized organization for the administration of the fleet.
Cromwell's refonn effons, which were supported by England's gentlemen,
would result in an emphasis upon maritime forces rather than the already
2
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'
powerful anny. Local seagoing commanders began in 1636 to issue written
8
instructions for their subordinates. Parliament issued comprehensive articles
of war in

1652, and in 1653 the first comprehensive written doctrine was

promulgated by a fleet commander. This written doctrine combined both sailing
instructions and fighting instructions, in separate but companion volumes. The
doctrine on fighting instructions was much shorter than the sailing doctrine.
Fighting instructions cannot be studied without considering sailing instruc
tions. The fighting instructions attempted to mass firepower. The commander
now had a different command and control problem than previously, since his
captains would no longer simply mimic his behavior-they were required to
place their ships in precise positions, which required a system of communica
tions. However, the signal book was incomplete by itself, since, if the captain
merely acted upon receipt of orders, he might fail to take advantage of a tactical
opportunity in the absence of a signal or when signals could not be sent or seen.
Doctrinal fighting instructions thus informed the commander how to make
decisions in the absence of other more tactical directives.
The new standing orders were immediately put to the test during three
Anglo-Dutch Wars in which:
•

Strategically, England essentially replaced the Dutch at sea throughout the

world.
•

Operationally, England executed a series of campaigns including several

devastating convoy battles, blockades, and bombardments of the Dutch
shoreline.
•

The seagoing generals more then held their own against the Dutch fleet,

led by the greatest admirals of the world.
The English success was generally due to the massing of superior firepower
and refusing to let the Dutch close for boarding. The defeated Dutch, on the
other hand, continued to rely on the

milie and had not yet accepted the primacy

of artillery.
The Cromwell-era fighting instructions and other reforms were not
repUdiated with the dissolution of the Commonwealth. Indeed, the return of the
monarchy under Charles II had a beneficial effect upon the politically untainted
fleet, which was now commissioned the Royal Navy and was provided with a
new benefactor, at the direct expense of the Army. The Royal Navy of this era
may have had its origins in the need to protect convoys, but with the combat
proven potential of artillery and massing, doctrine began to shift to the offensive
form of warfare. Simply put, the fleet could be used for other than defensive

tasks.
3
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Doctrinal sailing and fighting instructions were issued in various fonns by
several different fleet commanders. The instructions were flexible, issued as
guidance that was unlikely to be followed scrupulously in the heat of battle.
Revisions to the fighting instructions and new instructions reflecting combat
lessons were issued repeatedly during the wars (in 1654, 1655, 1666, 1672),
and for the first time as an integrated whole in 1 672-1673.

9

These revised

fighting instructions allowed for tactical flexibility on the part of the local
commander-to include milie tactics and the breaking of the line. Frequently
overlooked, but important, was the function of both fighting and sailing
instructions for ensuring that commanders acted more as components of an
integrated fleet having political aims rather than as entrepreneurs whose
motivation was the pursuit of prize money.

Commanders in Chief Sailing and Fighting Instructions
Following the Anglo-Dutch Wars, newly revised fighting instructions were
issued in 1678, 1688, 1690, 1691, 1695, 1702, and 1703. Many of these
revisions allowed for additional initiative on the part of the local commander.
The first fleet-wide sailing and fighting instructions were issued during the reign
of William and Mary (1689-1702). Although the actual date of their publication
is not known precisely, the instructions followed generally those previously
issued in 1672-1673.
During the War of the League of Augsburg (1688-1697), the French
managed to unite their Toulon and Brest fleets into one fighting unit. The
numerically inferior English elected initially to maintain a Mfleet-in-being" until
detached units could return to bolster their defense. The concept of a fleet-in
being called for a numerically inferior force to remain in port from which it
would threaten to sortie. Since it did not seek engagement, the effectiveness of
the concept would depend upon the enemy's perception of its combat

capability-it served more as a deterrent than a true fighting force. If the

fleet-in-being could deter the French from invading England, then it would be

a successful use of assets. The Crown, however, disagreed with the concept,

and a combined English and Dutch fleet sortied under Admiral Lord Herbert
Torrington, who was promptly defeated at the Battle off Beachy Head
(Beveziers) in 1690 by Admiral Anne-Hilarion de Costentin, Comte de Tour
ville. Fortunately for the English, the French were unable to capitalize upon
their tactical victory.
Following successes of a combined Anglo-Dutch fleet at the 1704 Battle of
Malaga, using the line-ahead formation, the English attitude toward doctrine

4
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may have split into two camps. 10 The first camp emphasized the ability of the
line ahead to bring the maximum number of guns to bear on the enemy. Malaga
had demonstrated that victory was possible with a well-disciplined battle line,
and it naturally followed that defeat would result when this doctrine was not
followed. This first group is referred to by some historians as doctrinal "for
malists." The second group placed more emphasis on independent maneuver
and is referred to as the "meleeists." The maneuver-oriented melee doctrine
attracted some of the more dashing English commanders, who did not want to
be as bound by rules and had the skills to master the freedom of maneuver
warfare.
The first version of what eventually came to be known as the Permanent
Sailing and Fighting Instructions was issued during the reign of Queen Anne
(1702-1714), probably about the time that the Act of Union created Great
Britain. The various instructions issued by the fleet commanders in chief, and
after 1799 by the Admiralty, gradually became known as Sailing and Fighting
Instructionsfor Her Majesty's Fleet. These instructions were authoritative but
not binding on the admirals in the fleet. Although most of the fighting instruc
tions were printed by the Admiralty for use by the fleet commander in chief,
they became regulatory only when signed by the fleet admiral and issued to
subordinates. Copies of the instructions were made available to all admirals
when they hoisted their flags. Tactical orders based upon the instructions were
mandatory for the individual ship captains who were in receipt of signals drawn
from the instructions.
In 1714, a private publisher produced an unofficial book that enhanced the
presentation, and presumably the comprehensibility, of the signals portion of
the formal fighting instructions. Jonathan Greenwood's The Sailing and Fight

ing Instructions, or Signals as They Are Observed in the Royal Navy of Great
Britain even added signals not currently in use by the fleet. This unofficial

publication was adopted by at least one Mediterranean fleet commander.
Private publications of a doctrinal nature had appeared earlier in Britain. For
example, The Seaman's Vade-Mecum and Defensive War at Sea (1700)
developed recommendations for the defense of merchant shipping, including
convoys. Convoy defense doctrine in this era was quite sophisticated; it was
understood that the role of the escort was to sacrifice itself, if necessary, to allow
the merchants to escape. Parliament passed the Cruisers and Convoys Act in
1708, resulting in instructions for the proper interaction of merchants and
commanders of warships.
During the first part of the eighteenth century, the commanders in chief's
fighting instructions were not routinely revised, presumably because none of

5
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the maritime campaigns lasted long enough to warrant such reconsideration.
Hence, there were no major technological breakthroughs. On the other hand,
additional instructions, also doctrinal in nature, were issued by the fleet com
manders, flrst in 1678 and regularly after 1710. These additional instructions

were as important as the main flghting instructions but were issued by local
commanders who were then held accountable for their use. IT validated by
combat success, additional instructions could lead to additional deviations.
Unfortunately, when the additional instructions were not validated in combat,
and the flghting instructions provided an alternative course of action, they might
also provide justification for punishment by court-martial.

Developments during the Wars against the French
Monarchy
Courts-martial for combat failure while not adhering to the existing flghting
instructions were an ever-present threat to the commander in the Royal Navy
during the long years of war with the French. There was an infamous case of
doctrinaire adherence to "keeping the line" above all costs at the disastrous
February 1744 battle off Toulon. Admiral Thomas Mathews, maneuvering in
what was virtually a line abreast, had expected his subordinate, Vice Admiral
Richard Lestock, to use common sense and engage the enemy when Mathews
signaled an attack. Lestock, "confused" by Mathews' continued flying of the
signal for line ahead, maintained his station in line ahead and failed to join the
engagement quickly. Mathews had him arrested.
Complicating the problem was Admiral Mathews' failure to get his fleet into
proper station on the previous night. Mathews had in fact issued the proper
orders, but his subordinates had failed to execute them, and the fleet became
further dispersed. The next day, Vice Admiral Lestock ignored some of
Mathews' instructions to increase sail and get into line-ahead position more

quickly; indeed he actually shortened sail on two occasions. Mathews and
Lestock were not on the best of terms before the battle, hence the failures at
Toulon are a bit more complex than whether or not offlcers adhered blindly to
doctrine in lieu of common sense.
At the court-martial, Lestock was exonerated because he had followed his
commander's primary signal (line ahead) during an extremely confusing
engagement of changing and conflicting signals and maneuvers. Mathews was
cashiered instead-due primarily to the escape of the Franco-Spanish fleet
under Admiral La Bruyere de Court. Four captains who had exercised initiative

6
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under conflicting signals and maneuvers, therein deviating from the standard
and additional instructions, were also cashiered.
The scandal of Toulon provoked reform, and new instructions for the
Mediterranean fleet were prepared to alleviate future confusion. Mutual support
was to take precedence over maintenance of the battle line. Abandonment of
the line ahead in favor of the general chase was sanctioned when the enemy
fleet was markedly inferior, disabled, or "on the run." Of course, if the admiral
gave signal for the general chase and failed, he would still be subject to close
after-action scrutiny by a court-martial.
During the First Battle off Cape Finisterre in 1 747, Admiral Baron George
Anson took advantage of existing loopholes in the fighting instructions regard
ing maintenance of the line ahead. Even though he used the general chase, he
avoided court-martial because he defeated the French and captured numerous
convoy merchants. Admiral Sir Edward Hawke ordered a general chase in the
successful Second Battle off Cape Finisterre ( 1 747). New additional instruc
tions followed, further refining and clarifying the doctrine contained in the
fighting instructions.

As a result of Parliament intervention, joint doctrine developed extensively
during the Seven Years' War ( 1 756-1763). William Pitt, Secretary of State and
leader of the House of Commons, ordered his generals and admirals to
cooperate, which they did with remarkable success. Elaborate written doctrine
was prepared for the transport, protection, disembarkment, and support for
ground troops, and it was used successfully in the captures of Louisbourg

(1758), Quebec (1759), and Belle Isle (1761). This followed the disastrous
performance in Admiral Edward Vernon's and General Wentworth's abortive
amphibious operations against Cartagena ( 1 740- 1 74 1 ).
There was also additional doctrine developed for blockading and observation
squadrons as well as for the interdiction of ships undertaking to leave a port.
Much of this doctrinal development was published in the form of private signal

books for which there was no official commander in chief or Admiralty
sanction. The successful telegraph signals system that later supported Admiral

Lord Horatio Nelson at Trafalgar had its birth in the privately published
doctrinal and signal development that took place during this era.

In

a celebrated Seven Years' War episode of failure that was tied to the

fighting instructions, the British in 1756 failed to engage fully a French fleet
off Minorca that was supporting the landing of a ground force, and which
resulted in the eventual loss of the garrison. The British admiral, Sir John Byng,
was eventually shot for his performance during this episode, but not for failing
to follow the existing fighting instructions, although that certainly was a major

7
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element of the prosecution's case. I I Byng had in fact deviated from the fighting
instructions in his plan of attack at Minorca. However, he was shot simply
because he failed to gain a victory when one was needed-a British force in
America, under the command of General Edward Braddock, had just suffered
a major loss to the French and Indians. The second major defeat, at Minorca,
threatened the British government, which at the time also was sensitive to
charges that it had not provided Byng with enough ships.
Simply put, a scapegoat was needed. Braddock had been killed in Pennsyl
vania, and Byng was available. The court-martial found Byng guilty of failing
to "do his utmost" either to defeat the French fleet or relieve the garrison on
Minorca; a law of 1749 mandated the death penalty for admirals who failed to
try hard enough. A review of the tactical situation, however, can lead one to the
conclusion that neither defeat of the enemy fleet nor relief of the Minorca
garrison was possible and that even had Byng fully engaged the French, and
had his plan been properly executed by his captains, victory was by no means
certain. In fact, compounding the difficulties he had in signaling intentions from
the rear of the fonnation were signal books that did not contain provisions for
exactly what he intended. Byng further complicated the matter, like Mathews
at Toulon, by continuing to fly the line-ahead flag while simultaneously
signaling to engage and maneuvering for a nearly line-abreast attack against a
well-fonned enemy line.
The shooting of Byng had major repercussions throughout the Royal Navy.
It did not, however, make the fighting instructions dogmatic; it had the opposite
effect. Admiral Hawke's victory at Quiberon Bay (1759) was due in part to his
courageous decision to initiate a chase before properly fonning into a battle
line. This victory had strategic implications; the loss of their escort force ended
French plans to transport ground forces from Quebec to Europe for an invasion
of England. Concurrent with the French loss in 1759 at the Battle of Lagos
(again due to a general chase rather than line ahead) and the loss of Quebec in
that same year, the result of Quiberon was a shift in the war's focus from
contesting control of the seas to applying real power from the sea to the shore.
Common sense was introduced into subsequent courts-martial that con
cerned failure to follow doctrine. Admiral Augustus Keppel was exonerated for
failing to follow the fighting instructions: he did not "waste" time to fonn a
battle line (directly engaging Admiral Louis Guillouet, Comte d'Orvilliers) and
failed to "do his utmost" (the fleets passed each other on opposite tracks at the
Battle of Ushant in 1778 where Keppel was defeated).
Another private doctrinal book, Naval Evolutions: Or a System of Sea
Discipline (1762), was published by Lieutenant Charles O'Bryen, Royal Navy.
8
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This boo k was based largely on Pere Paul Hoste's L 'Art des armees navales ou
traite des evolutions navales (1697). Although the translation of the French
extracts was poor, and the experiences of the recent Seven Years' War tended
to discount much of the doctrine, it signaled a growing desire by fleet officers
to have a tactical manual in boo k format.
The publication of then-Captain Sebastien Fran�ois de Bigot, Vicomte de
Morogues' Tactique navale ou traite des evolutions et des sig naux in 1763 was
noticed not only in Paris but also in London. Within four years, it had been
privately translated into English-probably by Charles or Christopher
O'Bryen. Like O'Bryen's earlier work, only sections were translated, and the
quality of the translation was poor. The translation of Morogues' work included
an additional section on fighting at sea, probably written by one of the seagoing
O'Bryen family.
A movement commenced to capitalize on these privately published doctrinal
books by officially revising the fighting instructions. However, no one on active
duty was willing to take on the commanders in chief; hence the standing fighting
instructions were allowed to languish "as is," and local commanders continued
to issue and revise additional instructions. These additional instructions indi
cated a growth in doctrine that capitalized upon the lessons of the Seven Years'

War. Finally, the Admiralty itself issued a supplement to the standing fighting

instructions codifying local practice, thus avoiding a debate over existing
-articles versus established procedures in the fleet. Left unsettled was the
proliferation of tactical doctrine and sailing and fighting instructions by both
the commanders in chief and private individuals-all in use by commanders at
sea.
During the opening days of the American War of Independence, Admiral
Lord Richard Howe, commander of the British fleet in North America, pub
lished his own quite sophisticated signals book. Unlike the standing fighting
instructions provided by the Admiralty, Howe's Instructions/or the Conduct
0/ the Ships 0/ War, Explanatory of, and Relative to the Sig nals contained in
the Signal-Book Herewith Delivered (1776) consisted of standing orders,
explanations of tactical ideas, and standardized signaling evolutions. Howe
adopted some innovative maneuvers for the execution of the battle line. He
issued additional instructions the next year with further emphasis on the role of
the individual commanding officer.
Taken as a whole, the system of fighting instructions by that time in force

off North America was so complex that an extensive period of instruction and

exercises would have been required before the fleet could respond to the
directions of its commander. There is evidence that Howe held regular meetings

9
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of his admirals and captains so that he could explain his doctrine, and also that
he exercised them regularly as well. Howe issued additional instructions in 1778
that formed the basis of a reconnaissance system later adopted by Nelson before
Trafalgar. By the end ofhis service in North America in 1778, Howe had created
the system of instructions and signals that he would subsequently use while in
command of the Channel Fleet.

A Set of Signals for a Fleet on a Plan Entirely New (1777), by Lieutenant
Sir Charles Henry Knowles, another privately published

book,

used the best

parts of Morogues' Tactique navale ou traite des evolutions et des signaux and
provided for actions by fleets or separate divisions. In his subsequent Fighting

and Sailing Instructions, published in 1798, although written in 1780, Knowles
expanded upon individual ship engagements to a degree that foreshadowed
Nelson.
Rear Admiral Richard Kempenfelt, chief of staff of the Channel Fleet,
embarked singlehandedly in 1779 on the most ambitious tactical reforms ever
undertaken by any one officer in history. During a twenty-seven-month period,
he issued more signal

books and

fighting instructions than anyone before or

after him. Many of the instructions were influenced by Howe; one was an exact
copy of a signal book used by the French. It was, however, not their centralized
version but rather a separate system adopted by Rear Admiral Fran�ois Joseph

Paul, Comte de G rasse -Tilly (an officer to whom the Untied States owes a great

debt). Kempenfelt blended the best of Howe and the French into a system of
instructions and signals that allowed for greater control over a larger fleet in
fighting a well-disciplined opponent.
Innovations were generally confmed to the Channel Fleet. Despite Howe's
earlier efforts in North America, officers subsequently assigned to those waters

and to the West and East Indies generally reverted to the combat-proven fighting
instructions and supplemental instructions that were issued. Natural conser
vatism as well as primitive communications hampered transmission of new
ideas from Europe to the far-flung reaches of the empire. Also, the commanders
in those distant stations had their own ideas about how to defeat the French, and
the Channel Fleet had yet to prove the value of its innovations in major combat.
Admiral Lord George Brydges Rodney was a commander who was willing
to test the waters with new doctrine. Departing European waters with a
considerable portion of the Channel Fleet, Rodney seized the opportunity to
attack a Spanish convoy and then a Spanish squadron at the Battle of Cape St.
Vincent, also known as the "Moonlight Battle" and the Battle of Santa Maria

(1780). Rodney used the new freedom to his advantage-he signaled a general
chase instead of maintaining the battle line. After his arrival in Caribbean

10
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waters, Rodney met a French squadron at Martinique (1780), but he failed to
bring on a successful engagement. Rodney censured his captains for failing to
break tradition and execute a melie, and he subsequently drilled them in his
doctrine.
A series of doctrinal issues being debated at the time included:
•

Should the admiral ride in the van, at the center, or outside the line?

•

Should he sail in a heavily anned ship of the line or in a fast frigate?

Shifting the flag to a frigate had been tried by Lord Howe off Rhode Island in

1778, and Admiral Sir George Rodney did the same off Martinique in 1780.
Following de Grasse's capture at the Saints (1782), French doctrine changed to
require that commanders in chief fight from frigates. Generally, the British
ended their experimentation by allocating a place for the admiral to occupy in
a heavily anned ship at the center.
The new doctrine of giving precedence to local instructions was not
foolproof; the defeat of Admiral Lord Thomas Graves at the Battle off the
Virginia Capes (1781) can be explained in part by the lack of clarity in local
doctrine. Graves had only recently taken command of the North America station
and had yet to hold a meeting with his commanders to explain his views on
doctrine and signals. Furthennore, ships of the West Indies and North American
squadrons had been using different signal books. When Admiral Samuel
Viscount Hood failed to use common sense and engage de Grasse despite
confusing signals, he knew the defense of his actions rested in his strict
adherence to the precise signals flown by Graves. This all sounds remarkably
like Mathews and Lestock at Toulon and very unlike what would take place at
Trafalgar. Graves' failure to attack Admiral de Grasse until the French had
sortied from their anchorage was something else that would not be repeated by
Nelson, at the Nile.
John Clerk of Elden, a retired merchant from Edinburgh, analyzed the naval
tactical issues of the day and wrote an Essay on Naval Tactics in 1782. This
essay pointed out the superiority of the French system in particular respects and
recommended concentrating strength against weakness-specifically against
only a portion of the enemy's line. In fact, this tactic was used by Rodney in

his successful and very significant victory in the Battle of the Saints that same
year, resulting in the capture and disgrace of de Grasse. Rodney failed to exploit
the victory fully, indicating that even innovative commanders were still some
what conservative. Discipline was still so great at this time that, although some
of his advance ships were in a position to fire on French ships being chased at
the Battle of the Saints, Hood denied permission to fire, since he had not been
granted pennission to do so by his own senior, Admiral Rodney.
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Although Clerk claimed credit for influencing Rodney's action, in point of
fact Rodney did not plan to break the line, nor was such a maneuver new.
Nevertheless, the victory at the Saints was the Royal Navy's major success
during this phase of the long war with France, and after that, Rodney's supposed
action and Clerk's book took on a life of their own. Clerk was well connected
socially in higher naval circles and had access to the evidence presented at the
various courts-martial resulting from important battles. His analysis and logic
were sound. Independently wealthy and with no official connections to the
Admiralty, Clerk was able to write his own views without fear of reprisal or
[mancial ruin. Although Clerk's book was a direct attack on the fighting
instructions, it had an influence on British naval thinking. 13 It was decidedly

offensive in its orientation. One of the commanders who favored it was Admiral
Lord Horatio Nelson, who reportedly had his chaplain read it to him.
The loss of the North American colonies and Howe's assignment to the
Admiralty from

1783-1788

stimulated further doctrinal reform in the Royal

Navy. A number of fighting and additional instructions were issued and
reissued. Captain Jacques Bourde de Villehuet's

1765 Le manoeuvrier ou essai

sur La theorie et La pratique des mouvements du navire et des evolutions navales
and Commodore Jurien, Vicomte de Grenier's

1787 L 'art de La guerre sur mer,
1787-

ou tactique navale were fully and accurately translated into English in

1788. The latter is one of the most masterful books on tactics written during the

age of sail, and it challenged fully the dogma of the line ahead.

Doctrine during Wars against the French Republic
The privately published Signal Bookfor the Ships of War (1790) was issued
to the Channel Fleet, thus capping Howe's long process of doctrinal reform.
Howe experimented with this revised doctrine and signals during the summer
of

1790 Channel Fleet exercises. By the end of that year, Howe retired, and the

mantle of doctrinal reform fell to the new commander, Lord Hood. Hood was
more interested in fleet discipline and station-keeping than in doctrinal reform.
He held exercises in

1792

to drill his captains in accordance with his version

of doctrine and signals, which did not include many of the innovations permitted
by his predecessor.
With the outbreak of war with France in

1793, Howe was recalled and once

again took command of the Channel Fleet. By now Howe had lost some of his
enthusiasm for reform and agreed that until his captains could perform basic
tasks in accordance with standing doctrine, there would be no need to grant
them a freer hand. Howe led a well-disciplined and recently exercised Channel
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Fleet against the Brest fleet of Rear Admiral Louis Thomas, Comte de Villaret
14
de Joyeuse, in the Battle of the First of June, 1794. Villaret de Joyeuse had

been a lieutenant at the time of the French Revolution (1789), as were his fellow

flag officers. Most of the French captains had been very junior officers, captains
or mates of merchant ships, and a few of them had bee n enlisted men. The
perfonnance of the Brest fleet against the well-trained British and their able
commander speaks well of Villaret de Joyeuse's leadership abilities and the
value of fighting spirit in combat.
The "Glorious First of June" was fought continuously over five days and
four nights. Howe employed the new idea of separating an advance squadron
from the main battle fleet, which could provide intelligence and act as a tactical
reserve. Whereas at that time the preferred method for breaking the line was to
concentrate mass upon a single vulnerable point, at the Battle of the First of
June, Lord Howe had his whole fleet cut through the line simultaneously at all
points, cutting between the sterns and bows of the nearest enemy ships. The
tactic allowed the British to engage on the lee side, on which the French had
neither loaded nor fully manned their guns. The tactic also was a hedge against
the French escaping to leeward. Howe deserves credit as an innovative tactician,
a signals specialist, and a successful commander in battle who never lost sight
of the need to defeat the enemy fleet.
At the battle's end, Howe was triumphant with a victory unparalleled in the
past one hundred years. Six French ships of the line were carried off to Spithead;
one had been sunk. and the melie had allowed superior British gunnery to wreak
havoc among the survivors. On the other hand, the French convoy of 130 ships
bringing supplies from America had been allowed to escape and enter port;
indeed, not a single British ship appears even to have laid eyes on the convoy.
Furthennore, Howe failed to exploit fully the victory, as had Rodney at the
Saints, but with more excuse-the length of the battle, Howe's age (then 68),
and damage to the British fleet inflicted by the French.

This British success was followed by the fonnation of a combined Anglo
Portuguese fleet. Howe's Ordersfor Combined Fleet essentially envisioned the
new squadron as a separate maneuver unit. Given his recent success with the
disciplined Channel Fleet, it is no wonder that Howe did not attempt to integrate
fully the Portuguese. There was from 1793 to 1795 a fennent of tactical and
signaling developments comparable to that during the American War of Inde
pendence. It culminated in January 1796 with the issuance by Sir John Jervis,
commander of the Mediterranean Fleet, of a Secret Instruction containing
innovative tactical options. Jervis planned to unleash his captains in a general
melee once he had broken the enemy line and its ships had become separated
13
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and disorganized. Jervis also adopted the advance squadron concept used by
Howe at the Glorious First of June.

Jervis' faith in the superiority of his captains was warran ted. The next period

of British tactical successes was due in part to the bold actions of some leading
and extremely confident local commanders. Rear Admiral Sir William
Cornwallis, commander of a small squadron attacked by the Brest fleet off
Belle-tIe (1795), fought on the offensive and succeeded in convincing the
French that additional ships were en route. Then-Captain Horatio Nelson
showed his aggressive fighting spirit during a series of minor engagements in
the Mediterranean that same year. These battles were not of themselves impor
tant, but they began to establish Nelson as a commander who sought to exploit
immediate tactical victories.
At the Battle of Cape St. Vincent (1797), where his well-trained Mediter
ranean Fleet attacked a Spanish force having nearly twice the firepower, Jervis
demonstrated superior seamanship, innovation, and good judgment in separat
ing the convoy from its escorts. Seeing an opportunity to deviate from the battle
line, Jervis signaled to his flag officers (who included Nelson, a commodore)
and captains to form whatever formations they wished in order to exploit their
tactical advantage. Nelson, who had anticipated this signal, captured two ships
and boldly engaged the flagship, which had nearly twice as many guns and was
the most powerful ship afloat. Jervis chose not to report that Nelson's success
in taking advantage of an excellent tactical opportunity had been due to his
exceeding his signaled authority, thus disobeying orders. 15
The authorship of another privately published doctrinal book, A System of
Naval Tactics, which appeared in 1797, is attributed to D. Steel. 16 Much of the
document was a reworking of works by Pere Paul Hoste and Bourde de
Villehuet. The section of the book that dealt with the Royal Navy was a more
readable version of Howe's fighting and sailing instructions without any
reference to engaging the enemy. Apparently the security of one's fighting
instructions was becoming a concern. In 1798 Parliament got into the act of
naval doctrine again, passing a law that made convoying compUlsory.

In late 1797, Britain secured one of its most notable victories of the era.
Admiral Adam Duncan, first Viscount of Duncan, employed extremely aggres
sive tactics and an offensive fighting spirit in thoroughly defeating a Dutch fleet
at the Battle of Camperdown. Duncan made good use of tactical signals to
outsail the Dutch and bring his superior firepower to bear as rapidly as possible.
Because of the fast tempo of the battle and the inferiority of their ships, the
Dutch were overwhelmed before they could escape to leeward into coastal
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waters. Duncan's attack, in columns of two, splitting the Dutch line from the
weather side, was to be repeated by Nelson at Trafalgar.

In 1799, the responsibility for the publication of the fighting instructions
went to the Admiralty, where it remained until 1914 when it reverted back to
the fleet commanders in chief. The doctrine published in the Signal Bookfor

Ships of War, 1799, continued to stress the line ahead, despite current practice

in the fleet and combat successes with the meLee. These fighting instructions
were mandatory for the fleet, although the cunning Nelson was able to justify
deviations when circumstances and his personal views conflicted with them.

The Nelson "Touch"
Rear Admiral Nelson's victory over the French at the Battle of the Nile

(1798) gave the British their greatest victory in over one hundred years. Not
on1y did Nelson benefit from major errors committed by the French com
mander, Admiral Fran�ois Paul Brueys d'Aiguilliers, who tried to fight on the
defensive, but he exhibited true genius in a daring night attack of a rapid tempo
that overwhelmed his opponent. Vice Admiral Nelson's next victory was over
the Danish at Copenhagen (1801), where he was pitted against a maldeployed
stationary fleet and fortifications operating under a defensive doctrine. Al
though he was in range of their shore batteries the night before the battle, Nelson
held a dinner party aboard his flagship. His detailed and written orders, outlining
the plan of attack in accordance with the newly issued Admiralty day signal
book, were given to each of his captains.
The plethora of newly issued signal books was not universally popular in the
fleet, since the books did not allow communication of complex ideas. Sir Home
Popham, an officer who would later rise to the rank of admiral, created an

innovative and unofficial system of telegraphic signals that made use of

numbers and later letters to substitute for words and phrases that combined to
make sentences. This new system gave the admiral a powerful tool. Popham's
model became an instant success in the fleet, although he was wise enough to
disclaim it as a mere adjunct to the official system and thus avoid a fonnal
confrontation with the Admiralty. Nelson fonnally adopted Popham's system

of signals in 1803 and made full use of it off Toulon in the subsequently renewed
war with France.
A series of minor engagements followed the renewal of warfare, but the
major concern in Britain was invasion. By a series of fleet maneuvers, the Royal
Navy deterred any invasion of the British Isles. With over 150,000 troops
assembled with a transport fleet that was unable to sail across the Channel due
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to the presence of the Royal Navy, Napo leon had to abandon his plan. The
French fleet was unable to mass in sufficient numbers to meet the challenge.
The most celebrated of all battles in the age of sail, Trafalgar (1805), pitted
a well-equipped fleet and combat-experienced commanders against the com
bined Franco-Spanish fleet, which had neither adequate training nor well-fitted
ships. 17 Nelson imbued his spirit of the offensive into every one of his captains.
His written plan of attack made his objectives very clear-complete destruction,
not taking ships for the prize money.
Nelson intended to form into two parallel columns in line ahead, with himself
and his second in command leading the charge (in violation of Admiralty
doctrine), and then to close boldly the combined fleet as rapidly as possible,
making it more difficult to be hit and minimizing the time British ships would
be exposed to defensive fire. A rapid attack would also minimize the chances
that the combined fleet could escape to leeward. Nelson also planned to conceal
the points of his main attack until the last possible minute. Once his two
squadrons broke through the enemy line, the aim was to concentrate offensive
strength against the weakness of the split enemy fleet. Nelson improved upon
this French concept of strength against weakness with another French concept,
the pe[otoTlS, assigning specific tasks for specific portions of the fleet. This was
a replacement of the now-centralized formalist doctrine of maintaining the line
Nelson envisioned, not with just a signal for general chase but in fact with a
new local doctrine of guerre d outrance (war to the extreme) . Based upon his
previous battle experience against the French, Nelson felt that he could go
beyond the general chase authority granted in the fighting instructions. This
would not be possible against all enemies, but it was appropriate at this time
and place.
The selection of the time and place of his attack was facilitated by a superior
reconnaissance plan aided by Popham's new signalling system. Nelson also
used an advance squadron that could, if necessary, engage the enemy until such
time as the main battle fleet arrived.
Nelson generally followed his battle plan and, although both sides fought
bravely, the resulting melie was a rout of the combined fleet. The reasons for
victory were, the superiority of artillery and gunnery by the British, �eir
superiority at maneuver and mutual support, and the generally inferior condition
of the combined fleet. The British fleet never formed properly into two columns
in line ahead; proper formation was subordinated to the offensive spirit and
tempo; keeping the battle line was no longer all-important. Speed allowed the
British to survive the charge directly into the teeth of an enemy, who had in
effect "crossed Nelson's T."
16
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Doctrine, of course, was used by Nelson, but often in a non-written fonn,
reflecting his decentralized philosophy of command and control that peaked at

Trafalgar. As Nelson 's experience grew, in lieu of fonnal signals and tight
control during battle, he relied on, a series of meetings with his commanders
before the coming battle. In these discuss i ons he communicated his perception
of the alternative courses the battle might take and the basic actions that were
8
to be expected . 1 His famous line from his pre-battle memorandum-"No
captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy" -is
typical of a doctrinal style that matched his personal abi lities as a charismatic
leader, abilities atypical of commanders in the age of sail. 1 9

Nelson's success w as due i n part to his style of doctrine-unwritten but clear

in the minds of his subordinate commanders. It proved extremely effective.

20

Whereas Nelson's signal to fonn into two columns, flown at the beginning of
the Trafalgar battle, might be misinterpreted today as precise instructions to be
followed to the letter, his captains knew how to interpret it properly. They
continued to close the enemy at all possible speed , while simultaneously
attempting to fonn into two columns in " irregular line-ahead. " This was not the
type of behavior witnessed at Toulon

( 1744) or off the

Virginia Capes

( 1 78 1 ).

Nelson 's decision-making process w as more intuitive than analytic, but this
should not imply that he improvised in the middle of the battle. On the contrary,
he planned his battles using both his intuitive and analytic skills. Nelson was
convinced that, with the proper attitude and sufficiently equipped and trained
force, one need only wade into the enemy. This had been the essence of Jervis '

Secret Instruction

of

1 796.

Indeed, none of the maneuvers that Nelson

employed at Trafalgar were new; all had been anticipated by Villeneuve. On
the other hand, Nelson did not give his subordinates an entirely free hand.
There is more to Nelson 's success than good doctrine and well-trained forces.
There is the intangible factor of Nelson 's own charismatic personality, which
inspired men to greatness. Where others sought to use the signal boo k to bring

order to the battle space, Nelson strove for chaos-within the bounds of
capabilities and shaped by his personal doctrine. Nelson is thus an aberration
who escaped successfully the confinement of the era's paradigm and embraced
the "fog of war" as an ally.
The Admiralty signal boo ks and fighting instructions issued by Admiral

Popham after Trafalgar made use of the tactical innovations initiated by Nelson

at the Nile and Trafalgar, but their authors never understood the conditions that
made such innovations poss i ble. Nelson 's successors attempted to emulate the
"Nelson Touch" with their own doctrinal writings, but they could not possibly
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capture the essence of his brilliance in any signal book. Simply pu� the style of
warfare practiced at Trafalgar was the correct style for a particular set of
circumstances and a uniquely charismatic leader, one whose essence could
never be "bottled," The myth of the "Nelson Touch" and the attempt to duplicate
it is one of the major themes around which one can study later developments
in the Royal Navy.

The

End of the Age of Sail

Written doctrine in the form of fighting instructions gradually fell into disuse.
When faced with an enemy that did not use rigid and effective tactics based
upon sound doctrine, there was no need for the Royal Navy to do so either. If
defenses were not skillfully prepared, there was no need for skillfully prepared
offenses. The attacker needed merely to be unleashed and pointed in the right
direction,

In

1 809, in

what would prove to be one of a long string of amphibious

failures, the British mounted the largest (to date) invasion of the Dutch coast.
Designed to put pressure on Napoleon's rear and thus support the Austrian
allies, the assault on Walcheren Island involved some forty thousand troops,
four hundred transports and almost two hundred naval escorts. The force was
evacuated eventually, and the operation stands as a case of mismatched political
objectives and military operations and of poo r planning for a joint operation.
The last major British naval victory in the age of sail was the controversial
Battle of Navarino ( 1 827).

21 A mere twelve years after Waterloo, Navarino saw

the French, British, and Russians allied for one battle against three Turkish,
Egyptian, and Tunisian squadrons. The three European squadrons fought on
the offensive against Muslim ships that, under Admiral Ibrahim Pasha, were
anchored in a defensive formation. The battle resulted in total annihi lation of
the Turkish fleet and the liberation of Greece. Unfortunately, Vice Admiral Sir
Edward Codrington ' s victory so embarrassed the Turks that it became
diplomatically expedient that he be recalled home; his career was ruined.
During the long wars with the Continental powers in Europe, British naval
doctrine was, primarily, to engage the enemy fleet-to either destroy it (to sink
a wooden warship was exceedingly difficult) or to capture enemy ships as

prizes. Britain essentially sought general command of the seas via warfare of
annihilation. If required to defend a convoy or a landing force, naval doctrine

called for the escort force to engage offensively the enemy fleet, posing a threat
rather than adopting a defensive position. If tasked to neutralize a threat of
invasion, the fleet would engage offensively the enemy fleet posing a threat.
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And to eliminate the source of power of a maritime nation, doctrine called for
the destruction of the enemy fleet ftrst and only then exploitation of command
of the sea by attacking merchant shipping.
The primary tactics of the Royal Navy were to attack on the offensive from
the windward side and then attempt to breach the ship's hull, kill the crew with
aimed gunftre and-only if necessary-engage in close combat. In general,
formal doctrine called for the strict maintenance of the line ahead, with
deviations tacitly approved after the fact when commanders were successful.
Between Toulon ( 1 744) and the Saints ( 1782), the British fought thirteen battles
to a draw, using linear tactics, while they obtained six victories by abandoning
the line-clear evidence of the need to ensure that successful fleet lessons
learned are accepted as new doctrine.
The Admiralty was not oblivious to these statistics. The issue was that if one
formed the line ahead, one would be more likely to avoid defeat than if one
abandoned the line. Hence the line ahead gave the commander his best guaran
tee of not failing, even though he might not succeed. The personality of many
of England's leading commanders was such that they felt their individual
initiative, skill, and spirit allowed them to abandon the safety of the conservative
formalist school of doctrine in favor of the melie.

The Age

of the Ironclad

Although maritime technology advanced in the form of steam and the screw
propeller, it was some time before the Royal Navy took the next step, that of
ironclads. The simple reason appears to be that the role of oceanic policeman
against lower technology forces could be carried out with the old wooden ships
of sail. Even when the Navy adopted the new technologies, the absence of
continuous warfare put tactical and doctrinal innovation into the schoolhouse
and not the active fleet. Small detached units were left to improvise their own
local doctrine, which they did successfully. Technological improvements now
allowed more certainty (contrasted to the uncertainty of sailing via wind power)
and more distant control (via signals) as this era progressed. The improved
signalling capabilities may have played a role in the downfall of doctrinal
development-after all, why take local initiative when the admiral (later the
Admiralty) will send orders directly?
With the formation of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence
Studies (or RUSI) in 1 83 1 , an unofficial forum was created for the discussion
of military issues. RUSI began publishing a journal in 1 859, creating a vehicle
for the publication of new ideas. Journals and societies such as these flourished
19
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throughout the world, and they provided an arena for doctrinal development
22
not under the thumb of official Navy bureaucracy.
Similarly , the Naval
Records Society (founded 1893) allowed scholars to research documents from
Royal Navy history . Pere Paul Hoste's L 'Art des armees navales ou traite des
evolutions navales (1 697) was again (hut this time fully) translated into English,

in 1834, by Captain J.D. Boswall, Royal Navy.

In 1 843 and 1846, Captain C.R. Moorsom, Royal Navy, published two brief
works on naval tactics, which included a section on the actions between
steamships . Moorsom was later promoted to vice admiral ; since he had not been
to sea since the 1820s,

23

his subsequent Organization and Maneuvers ofSteam

Fleets ( 1 856) built on these early ideas. Although his recommendations were,

as far as is known, never employed in practice, a modification was included to
subsequent versions of the general signal boo k. The 1 857 French Ministry of
Marine's Tactique navale, for both sail and steamships, was translated in 1 859
for the benefit of Royal Navy officers. Additional privately published boo ks ,
such as Sir Howard Douglas' Naval Warfare with Steam (1 859), appeared on
steamers in combat, but no changes were made in Admiralty fighting instruc
tions. On the other hand, the Battle of Lissa ( 1866) gave primacy to develop
ment of the ram rather than the gun.
The impact of the ironclad was to raise once again the specter of invasion by
24
France. It was claimed that steam had "bridged the Channel" and that thirty
thousand Frenchmen could rush across in a single night. The result of this
technological innovation was a shift in strategy rather than doctrine. No longer
would the Royal Navy alone be sufficient for defense of the realm, but a sizeable
portion of the standing anny would have to garrison the coastline as wel l.
Doctrinal development continued under the auspices of Admiral Sir Geof
frey Phipps Hornby. While in command of the British Flying Squadron ( 1869-

187 1), he experimented with tactics under steam. Hornby appears to have been
the first flag officer to arrange for the ironclads of the Chann e l Squadron (which
he commanded from 1 872- 1 875) to act as pelotons, or separate tactical groups.
The Admiralty approved of his concepts in 1874 and incorporated them into its
signal book of 1 879 . Unofficial writings on naval doctrine continued to
be sponsored by various professional associations that offered prizes as
inducements for creative thinking and writing. It is of some small note that after
the Royal Navy swept the seas of its enemies, it turned to scientific research
25
and pursuit of discoveries. This parallels somewhat the more recent shift in
the U.S. Navy to military operations other than war-which include environ
mental concerns.
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The next major expression of formal doctrinal thought was introduced in the
writings of Vice Admiral Philip Colomb. The older of two brothers (both of
whom wrote about naval matters), Philip retired from active service and took
a position as an instructor at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich. While a
commander, Philip had studied the results of the Battle of Lissa and nearly, but
not totally, embraced the primacy of the ram over the gun. His later research
efforts and writing concentrated on the science of naval tactics. Philip's
approach was inductive, with due credit given reasoning, experience, and

Naval Warfare: Its Ruling
Principles and Practice Historically Treated, first published in 1 89 1 .
Naval Warfare is more than a doctrinal book . It contains rich discussions

history. Philip Colomb's maj or contribution was

about strategy, is unabashedly pro-Navy, and parallels the work done in the
United States by Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (which generally eclipsed
Colomb's efforts). Within the pages of Naval

Warfare one can fmd the doctrinal

concepts of decisive battle, blockade, and fleets-in-being as means to assure
command of the sea and, thereby, defense of the homeland, defense of sea lines
of communications, and the ability to move the army overseas for offensive
action. Colomb followed this work with his shorter

Essays on Naval Defence

( 1 896), reprinting a series of chapters, articles, and lectures at RUSI.
Colomb's and Mahan's writings in favor of warfare by annihilation, the
decisive battle, and an offensive doctrine met with favor among those of the

material school, like Admiral Lord John Fisher, who favored the expansion of
the Royal Navy and development of the dreadnought. These writings may not
have been official Admiralty doctrine, but they were certainly internalized by
the officer corps and accepted as unofficial doctrine representing the preferred
views about war. To put it simply, for the

material school, war was reduced to

a technical problem with mathematical and mechanical solutions; war should
be fought on the offensive with superior weapons, since the new likely enemy
(Germany) would have at least technological parity and maybe technological
superiority.
No recounting of doctrinal development in the Royal Navy during the
Victorian-era would be complete without mention of Vice Admiral Sir

Victoria after her col lision with
Camperdown in 1 893. Tryon had been an advocate of independent steaming
and command initiative instead of orchestrated maneuvering by pelotons in

George Tryon, Royal Navy, and the loss of

accordance with signal boo ks . With the blame for the collision attributed to his
unorthodox ideas, it was inevitable that Tryon 's reform efforts would also fmd
26
a watery grave.
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When Japan decided to create a Western navy, it chose to model its fleet and
doctrine on those of the British. In their first major fleet engagement, at the
battle of the Yalu ( 1 894) , the Japanese employed aggress ive British tactics in
ships, maximizing speed over armor and guns, and they decisively defeated the
Chinese. On the other hand, the Japanese did not charge, or ram, or seek a melie.

About this time the l00th anniversary of the British victory at Trafalgar

occurred. A great celebration was held, and the myth of the "Nelson touch" was

perpetuated. What was the "touch," however? Did it arise from the "band of
brothers," the myth of the offense, the undisciplined melie, or the charismatic
personality of Nelson himself? With the rapid development of new technology,
bright naval officers looked for bureaucratic success. Also, having no enemies
at sea, they turned to warfare ashore for glory. Indeed, one of the more important
of the First Sea Lords of this era, Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, earned a Victoria
27
Cross for his fighting ashore in the Sudan in 1 884.
Doctrinal development in the Navy stagnated, and it was then that the myth

of Nelson, carefully cultivated and perpetuated by Admiral Fisher, provided the
new unwritten doctrine for warfare at sea. This unwritten doctrine included
official adherence to stagnant fighting instructions, with the tacit implication
that one could do no wrong if one aggress ively engaged the enemy. Thus the
Royal Navy simultaneously embraced, with its head, the formalism of the
fighting instructions enforced by modem signals, as well as, with its heart and
soul, the aggressive and relatively unconstrained spirit of Nelson.
The next major British thinker about naval doctrine was Sir Julian Stafford
Corbett. 28 His historical analyses of doctrine, strategy, and tactics in the days

of sail are class ics: Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816 (1905), Signals and

Instructions, 1776-1794 ( 1908), and Some Principles of Maritime Strategy
( 1 9 1 1 ) . To truly understand Corbett, one must see him as advocating the
antitheses of the conventional wisdom of the time and knowing that he was

doing it. Simply put, Corbett argued against the mindless embrace of the
offensive, wars of annihilation, and the "Nelson touch," in favor of cool,
historically based analyses to investigate all forms of warfare and set maritime
operations into the context of the war as a whole.

Sir Winston Churchill noted that when he came to the Admiralty in 1 9 1 1 , he

found that there was not a single moment in the career of an officer where he
was obligated to read books on naval warfare, let alone be examined on them.
Hence, he organized the Naval War StatI to study the lessons of history and apply

them to naval war planning strategy. Corbett used history to devise permanent

"principles of maritime warfare." 1Dese efforts, however, were largely discounted
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by serving officers who felt that technology had invalidated the lessons of the
age of sail and who were otherwise captured by the spirit of Nelson.
While Corbett served as a lecturer at the Royal Naval College at Greenwich,

he published his more mainstream doctrinal thoughts in a series of classified
booklets known as "The Green Pamphlet," or more properly, the Strategic

Terms and Definitions Used in Lectures on Naval History. Although these

predate Some Principles ofMaritime Strategy, the doctrinal materials contained
in "The Green Pamphlet" are more concise and specifically addressed to a navy
audience. Written as it was by an appointed lecturer in Fisher's navy, this
booklet came close to being written doctrine, even if it was not endorsed
officially by Fisher himself. Indeed, other than the fighting instructions, there
29
were no doctrinal documents.
Corbett's writings are in fact doctrinal, and, although they were not ap
preciated by officers who were obsessed with the centrality of offense, annihila
tion, and the decisive battle, they remain of interest today. The army officer,
who was included in his audience, was far too preoccupied with mobilization

rates, short war, offensive doctrines, and rail timetables to understand the
3O
important role to be played by sea power. It is simply that there is far more
to naval warfare than seeking out and destroying an enemy fleet. Corbett
attempted to explain how initiative can be part of the defensive form of warfare
(the role that the fleet-in-being first employed in 1690), and that because of
technological innovations, surprise no longer meant escape but could now spell
31
disaster.

It is also true that sea power alone is not enough. Corbett attached importance

to joint operations. The post-Fisher Admiralty generally ignored Corbett's
theses and went so far as to put a disclaimer on his subsequent documentation
32
Despite his problems

of the Royal Navy 's performance during World War 1.

in "selling" his doctrinal message, there is a great deal of value in Corbett's
writings for any naval service making its operations more integrated with
political objectives and in concert with other services.

World War I
Britain 's naval doctrine prior to World War I stressed combined arms and
33
A good deal of flexibility was

was practiced in frequent battle maneuvers.

demonstrated by the fleet during the war, but upon occasion battle squadrons

were tied to synchronized movements en masse , as they had been in the
eighteenth century. September 1 9 1 4 marked a return to commanders in chief
having overall cognizance over the fighting instructions. New instructions,
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some hundred pages in length. entitled Grand Fleet Battle Orders. were issued
over the signature of Admiral Earl John Jellicoe.34 These fighting instructions

attempted to provide guidance for all eventualities and offered the unit com
mander very little opportunity for initiative. They were reissued several times
during the war by Jellicoe and by his successor. Admiral Sir David Beatty.35

Open discuss ions on doctrine became more difficult during the World War

I era. Discussions now took place within the Naval War Staff and involved all

of the issues that one would have expected: the proper method to meet the
challenge of an invasion. commerce protection. amphibious warfare. and fleet
engagements. Churchill was dissatisfied with anything that reeked of pass ive

defense. but he had no specific doctrine for how his preferred offensive was to
be carried out. His offhanded political direction often distressed the Admiralty.

In one such case. Rear Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock found himself

facing a superior force commanded by Admiral Graf Maximilian von Spee.36
Although his mobilized reservist crews lacked training . Cradock sought an

engagement against the Germans; he was promptly defeated at the battle of
Coronel ( 1 9 14). Churchill did not respond to Cradock's cable. which implied
he would engage a superior force. nor did he dispatch sufficient forces for

Cradock to deal with the threat. The Admiralty attempted to salvage the

situation at the last minute. but it was left to a relief effort at the battle of the
Falklands ( 1 9 14) to redress the loss.
Cradock's decision to engage the Germans was probably influenced by
public opinion that demanded something be done about German Navy raiders

as well as by the ongoing court-martial of one of his colleagues who failed to
engage a marginally superior enemy force. If the Nelsonian legacy of aggres
siveness. as informal doctrine or new strategic culture. could ever be carried

too far. it probably was at Coronel. 37 Far better to have massed sufficient forces

to have dealt with von Spee than to have suffered a humiliating defeat in the
first major sea battle since Trafalgar. The "cult of the offensive" can be

disastrous for naval forces-the defense is an honorable alternative when
appropriate. and at Coronel it would have been .

The pre-war Frenchjeune ecole and the new technologies allowing impres

sive amounts of firepower to be massed in smaller. swift. expendable forces

had an impact on the employment of the Channel Fleet during the war. When
faced with the humiliating loss of three cruisers only six weeks after the
outbreak of the war (all of which were sunk within one hour by the same

submarine) as well as the ever-present threat of the High Seas Fleet in mortal
combat. the Royal Navy wisely chose a distant. vice close. blockade. S imply

put. navies could not allow their principal fighting machines to be whittled away
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by throw-away strike forces. Essentially, the Royal Navy was replicating the
fleet-in-being strategy first employed by Admiral Lord Herbert Torrington in

1 690.

In the long-awaited clash between Jellicoe's Grand Fleet and Vice Admiral

Reinhard Scheer High Seas Fleet off Jutland ( 1 9 1 6), the Royal Navy paid the
price for not having instilled initiative in the minds of its admirals. When Scheer
executed the

gejechtskehrtwendung (or, battle tum-away together), inde

pendently acting battle squadrons trained to seize the initiative might have taken
advantage and turned the battle into a decisive victory for England. Jutland was,
therefore, a strategic-level success for the allies, but Jellicoe is forever doomed
to be second-guessed for having failed to send the High Seas Fleet to the bottom.
Jellicoe, of course, was operating within approved doctrine when he turned his
fleet away from torpedo threats and declined a night engagement.
On the other hand, after years of concentration on decisive fleet engage
ments, the Royal Navy fell somewhat short in their doctrine for amphibious
operations. While a landing in Gennan East Africa was neutralized, the dis
astrous attempt at Gallipoli resulted in a Royal Commission of investigation.
The analysis did not really get to the heart of the matter, however, and it was
not until after the beginning phase of the next world war that amphibious
doctrine was no longer discredited but mastered.
Despite years of unofficial doctrinal writings on the proper method of
safeguarding the sea lines of communication, the Navy failed absolutely to
organize and maintain convoys for its vital shipments coming by sea. Parlia
ment had been the driving force behind convoys as early as 1 650, 1 708, 1 792,

1 798, and 1 803 , and it now fell to the political leadership to force the Navy to
adopt convoys-three years after the commencement of hostilities.

38

An inter

nal study by younger officers in the Admiralty came to the correct conclusions
39
but failed to convince their seniors. They did convince Admiral Wi lliam S .
Sims, U . S . Navy, who had been sent to Britain t o study ways in which the U.S.
Navy might be employed as part of the Grand Fleet. Sims, in tum, had the
opportunity to present his views on the value of convoys to Prime Minister
40
Lloyd George. The prime minister forced the change.
Initiative was not defunct in the Royal Navy. The old spirit of Nelson lived
in the operation of submarines, Q-ships, and the flotilla craft of the Dover Patrol.
These commands, however, were held primarily by junior officers ; for the most
part, the navy 's senior leadership had lost the lessons of history and relapsed
into conservatism.
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The Interwar Years
Attempts to influence doctrine in the Royal Navy were also undertaken by

an outspoken insider, a critical officer who managed to remain upwardly
4l
mobile-Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond. Richmond was a friend and con

fidant of Corbett, and as Assistant Director of Operations on the Naval War
Staff, he established his bonefu:ks as a serious scholar and then led the "young
Turks" reform movement prior to World War I. Richmond also challenged the

decisive battle orthodoxy of the navy and managed to remain in active service
until an enforced retirement in 1 93 1 . Richmond did not change the battleship
dominated doctrine of the day (nor, for that matter, did the opening days of
World War

m, but he left as his legacy the Naval

Naval Review, founded in 1 9 1 2 .

42

Society and its journal, The

One could write in the pages of this journal

the most heretical of articles, since authorship need not be disclosed and
distribution was restricted. The lessons of the Royal Navy's difficulty in
abandoning the battleship-dominated decisive engagement doctrine betoken
that sound doctrinal development must contain a forum for free and open
discussion that is external to official channels.
Within the Royal Navy, a study of the combat experiences in the past war
was undertaken at all levels of staff and at the appropriate training and
43
educational institutions. Indeed, although many have argued that the navy was
obsessed with refighting the Battle of Jutland, there is good evidence of tactical
44
Some of this effort realized the desired effect, that of revisiting

innovation.

certain established doctrinal principles such as the avoidance of night actions.
The Grand Fleet Battle Orders were duly revised in 1 924 and 1 928 - 1 929.
The fleet experimented with alternative doctrines for war at sea during the
45
Combined arms were used in an exercise off Bombay in 1 924,

interwar years.

and Admiral Sir A. Ernie

M.

Chatfield used aircraft for the long-range strikes

in fleet maneuvers in the early 1 930s. Blind faith was placed in the improved
anti-aircraft guns (hence self-defense fighters were not sought in great numbers)
and in the Asdic detection system for fmding submarines.
The new fighting instructions continued to emphasize surface engagements
and convoys. Although the global system of naval intelligence and the similar
global system of Naval Control of Shipping

(NCS) had been kept active from

its World War I days, the Navy awaited German actions at sea before
46
Convoy

implementing the convoy system after the outbreak of war in 1 939.

duty was seen as an attrition-oriented defensive style of warfare during an era
when the culture of the navy emphasized the offensive and annihi lation warfare.
26
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Of the assumed possible enemies, the navy concentrated its planning against
Japan and the reinforcement and relief of Singapore. A sound doctrine for war
was developed in this area of operations, one that made full use of Dominion

resources, distant water offensive mine laying, and minesweeping. Fleet exer
cises in the Mediterranean were models for planned engagements in Southeast
47

Asia.

Of the criticism that can be ascribed to the British armed forces during the

interwar years, the Royal Navy may claim the least blame, given the greater
48
success that it had in the initial stages of the next war. Compared to the Royal
Air Force's

(RAP}

shortsightedness in regard to strategic bombing and the

army ' s noncentralized doctrine and approach to training, the navy did
49
remarkably well in preparing for World War 11. All of the services, however,
had poor ly developed joint military doctrine and planning. 50

World War II
Prior to the war, the navy was often criticized for relying more on new
technology as the solution to combat problems than on thinking through better
ways to fight. 5 1 Yet in subsequent battles, these new technologies would prove

critical. In many ways, the navy demonstrated far more success than the army,
due in part to a systematic approach to doctrine and training.

In 1 939, a new set of Fighting Instructions, again stressing battle fleet

concepts, was issued by the commanders of the Home and Mediterranean fleets,
with a preface stating that they were not mandatory. 52 On the other hand, the
disaster of the small squadron that initially met the German surface raider

Bismarck can be attributed in part to strict conformance with those fighting
instructions. Local commanders never again repeated that error, and most
subsequent naval operations were conducted using the fighting instructions as
a guide-not as compulsory directions. Perhaps it was the assimilation of
aircraft into fleet operations that fmally ended the navy 's reliance upon the

fighting instructions that had been born in the age of sail. In general, Royal

Navy commanders fought surface engagements on the offensive and with a
great deal of flexibility.
The introduction of aircraft into the Royal Navy is a story fraught with

important doctrinal lessons. 53 One cannot fault the Admiralty for not recogniz
ing the potential of the airplane when it was first proposed-most military
services were similarly blind. Doctrinal development for fleet aviation was

shaped disastrously by a decision during World War I that the naval wing of
the Royal Flying Corps

(RFC)

form the first line of defense against German
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Zeppelin attacks. Although individual aviators fought bravely, it set the tone
for fleet aviation to perfonn auxiliary and defensive duties.
The loss of the Fleet Air Ann to the Royal Air Force (RAF) during the

interwar years is a story that has bee n well told elsewhere. 54 The transfer led to
air power doctrine being developed by another service, whose preoccupation

was not maritime operations. Fleet officers relied on a small cadre of aviation
officers to help them understand how to integrate their low-perfonnance
ss
airplanes into battleship-dominated navy doctrine. The culmination of these

efforts was the successful combined- anns Battle of Cape Matapan ( 1 94 1 ), in
which aircraft were used as long-range strike assets (predating the same role of
the U.S. Navy at the Battle of the Coral Sea).
At the last major fleet-versus-fleet battle of the Royal Navy, off Cape
Matapan, Admiral Andrew Brown Cunningham demonstrated the requisite
initiative and decisiveness to qualify him to be heir to the Nelson mantle.

S6

Cunningham had the advantage of air cover, radar, and Ultra. The Italians had
the advantage of speed, and they managed to avoid a total rout in their first and
last attempt to challenge control of the Mediterranean during World War n.
Perhaps due to a series of prewar exercises that experimented with naval aircraft
as strike platfonns, Cunn ingham managed to master combined operations and

made good use of his assets. Upon recognizing the value of air power, the

Mediterranean Fleet changed its standard tactical fonnation from the battle line
to an antiaircraft circular fonnation.
Following Matapan, the influx of new Lend-Lease aircraft and pilots trained
in the United States resulted in the British Pacific Fleet's (BPF) wholesale
adoption of American naval doctrine. The BPF was molded into an American
fast carrier task force that operated in support of amphibious landings, ground
forces ashore, and in independent strikes against land targets. Because they
lacked a similar logistical train and differed in the complement of the air wing,
the BPF generally operated in its own area of operations rather than as an
integrated player in the U.S. Pacific Fleet. It had taken nearly forty years and
two world wars for doctrine in the Royal Navy to shift its prime focus from the
battleship to the aircraft carrier.
Not all transfer of doctrinal infonnation flowed from the U. S . to Great
Britain, however. In the area of antisubmarine patro ls, it would take the
U . S . Navy its own trial by fire to conclude that offensive antisubmarine
operations were not the most effective way to ensure that convoys reached thei r
destination.

S7

In an interesting contrast to its preoccupation with the destruction

of surface raiders with offensively oriented hunting groups, the Royal Navy
published the defensive Atlantic Convoy Instructions in 194 1 and 1 942, which
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set forth the doctrinal principles for the safe arrival of convoys via escorts and
for attrition warfare. These instructions were fmally accepted by the u.s. Navy

as well as other allied navies. Of note is the late date of publication, there being
no established written doctrine prior to that.

Doctrinal Development during the Cold War58
Immediately after the war, some purely national doctrinal publications were
S9
produced that capitalized upon the knowledge gained during the war.
Cooperation between the allied navies during World War II had set the stage
for drawing to a close the uniquely British way of war at sea, replacing it with
allied doctrine. By the end of the war, the Royal Navy had shifted its primary
striking and sea control force to the aircraft carrier, and the u.s. Navy had
begrudgingly accepted (but only temporarily) the value of convoys. Naval
planning shifted from a national function to an allied response, and doctrine
had to be accepted by all of the nations participating at sea in the North Atlantic
Alliance. The new Atlantic Striking Fleet would fulfill the role previously
played by the Grand Fleet and Home Fleet of the two previous world wars.
British ships operated within standing naval forces in the Atlantic, in the
Channel, and in the Mediterranean. An alliance "concept of maritime opera
tions" set the tone for subordinate standardized allied tactical pUblications
(ATPs) and other similar manuals.
In the 1 950s, the British and Americans once again debated maritime

doctrine

,c)() including the proper way to ensure that North American materials

and supplies arrived in Europe in the event of war. The Americans wanted to
fight NATO 's navy forces on the offensive. The British remembered the lessons
of two world wars. Finally, the Royal Navy published a defmitive Naval Staff
History study on the value of convoys: The Defeat of the Enemy Attack upon

Shipping. 1939-1945: A Study in Policy and Questions ( 1957), which settled
the matter.

61

Other doctrinal debates occurred over the role of aircraft carriers

and amphibious warfare.
With the residual responsibilities of the Empire, the Royal Navy maintained
a capability for limited overseas crisis response (warm wars) and peacetime
presence outside of the NATO context. Attention was paid to amphibious
warfare and assault by helicopter from the sea. Over time, the naval out-of-area
presence was reduced , to be increased only during actual combat operations,
such as during the Falklands War. Obviously , combat experience during
national emergencies benefited the NATO alliance in the form of doctrinal
62
lessons learned.
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The introduction of nuclear weapons into the Royal Navy similarly fol lowed
allied and American doctrine, although the British made it clear from time to
time that a national decision on release might precede that made by the Alliance.
Initial planning centered on allied nuclear use, whose primary purpose was
ashore. On the other hand, when Americans appeared to become preoccupied
with ballistic missile submarines off their own shores, it was British efforts that
pushed the U.S. Navy into an offensive doctrine that would catch these
submarines before they left home waters.
The close integration of the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy in the Cold War
era, especially with the U.S. Navy 's maritime strategy, continues in the present
era. As with the doctrinal renaissance in the U. S . Navy, there is a similar effort
63
by the British to once again look at centralized navy doctrine. This develop
mental effort is taking place in a doctrinal void within the context of the United
Nations, NATO, and the Western European Union-sanctioned maritime opera
tions in the Mediterranean. Efforts are being made within European nations to
fill that void, and it would appear that the doctrinal renaissance will occur on
both sides of the Atlantic.

T

his brief overview of the development of doctrine in the Royal Navy
demonstrates that there is a consistent history of more than four hundred

fifty years of combat doctrine in that service. Doctrine in the Royal Navy has
existed in every conceivable form-from formal written centralized fighting
instructions to additional written and verbal instructions by regional fleet
commanders in chief and local squadron commanders. While doctrine has
helped the Royal Navy win in tactical combat, from time to time it has also been
the source of major problems.
The Royal Navy has emphasized development in tactical doctrine, which has
contributed partly to the long years of successful combat by the fleet. That is
not to say that strategic and operational-level military doctrine have been totally
overlooked, but that the Royal Navy, like the French Navy , has primarily
devoted its attention to the development of service-unique doctrine at the
tactical level of warfare. This is somewhat surprising, since Britain was in
volved in global conventional war and numerous major regional contingencies
against France and other nations for many years. The Royal Navy did not have
a coherent doctrine at all levels of warfare. Only in more recent times has it
given preeminent attention to strategic and operational-level multinational
doctrine, specifically NATO doctrine, and even more recently to unilateral joint
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doctrine. Due in part to these higher level doctrinal deficiencies, fighting at the
strategic and operational levels of warfare was affected unfavorably as well.
Perhaps because doctrine focused on the tactical level of warfare, it was often
issued by the fleet commander in chief rather than the Admiralty. Even
Admiralty-issued doctrine generally could be modified by the fleet com
mander-thus there appears to have been some recognition that doctrine for a
worldwide fleet might vary due to different locations, assumed enemies, and

preferences for combat as intended by the local commander. The focus on

tactical-level doctrine also resulted in less than full development of doctrine for
more complex multinational operations.
It was a perceived void in multinational doctrinal development that in some
measure caused the u.s. Navy to challenge the doctrinal leadership of the Royal
Navy during the early days of the NATO alliance. The U.S. Navy did not win
all these bureaucratic battles, however, and British views drove NATO concepts
in a number of key areas-especially with favor toward convoy defense rather
than offensive operations against attack submarines using hunter-killer groups.
Independent British doctrine continues, in addition to NATO navy doctrine, to
govern nationally mandated operations taken outside of the multinational
environment.
The naval doctrine adopted by the British has been shaped by the nature of
their government, geographic position, the assumed threat, the overall strategy
being pursued, the seafaring character of their people, their unique strategic
culture, and oftentimes, but not always, the lessons learned from history. During
the twentieth century, doctrine has been implemented more successfully in the
Navy than in the Army-leading to the conclusion that the higher competence
shown by the fleet can be attributed to the Royal Navy 's better understanding
of and adherence to doctrine.
There have also been important negative lessons learned from British naval
doctrinal development. The ever-present search for the heir to the throne of
Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson led to the myth that superior combat performance
is primarily a result of an aggressive and offensive doctrine oriented towards
naval warfare of annihi lation (decisive battles) -when history has shown
clearly the need for the wise commander to select the defense and attrition
warfare when it is most appropriate. As long as the u.s. Navy continues to view
its roots as being those of the Royal Navy, American officers will need to come
to grips with both the positive and the negative aspects of the heritage of Great
Britain's doctrine- including overemphasis on the offensive.
Nelson's "touch" included his charismatic personality, audacity, and bold
ness in the face of the enemy, pre-battle meetings with his "band of brothers"
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to share the commander's intent, and also (and Nelson knew this at the time)
an enemy who was not on par with his own fmely honed forces. Nelson deserves
all of the credit that he earned, but as time has passed, we have forgotten the
effects of the Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte on the French Navy. Naval
doctrine based upon the mindless "cult of the offensive" will doom a fleet just
as it doomed millions of soldiers in the trenches during World War I.

Perhaps the greatest lesson to be learned from the British experience is how

difficult it is to change doctrine. The battleship 's reign survived through World
War I, the long interwar years, and the initial stages of World War ll. From
British naval history, it should be obvious that a system is needed to ensure that

success in the fleet resulting from actions taken outside of established doctrine
produces timely changes in the established orthodoxy. It will take the dedicated
officer much time and effort to apply both the positive and negative lessons of
the history of doctrine in the Royal Navy to the issues facing navies today. We
dare not ignore history.

32

Notes
1 . Carl H. Builder, The A nny in the Strlltegic Plllnning Process: J.Vho Shllll Bell the Cllt?
(Santa Monica, Calif: The RAND Corporation, Arroyo Center) , R-35 1 3-A, p. 46. Prepared
for the U.S. Army, April 1 987. An expanded version of this study was published as The M/lSks
of Wllr: Ameriell n Militllry Styles in Strlltegy Ilnd A nillysis (Baltimore, Md. and London : The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 9 89) , p. 32.
2 . This opinion was shared by one of the first U.S. Navy officers to formally advocate
naval doctrine. See Dudley, W. Knox (Lieutenant Commander, USN) , "The Role of
Doctrine in Naval Warfare, ' U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March-April 1 9 1 5, pp. 344-5 .
3. The age of sail and other sections of this paper are based heavily upon S.S. Robison
(Rear Admiral, USN, Retired) , A History ofNllvll1 Tlleticsftom 1530 to 1 93 0 (Annapolis, Md. :
Naval Institute Press, 1 942) ; E.B. Potter and Chester W. Nimitz (Fleet Admiral, USN) , eds.,
Sell Power: A Nilvill History (Englewood Cliffi, N .J . : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1 960) ; John Creswell,
Bn'tish A dm irills of the Eighteenth Century: Tilctics in &ttle (London: George All e n & Unwin,
Ltd., 1 972); Clark G. Reynolds, Commllnd of the Sell: The History Ilnd Strlltegy of Milritime
Empires (New York: William Morrow & Co. , 1 974); Helmut Pemsel, A History of Wllr Ilt
Sell: An A tl/lS Ilnd Chronology of Conjlict Ilt Sellfrom Ellr/iest Times to the Present, trans. i . G . D . G .
Smith (Major) (Annapolis, Md. : Naval I nstitute Press, 1 977) [translation of Von Slllllmis bis
Okinllwll, first published in 1 975] ; Brian Tunstall , Nilvill Wllifllre in the Age of Sllil: The Evolution
of Fighting Tilctics, 1 650- 1 8 1 5, Dr. Nicholas Tracy, ed. (Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute
Press, 1 990) ; and Geoffrey Till, Milritime Strlltegy Ilnd the Nuc/ellr Age, 2nd ed. (New York:
St. Martin 's Press, 1 984) , pp. 23-4, 39-49 .
4. Alonson de C haves, Qulltri partitu en cosmografia prlletiell , also known as Espejo de
navegantes (Madri: Instituto de Historia y Cultura Navar, 1 983 [original version written from
1 520 to 1 538] .
5. "Traditional tactics, 1 530: A book of orders for the war .. . ' written by Thomas Audley
at the command of Henry VIII, ell 1 530," inJohn B. Hattendorf et al. , British Nilvill Documents:
1204- 1 960 (Hants, UK: Scolar Press [for the Navy Records Society] , 1 993) , pp. 83-4. There
is some evidence of a p revious doctrinal publication, the British Blllck Book, issued in the age
of oars. See Willi am Ledyard Rodgers (Vice Admi ral , USN, Retired) , Nilvill Wllifllre under
Oars: 4th to 1 6th Centuries--A Study of Strategy, Tlletics and Ship Design (Annapolis, Md. :
Naval Institute Press, 1 939) , p . 1 0 5 .
6 . The numbers of cannon a t sea during maj or fleet engagements i s an often overlooked
point. For example, at the Battle of Trafalgar (1 805) , the gun power of Admiral Lord Horatio
Nelson's fleet exceeded that massed by Napoleon Bonaparte at Waterloo (1 8 1 5) by a factor
of six. See John Keegan, The Price of A dm irillty: The Evolution of Nilval Waifare (New York:
Viki ng Penguin, Inc . , 1 988) , p. 47
7. Step hen Wentworth RoskilJ (Captain, RN , Retired) , The Strategy of Sea Power: Its
Development Ilnd Appliclltion [based upon the Lees-Knowles Lectures delivered at Cambridge
University, 1 9 6 1 ] (London: Colli ns, 1 962) , p. 39.
8 . "Fighting i nstructions, 1 636 , " in Hattendorfet a1. , British Nilvill Documents, pp. 1 60-- 1 .
9 . Historians are constantly refining these dates as they discover additional materials.
These dates serve to illu strate the point that doctrinal develop ment was on-going and
constant.
1 0. Such a formal division of opinion into two schools of doctrinal thought is not clearly
documented in history. On the other hand, from a review of history, it is reasonably clear
that t here were often two relatively distinct views on doctrine as demonstrated by fleet
engagements and courts-martial. Historians have p rovided names to two " schools" which
may not have existed in fact, but probably did exist in spirit.
1 1 . Keegan, The Price of Admiralty, p. 45.
1 2 . Alfred Thayer Mahan (Captain, USN) , The Injluence of Sell Power upon History,
1 660- 1 783 (Boston: Little , B rown & Co . , 1 890), p. 356.
13. John Clerk of Elden's book was republished with additional materials and notes by
senior naval officers. For example, see John Clerk, Esq. of Elden, An Esslly on Na vill Tilctics,
Systemlltiell i Ilnd Historielll with Expillnatory Pilltes, in Four Pllrts, 3 rd. ed. , with notes by [Admiral
•

The Newport Papers
George Brydges] Lord Rodney and an introduction by a naval officer (Edinburgh, Scodand:
Adam Black, 1 827) .
1 4. This battle is known simply by its date since, unlike most batdes fought in the littoral
during the age of sail, it occurred well out to sea, some 400 miles off the coast of Europe.
1 5 . Alfred Thayer Mahan (Captain , USN) , The Lifo of Nelson: The Embodiment oj the Sea
Power of Great Britain (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1 897 [ 1 9 43 reprint] , p. 239; and
Admiral of the Fleet of the I talian Navy Giuseppe Fioravanzo, A History oj Naval Tactical
Thought (Annapolis, Md. : Naval I nstitute Press, 1 979) [original manuscript prepared in 1 956],
p . 96.
16. "Naval tactics, 1851 : Captain Alexander Milne, a Lord of the Admiralty, to
Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker, Commander i n Chief Mediterranean, 4 October 1 85 1 , "
i n Hattendorf e t al . , British Naval Documents, p. 629, n.2.
17. Keegan, The
Admiralty, pp . 37-8 .
Nelson, pp. 294, 297 .
1 8. Mahan, The Life
1 9 . "Trafalgar: the order of battle, 1 805 , " in Hattendorf et al. , British Naval Documents,
p . 425 .
20. Michael A. Palmer, " Lord Nelson: Master of Command, " Naval War Col/ege Review,
Winter 1 988, pp. 105-1 6 . I am indebted to Michael A. Palmer for additional analysis which
will be found in the prologue, " A Regular Confusion , " to his forthcoming book: Command
at Sea: Naval Command and Control since the Sixteenth Century, draft dated February 1 994.
21 . William Koenig, "Navarino , " Epic Sea Battles, S.L. Mayer, ed. (Secaucus, N.] . :
Chartwell Books, Inc . , 1 975) , pp . 62-83.
22. The Royal United Services I nstitute for Defence Studies (RUSI) annual essay contest
for a Gold Medal often results in follow-on publications of a doctrinal nature by j unior
officers. For example , see Lieutenant Charles Campbell, RN, Essay on Tactics in an Action on
the Open Sea with Existing Weapons (London: Harrison , 1 880) .
23 . Basil Greenhill and Ann Giffard, The British Assault on Finland, 1 854- 1 855: A
Forgotten Naval War (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1 988) , p. 80.
24. Norman H. Gibbs , "The Origins of Imperial Defence, " Maritime Strategy and the
Balance oj Power: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century, John B. Hattendorf and Roberr
S . Jordan, eds. (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1 989) , p. 25 .
25. Gwyn Prins and Robbie Stamp , Top Guns & Toxic Hlhales: The Environment & Global
Security (London: Earthscan Publications, Ltd.), pp. 1 46, 1 50-1 .
26. Andrew Gordon, Conflict of Style: Jutland and British Naval Command, draft manuscript
circa November 1 994, chapters I I , 1 3 , and 16.
27 . Arthur ]. Marder, From the Dreadnought t o Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher
Era, 1 904- 1 9 1 9, Volume I: The Road to War, 1 904- 1 9 1 4 (London : Oxford Univ. Press,
1 96 1 ) , p . 2 1 2.
28. See Donald M. Schurman, "Julian Corbett's I nfluence on the Royal Navy's Percep
tion of Its Maritime Function," Mahan Is Not Enough : The Proceedings oj a Coriference on the
Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, James Goldrick (Commander,
RAN) and John B. Hattendorf, eds. (Newport, R . I . : Naval War College Press, 1 993) , pp.
5 1 -63 .
29. In his introduction to a recendy re-issued version of Some Principles ojMaritime Strategy,
Eric ]. Grove argues the case for Corbett's influence on the Royal Navy, including assistance
in the drafting ofthe 1 9 1 4 Grand Fleet Battle Tactics. See Julian Stafford Corbett, Some Principles
of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1 988) , p. xli .
3 0 . B a rry D . Hunt, "The Strategic Thought o f S i r Julian S. Corbett," Maritime Strategy
and the Balance of Power, Hattendorf and Jordan, eds . , p . 1 1 1 .
3 1 . An opinion shared by Knox in "The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare, " pp. 328-9.
32. "The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have given the Author access to official
documents in the preparation of this work, but they are in no way responsible for his reading
or presentation of the facts as stated, " disclaimer found opposite tide page of SirJulian Stafford
Corbett, Naval Operations: History of the Great War Based on Qfficial Documents (London:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1920) .

Price of
of

34

Tritten

*

Great Britain

33. Paul Kennedy, "Britain in the first World war, " Military Effectiveness, Volume I: The
First World War, Alla n R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds . (Boston: Unwin Hyman, for
the Mershon Center, Ohio State Unive rsity, 1 988 ) , pp. 3 1 -79.
34. Roski11, The Strategy if Sea Power, pp. 1 01-42 is the basis of the section on World
War I .
3 5 . Stephen Wentworth Roski11 (Captain, RN Retired) , Naval Policy between the Wars,
Volume I: The Period of A nglo-A merican A n tagonism, 1 9 1 9- 1 929 (London: Collins, 1 968 ) , p .
533.
36. William Koenig, "Coronel and Falkland," in Epic Sea Battles, Mayer, ed. , pp. 1 44-59.
37 . The search for an heir to Nelson within the Royal Navy can be seen in books such
as John Horsfield, The Art if Leadership in War: The Royal Navy from the Age if Nelson to the
End if World War II (Westport, Conn . : Greenwood Press, 1 980) . A similar search in the U.S.
Navy is evidenced by Charles Benedict Davenport, Naval Officers: Their Heredity and
Development (Washington, D.C. : The Carnegie Institution, 1 9 1 9 ) .
38. See Owen Rutter, Red Ensign: A History if Convoy (London: Robert Hale, Ltd. ,
1 943) .
39. "The adoption of convoy, 1 9 1 7 : ' Some suggestions for Anti-Submarine Warfare' by
Major Maurice Hankey, R . M . A . , Secretary of the War Cabinet, 1 3 February 1 9 1 7 , " in
Hattendorf et aI . , British Naval Documents, pp. 76 1 -6 .
40. See especially Peter Baron Hill-Norton (Admiral o f the Fleet, RN Retired) and
John Dekker, Sea Power: A Story if Warships and Naviesfrom Dreadnoughts to Nuclear Submarines
(London: Faber and Faber, 1 982 ) , pp . 1 1 8-9 , 1 70 . The authors make the case that ave rsion
to convoying was alive and well in the Royal Navy at the time of the writing.
4 1 . See also Daniel A. Baugh, "Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond and the Obj ects of Sea
Power" in Mahan Is Not Enough, Goldrick and Hattendorf, eds . , pp. 1 3-49.
42 . James Goldrick, (Commander, RA N) , "The Irresistible Force and the Immovable
Obj ect: The Naval Review, the You ng Turks , and the Royal Navy, 1 9 1 1 - 1 93 1 " in Mahan
Is Not Enough , Goldrick and Hattendorf, eds . , pp. 83- 1 02.
43. Roski11, Naval Policy between the Wars, Volume I, p . 533.
44. Jon Tetsuro Sumida, " ' The Best Laid Plans': The Development ofB ritish Battle-Fleet
Tactics, 1 9 1 9- 1 942," The International History Review, November 1 992, pp. 66 1 -700.
45 . Credit should be given for the use of carrier-based aircraft as long-range strike assets
in the Mediterranean Fleet exercise of July 1 928. The attacks, however, were against
" enemy" aircraft carriers and not against the main battle flee£. Similarly, Combined Staff
exercises and planning during the interwar years included air strikes from the sea against the
shore. Geoffrey Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy, 1 9 1 4- 1 945: A Historical Su"'ey (Lo ndon:
Jane 's Publishing Co. , 1 979 ) , pp. 162-3 , 1 66 .
4 6 . Marc Milner, "Anglo-American Naval Co-operation in th e Second World War,
1 939-45 ," in Maritime Strategy and the Balatue if Power, Hattendorf and Jordan eds . , p . 244;
and "The protection of trade, 1 937: Memorandum for the Committee of Imperial Defence
by the Chiefs of Suff Sub-Committee, 2 February 1 93 7 , " in Hattendorf et al., British Naval
Documents, pp. 781-7 .
4 7 . Roski11, Naval Policy between the Wars, Volume I, p. 538.
48. B rian Bond and Williamson Murray, "The Bri tish Armed Forces, 1 9 1 8-39," Military
Effectiveness, Volume II: The Interwar Period, All an R. Mill ett and Willi amson Murray, eds.
(Bosto n: Unwin Hyman, for the Mershon Center, Ohio State University, 1 988 ) , pp. 98-1 30.
49. For an extremely well-developed case study of the difficulty in changing doc tri ne ,
see Harold R. Winton, To Change an A nny: General SirJoh n Burnett-Stuart and British A nnored
Doctrine, 1 92 7- 1 938 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1 988 ) , especially pp . 238-40.
50. See especially Barry R. Posen, The Sourres if Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and
Gennany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y . : Cornell University Press, 1 984) , pp. 1 59-63 .
5 1 . Williamson Murray, "Bri tish Military Effectiveness in the Second World War, " in
Military Effectiveness, Volume III: The Second World War, Alla n R. Millett and Williamson
Murray, eds. (Boston: Unwin Hyman, for the Mershon Center, Ohio Stale Unive rsity,
1 988 ) , p. 1 1 4.
,

,

35

The Newport Papers
52. Roskill , The Strategy of Sea Power, pp. 170, 247-8, is the basis of the section on World

War II.

53. See James J . Tritten, "Introduction of Aircraft Carrien into the Royal Navy: Lessons
for the Development of Naval Doctrine , " The Naval Review, July 1994, pp. 260-7; and
Norman Friedman, Thomas C. Hone, and Mark D. Mandeles, "The Introduction of Carrier
Aviation into the U.S. Navy and the Ro;yal Navy: Military-Technical Revolutions,
Organizations, and the Problem of Decision,' draft report prepared for the Director, Net
Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 12 May 1 994, p r o l l G-63.
54. Geoffrey Till, "Airpower and the Battleship in the 1 920 s, " in Technical Change and
British Naval Policy, 1 8 60- 1 939, Bryan Ranft, ed. (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishen,
I nc . , 1977) , pp. 1 08-22; and Bernard Acworth (Captain, RN) , The Navies of Today and
Tomorrow, (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, Ltd., 1 930), especially chapter 14.
55. " Functions of fleet aircraft, 1936: Admiralty Memorandum on Fleet Air Arm tactics
and equipment, December 1 936," Hattendorf et al. , British Naval Documents, pp. 948-9.
56. Willi a m Koenig, "Matapan," in Epic Sea Battles, Mayer, ed. , pp. 1 82-97; and Martin
Stephen, "The Battle ofMatapan," in Sea Battles in Close- Up: World War 2, Eric Grove, ed.
(Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 48-69.
57. Milner, "Anglo-American Naval Co-operation in the Second World War, 1 939-45 "
in Maritime Strategy and the Balance ofPower, Hattendorf and Jordan, eds., pp. 25 1-4; and Eliot
A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Miifortunes: The Anatomy of FailurE' in War (New York:
The Free Press, 1 990), pp. 59-94.
58. Eric ] . Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World War 11 (Annapolis,
Md.: 1 987) ; and Eric Grove and Geoffrey Till , "Anglo-American Maritime Strategy in the
Era of Massive Retaliation, 1 945-60" and Joel J. Sokolsky, "Anglo-American Maritime
Strategy in the Era of Flexible Response, 1 960-80," both in Maritime Strategy and the Balance
of Power, Hattendorf and Jordan, eds . , pp. 27 1-303, 304-29.
59. For example, two manuals were published immediately after the war: Naval Control
of Shipping in War (1 948) and Naval War Manual, B . R . 1 806 (1 947) .
60. These debates should also be seen in the context of Britain attempting to reestablish
its role in the world as a global and fint-ranking power. Many of the doctrinal debates
revolved around command. For evidence of the depth of these debates, see the declassified
papen of Admiral Arleigh Burke found in the Operational Archives of the Naval Historical
Center. One su ch example is an undated osition paper, " United States/United Kingdom
Differences of Opinion . " I am indebte t o Captain Peter Swartz, USN (Retired) for
providing me with a copy of this paper.
61 . Naval Staff History [Commander F. Barley and Lieutenant Commander D.W.
Waten], Second World War, The Defeat of the Enemy AttiJCk upon Shipping, 1 939- 1 945: A
Study in Policy and Operations, Vol. IA (Text and Appendices) B.R. 1 376(5 1 ) ( 1 A) , and Vol .
IB (plans and Tables) B . R . 1 376(51) ( l B) (Lo ndon : Admiralty Historical Section, 1 957)
[declassified] ) . See also "The anti-submarine war, 1 939-45: Appendix 3 of the Report of the
Mari time Air Defence Committee to the Chiefs of Staff, 3 October 1 950, " in Hattendorf et
aI. , British Naval Documents pp. 873-5.
62. Department of the Navy, Lessons of the Falklands, Summary Report, February 1 983.
63. "The Practical Application of Maritime Doctrine," fint draft, 22 April 1 994; "The
Foundation of British Maritime Doctrine," second draft, 23 September 1 994.

/

The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not necessarily represent those
of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Navy. The author is indebted
for comments by Eric Grove, Department of Politics, Univenity of Hull; Professor Geoffrey
Till, Department of History and International Main, Royal Naval College, G reenwich;
Professor Michael Palmer, East Carolina Univenity; and Co mman der James Goldrick, RAN.

36

Navy and Military Doctrine in France
James J. Tritten

If N A MAJOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCY fought some years ago, in
lL digenous ground forces converged on a narrow peninsula in the southern

part of their country, where they cut off part of the army of a foreign occupation.
The foreign commander had planned to disrupt indigenous transportation from
a small seaport, anticipating additional support or, if necessary, evacuation by
sea. His navy was one of the best in the world; the invaded country, which had
essentially no navy of its own, had sought assistance from France, a major sea
power.
France, which had already provided the indigenous forces with combat-ex
perienced ground officers and modern military equipment, now landed a major
ground force in the northern part of the country, while her fleet sailed in support
from a forward-deployed location. The French naval commander detached a
small portion of his fleet to land additional troops and also to blockade the
occupied seaport. When the enemy navy forces arrived, they were surprised to
fmd the numerically superior French. The enemy admiral, who had assumed
command only recently, was without benefit of having met with his subor
dinates to outline his personal doctrine or to conduct work-up exercises.
The French fleet commander, operating within an established navy doctrine,
knew that if he remained in a defensive posture near the seaport, he would doom
another French squadron that was due to arrive soon with additional troops,
artillery, and other supplies. In keeping with his main objective, the French

commander seized the initiative and tactically maneuvered his forces to meet

the enemy fleet far enough out to sea to permit the safe arrival of the French
resupply squadron. The enemy met the French challenge but was unable to gain
an advantage. The French fleet commander engaged the enemy but husbanded

his own assets without a serious decisive engagement, keeping the enemy fleet
"in play" for four days.
Ships from the French resupply squadron landed their troops and equipment
safely and then sailed north. embarked coalition ground forces. and brought
them to the area of the occupied seaport. Coalition forces masse d around the
seaport and engaged in bloody but ultimately successful warfare against an
entrenched enemy. The enemy capitulated in the face of the repeated assaults
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and no possible escape or hope for reinforcement. The French fleet maintained
station and provided security for the victorious coalition forces by deterring a
second. belated attempt by the enemy to reinforce. resupply. or evacuate forces
at the seaport.
The above actions were taken by the French. British (the enemy). and
Americans (indigenous forces) off the Virginia Capes and at Yorktown in 1 78 1 .
The United States owes the French Navy a great deal for this military victory
over Great Britain. which resulted in the independence of the United States. It
is appropriate. therefore. to review the legacy of the defensive navy and the
French military doctrine employed during these decisive battles; perhaps there

is something from which naval forces today can benefit. I

Doctrine of the plume
Although most histories of French naval thought begin with the seventeenth
century. there is at least some record of prior activity . 2 Gi lles de Rome. an
advisor to King Philip IV (the Fair) who ruled from 1 285 to 1 3 14. proposed
some novel tactical ideas in a boo k entitled De regimine principum . A much
later record is the book Debat sur Ie heraut d 'armes ( 1 455). which responds to
English claims to control of the seas. A few decades later. Philippe de Cleves
published his Instructions sur Iejait de Ia guerre. which addressed the potential
of the tempo of artil lery fire to dominate tactics in the same way that speed
affects strategy. and he recommended maneuvering to harass the enemy and
repel his attack. In 1 5 1 6 (or 1 5 20). Antoine de Conflans published Lesjaisz de

Ia marine et de 1a navigaie. During the reign of Henry II. from 1 547 to 1 559.
there appeared Stoionomie (or Traite contenant Ia maniere de dresser, fournir,
equiper et entretenir en tout temps en bon ordre une armee de mer consacree
aux galeres). It was. however. with the final expulsion of England from the
Continent that France began to address the development of its navy in earnest.
The events ashore that influenced the development of French Navy doctrine
cannot be overlooked. During the Thirty Years ' War ( 1 6 1 8 - 1 648). in which
France became the dominant power on the continent of Europe. Marshal Henri
de la Tour d' Auvergne. Vicomte de Turenne. forced the withdrawal of Holy
Roman Empire forces from Freiburg and then chose not to exploit the victory
with a pursuit. In a subsequent encounter, Turenne maneuvered William
Frederick, the Great Elector of Brandenburg. out of Alsace without engaging
3
him in battle. Thus the inception of elements of a maneuver warfare philosophy
in Europe are found in the French military-and later in navy doctrine.
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Annand Jean du Plessis, Cardinal de Richelieu, the all-powerful Chief
Minister, beginning in 1 624, was the founder of the pennanent navy of France
4
and author of a seminal doctrinal book - Testament politique. In 1 626 he
arranged for himself an appointment as Grand Maitre, chef et surintendant
general de Ja navigation et commerce de France. Richelieu organized a
centralized navy from the surviving remnants of feudal France-four inde
pendent admiralties whose admirals rarely went to sea. Richelieu's efforts
created a strong corps of administrative officers, the plume (the pen), who had
more power and influence than the actual body of warfighting seamen-the
epee, or the sword. The friction between these two types of officers constitutes
s
a theme for the study of French Navy doctrine.
France was one of the first modern sea powers to examine fonnally past sea
battles to garner lessons learned. Jean-Baptiste Colbert, under Louis XIV,
instituted a naval program that took advantage of what the Royal Navy had
learned

in

its wars with the Dutch ( 1 652- 1674) . The French quickly changed

their preferred tactical fonnations to capitalize on the lessons learned by the
English in combat.
Credit for doctrinal development in the French Navy belongs to Admiral
Anne-Hilarion de Costentin, Comte de Tourville. Tourville proved his charis
matic combat leadership against the combined English and Dutch fleets at
Beveziers (Beachy Head) in 1690 and against the large multinational Smyrna

6

convoy in 1 693. He was the impetus behind the development of the French
Navy into a modern fighting force. Tourville drilled his fleet into a disciplined
fonnation that responded to his command. His Signals and Instructions, issued
before Beveziers, was the first such written French Navy doctrine, and it was
credited, in part, for his victories. These instructions were reissued and revised
between 1 69 1 and 1 693.
The French sailing and fighting instructions, signals, and orders of sailing
issued by Tourville were superior to those of the English in the area of fleet
organization and signalling. A strength of the French system was to issue
separate boo ks for fighting and sailing instructions; in this way, advances in
one area were not held hostage to the other. Tourville's instructions of 1690
included an innovative pocket-sized signal book with an index . English and
British commanders laler copied and employed successfully some of the French
sailing fonnations of this era.
The War of the League of Augsburg (1688 -1697) exhausted the French
treasury, leaving a dearth of resources available for the fleet and for doctrinal
development. General respect for the fleet also declined tremendously
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following its defeat at the Battle of La Hougue in 1 692 and the subsequent
slaying of its survivors in full view of the French Anny watching from the shore.
Because they were unable to invade England, the French chose guerre de
course-commerce warfare -as their strategy for fleet employment. Guerre
de course had been favored by two successive ministers of the navy under Louis

XIV and Louis XV. It also had been the subject of an influential pamphlet,
Memo ire de 1a course (also known as Memoire sur 1a caprerie), by the famous
engineer Sebastien Le Prestre, Marquis de Vauban. Vauban, a Marshal of
France (a reward for his work with coastal and northeastern frontier fortifica
tions) , advocated sending small squadrons to raid the rich commercial sea lines
of communication as a way to replenish the national treasury. His recommen
7
dations were highly influential due to his stature in France. Vauban's vision,
however, included neither control of the seas nor contesting control of them.
To a large degree , war at sea was turned over to privateers, such as the famous
Jean Bart, who operated success fully under Vauban 's doctrine of guerre de
course.
Pere Paul Hoste, a professor of mathematics at the Royal Naval College at
Toulon and a Jesuit priest with twelve years of sea duty and service as a chaplain
to Tourville, was influenced by the latter to write the first major French
scholarly book on naval tactics, L 'A rt des armees navales ou traite des

8

evolutions navales ( 1 697). This work codified such geometric fleet formations
as the line ahead, the line abreast, and the line of bearing. Although Hoste's
emphasis was on precision and control , his boo k also demonstrated to the officer
corps what was possible with strict control of limited assets . Hoste addressed
the respective advantages of fighting from windward and leeward and the
question of whether a fleet of inferior strength should or could fight, and he
tried to compare the doctrine of warfare at sea to that of warfare ashore. Hoste
praised Tourville for his ability to prevent engagements. The Art of Evolutions
was republished in 1 727 and was still being used as a text toward the end of the
eighteenth century; it was translated into Dutch, Greek, and twice into
English-being published in London in 1762 and 1 834.
Although these early French doctrinal efforts reduced the chaos of battle and
allowed the fleet to fight as a disciplined whole, the administrative officers, the
plume, biased navy doctrinal development in favor of the more controllable
defensive. Warfare ashore was influenced by the maneuver warfare philosophy
and the science of fortifications advanced by Vauban. Warfare at sea was made
similarly geometric and precise; chance would be eliminated by control. Fight
ing seamen, those of the epee , held an opposing view. In this aspect of the
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standing tension between these two types of officers during this period, the
plume was generally dominant.

Defense and control, rather than offense and the milie (or close engagement
at discretion) were stressed, although Hoste did address breaking the enemy's
line. The English maintained a strict battle line; their perfonnance against the
combined Franco-Spanish fleet off Malaga in 1 704 reaffmned the defensive
doctrine favoring control, as advocated by Hoste. Facing an economic crisis
and invasion from the northeast, France laid up its larger ships and returned to
guerre de course. In a larger sense, guerre de course was a fonn of attrition
warfare in which pain was to be applied over time rather than in one decisive
battle, i.e., a war of annihilation. In attrition warfare, a major engagement is not
sought.
Although unintentional, these early doctrinal endeavors precluded the initia
tive of the individual commanders and their ability to see k to profit from
unexpected opportunities. The French Navy continued to use Tourville's signal
boo k and doctrine until the Seven Years' War ( 1 756- 1 763) . During that
conflict, individual fleet commanders began to issue their own local instructions
to supplement the centralized doctrine.
French Navy commanders sailing on the offensive against a convoy were
obligated to capture merchants rather than attempt to sink enemy warships. In
a major convoy action in October 1 707, a French squadron of privateers under
Rene Duguay-Trouin ignored this doctrinal principle and concentrated its attack
on the five defending British escorts under Commodore Richard Edwards.
Although Rene Duguay-Trouin succeeded in sinking a major escort and cap
turing three of the remaining four, the tactical victory was not complemented
by achievement of the overall objective. The French only took about ten percent
of the convoy-some twelve ships.
In the Battle off Toulon ( 1 744), a French fleet, under Admiral La Bruyere
de Court, successfully escorted a Spanish squadron under Don Jose Navarro
through a blockading English fleet under Admiral Thomas Mathews. De Court,
under orders not to fire unless attacked, offered to intennix his ships amongst
the Spanish. Navarro refused, and although the subsequent tactical engagement
was indecisive, the Spanish squadron . made its way to Cartagena, where
Navarro was decorated with the title of Marques de la Victoria. The elderly
(seventy-eight years old) de Court, on the other hand, was relieved of command
for leaving the deck with only superficial wounds.
French Navy doctrine also addressed defensive interactions with mer
chantmen. Convoy escort commanders were subject to severe penalties for
deserting the convoy that they were to protect, and merchant shipmasters could
41
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be fmed heavily for refusing to sail in convoy. If a friendly convoy could be
protected with a maneuver rather than ftrepower. this would be done. In battles
where the French Navy fought to defend convoys. escort commanders and
captains often fought gallantly. For example. during the Second Battle off Cape
Finisterre (1747). a signiftcantly smaller escort force under Commodore
Desherbiers. Marquis de Utenduere. was defeated by Rear Admiral Edward
Hawke ' s attack, but his convoy of 250 merchants escaped. The French escort
under Utenduere damaged the British to such a degree that they could not
pursue the merchants. Utenduere thus distinguished himself as an inspirational
combat leader against one of the most aggressive and successfu l of English
commanders, even though he did not follow French Navy doctrine precisely.
Unfortunately. Utenduere 's force was France ' s last combat-experienced con
voy escort squadron. and its loss diminished France's ability to ensure further
safe delivery of seabome shipments. Hence. Utenduere's selection of aggres
sive tactics not in confonnance with doctrine suggests that such departures are
not necessarily in the best interests of the nation as a whole. however stirring
their accounts in history boo ks .
In an interesting interpretation of intemational law. a defensive alliance with

Spain obligated France to provide warships to Spain during the latter' s War of
Jenkins 's Ear (1739-1743) with England. A French squadron of twenty-two
ships operated essentially as part of the Spanish fleet and convoyed a division
of Spanish ships to North American waters. This massing of forces, and the
presence of French warships within them. deterred a British attack. Otherwise
during this war. France claimed the rights and privileges of a neutral. although
cooperative interaction between the French and Spanish fleets was extensive
enough over the years to lead eventually to the development of multinational
naval doctrine.
The French fleet at Minorca in 1756 operated in accordance with a defensive
doctrine for maritime support of ground forces wherein the object of the tactical
action between fleets was to protect the beachhead and not necessarily to sink
enemy ships. The French victory under Lieutenant-General Roland-Michel
Barrin. Marquis de La Galissonniere. was not only a great triumph but resulted
in major problems that plagued the defeated Royal Navy commander. As a
result of a campaign for Minorca. 150 transports landed successfully some

15,000 troops who eventually took the island. Unfortunately. the subsequent
disaster at Quiberon Bay (1759) once again ended France 's dreams to invade
England and forced her to ftght the remainder of the Seven Years ' War at sea,
off her own shores, on the defensive.
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Doctrine of the epee
Under Louis XV 's Minister of Marine, Etienne Fran�is, Duc de Choiseul,
naval doctrine was removed from the province of the plume and brought directly
under the control of the epee. After assuming the ministry in 1 76 1 , Choiseul
issued formal fighting instructions and created a training squadron as well as a
marine corps modeled after the British. Despite his many reform efforts and
excellent theories, Choiseul served a reluctant sovereign who had competing
9
fmancial and political needs and chose not to bolster the fleet. In the absence
of a vast overseas empire, France turned her attention inward, sentencing her
fleet to become a force for coastal defense and war by attrition. Raiding was
once again turned over to privateers.
The two leading figures in the reforms instituted under Choiseul were
Sebastien Fran�ois de Bigot, Vicomte de Morogues, and Jean Fran�ois de
10
Cheyron, Chevalier du Pavillon.
Neither of these officers altered the fun
damentally defensive nature of French Navy doctrine of war by attrition, and
both sought to minimize risk. Morogues believed also that combat at sea would
hardly be decisive in the overall war effort. France's particular geographical
position made this true at the time. Morogues' bias, however, tended to drive
naval doctrine further towards the defensive and escape as an honorable
alternative to battle.
Morogues put together a textbook for cadets of the academy at Brest.

Tactique navale ou traite des evolutions et des signaux ( 1 763), which was
published after the end of the Seven Years ' War, contained the ideas that had
been circulating among the officer corps for some time. Although modeled
somewhat upon Hoste' s work, Morogues wrote as a naval officer for naval
officers, and his tactical ideas tended to be more practical than theoretical.
Morogues' signalling system was far more complete than any other in practice.

Interestingly, he accepted the role of elan, bravery, and experience as necessary
ingredients for success when a smaller force faced a larger one. He even
accepted the concept of outflanking and breaking the enemy battle line , al
though only in special cases where one had a superior force or where it was
necessary to seize easy targets or to exploit a break

in

the line created by the

enemy.

Morogues' combat experiences at Quiberon Bay ( 1759) reinforced his strong

bias in favor of the defensive form of warfare and control and his belief in the
futility of actions between forces of equal strength. Morogues argued that one
should mass strength against weakness. Unfortunately, for a variety of political,
economic, and cultural reasons, French governments did not normally envision
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supporting a fleet that would be able to face the Royal Navy on an equal basis,
regularly.
Tactique navale ou traite des evolutions et des signaux was published

privately and was not in confonnance with the official French Navy signal book.
Though it was reprinted once, translated by the British, and published in
Holland in

1 779, it is difficult to establish how much

impact it had on combat

in the French fleet. Yet Morogues' book must have had influence there; it was
a textboo k at the academy, was widely read, and reinforced an emerging
appreciation for innovation during battle and the idea that control and defense
were the answers to British offensive power.
Captain Jacques Bourde de Vi llehuet, an officer in the service of the French
East India Company, wrote I.e manoeuvrier ou essai sur la thiorie et la pratique
des mouvements du navire et des evolutions navales in

1765. This book included

sections on the preparation of the crew for battle, boarding tactics, engaging
enemy ships, and shifting from sailing formations used during transit to those

employed in battle. 1 1 It was published in several editions and was translated
into English and Dutch. Another

1 765

publication, Ordonnance du roi, also

emphasized control in reference to local freedom of action.
The second leading figure during the Choiseul reforms was Jean Fran�ois
du Cheyron, Chevalier du Pavilion. Pavilion developed a set of signals that was
accepted by the French Navy following two meetings of flag officers. one in

1773 and the other in 1775. The signals were given trial during fleet exercises,
1 776. and authorized for fleet use in 1778. But. individual com

published in

manders apparently were given the option to adopt them or not, as in the Royal

Navy.
French Navy doctrine formula was to "exercise rigid tactical control over
their fleets throughout the whole action by means of an excellent system of
signals. The French used one particular flag to represent each digit. and by
hoisting combinations of flags could quickly indicate any signal in the num

bered signal boo k. " 1 2 The French made a science of naval warfare. creating an

incredibly complex system of manuals and accompanying signal boo ks that
were retained until after the end of the Napoleonic Wars . Unfortunately. the
direction of the battle signals available was not towards the actual defeat of the
enemy fleet.
The French victory under the command of Admiral Louis Guillouet. Comte
d'Orvilliers, at Ushant

( 1 778)

over Admiral Augustus Keppel. provides an

exce llent opportun ity to re view the effectiveness of existing doctrine in
both navies. Keppel operated under the centralized Royal Navy fighting
instructions, supplemented by his own. D ' Orvilliers used instructions prepared
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and influenced by his chief of staff, the Chevalier du Pavilion. Keppel engaged
d ' Orvilliers without first having properly fonned a battle line, and the resulting
attack was ragged. The French fought generally on the defensive, and their
immediate objective was to impair enemy mobility by damaging masts and sails
rather than taking prizes. D ' Orvilliers achieved this, generally getting the better
of the British. Keppel and one of his subordinates were court-martialed after
the battle for, essentially, failing to do their utmost, but both were found
inn ocent. The same complaint could have bee n lodged against d ' Orvilliers,
since French mobility was impaired to a much lesser extent, but the French
seemed less inclined than the British to initiate legal proceedings following lost
or indecisive battles.
A combined French and Spanish fleet operated during 1 779 to gain control

of the English Channel. Overall co mmmand was exercised by d 'Orvilliers, who
issued a newly revised set of signals and instructions for use in both fleets-in

effect, multinational navy doctrine. Although the fleets had not operated
together previously, some Spanish ships were eventually able to act success
fully as integral parts of French squadrons in addition to forming their own
national squadron of observation, which would join the battle once the enemy
was engaged. Other attempts to combine assets, such as in the Caribbean, were
less successful.
French naval command was, at times, given to anny officers. Jean-Baptiste
Charles Henri Hector Theodat, Comte d 'Estaing, an infantry officer during the
Seven Years ' War, was promoted to lieutenant-general, and he was sub
sequently and simultaneously appointed governor-general of San Domingo and
the first Chef d 'Escadre des Annees Navales (commodore). At the Battle of
Grenada ( 1 779), his opponent, Vice Admiral the Honorable John Byron, failed
in an offensive attack, leaving himself vulnerable to counterattack or destruc
tion of his convoy. The Comte d'Estaing, in tum, failed to use his superiority
and seize upon the opportunity, being content to have prevented the British from
landing troops. Regular French Navy officers, such as then-Captain Pierre
Andre, Bailli de Suffren-Saint Tropez, criticized this decision and the resulting
inaction.
Failure to capitalize on their superior ability to control their forces and order
them to respond promptly to signals was demonstrated during Commodore
Destouches ' victory over Admiral Mariott Arbuthnot off the Virginia Capes in
March 1 78 1 . Destouches blunted a British attack on his ships, broke off, and
withdrew from the shores of Virginia rather than exploit fully the victory or
land troops destined to support Major General Marie Paul Roch Yves Gilbert
Motier, Marquis de Lafayette. Destouches was subsequently criticized at court,
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and by some of his officers. At the end of the battle, Arbuthnot's forces
remained between the French ships and Virginia.
The same criticism could have been levied against Rear Admiral Fran�ois
Joseph Paul, Comte de Grasse -Tilly (another former army officer), who
maneuvered boldly from the Caribbean to the Virginia Capes (September

178 1), but in his subsequent victory over Admiral Lord Thomas Graves, failed
to act in a daring manner during the first day of the Battle of the Saints ( 1 782) .
Of course, Admiral Lord George Brydges Rodney 's failure to exploit the
victory over de Grasse on the second day of the battle is the subject of
controversy and proof that this problem was not limited to only one navy.

Despite his subsequent humiliation due to his losses and capture at the Battle
of the Saints, Admiral de Grasse is remembered by a grateful America for his
support and success off the Virginia Capes and its resulting impact on coalition
military operations ashore at Yorktown.
The one French Navy officer in whom both sides acknowledged an innova
tive, offensive fighting spirit was Pierre Andre, Bailli de Suffren-Saint Tropez.
Then-Commodore Suffren engaged in a series of five battles against Admiral
Sir Edward Hughes in the East Indies between 1782 and 1783. Suffren, admired
as one of the greatest tactical innovators of naval history, is generally credited
as the first to order his captains to attempt to break the enemy 's battle line-al

though in fact this had been done earlier by de G rasse , under whom the Balli
de Suffren had served. Suffren issued both written and verbal plans before each
battle-sometimes exhorting his captains to do the best that they could under
the circumstances. His personality, however, lacked the magnetism of Admiral
Lord Horatio Nelson, nor did he command the devotion of his men as did
Tourville. When necessary, Suffren replaced less effective captains with those
who were bolder, but there is also no indication that he devoted a great deal of
time to the preparation of formal standing fighting instructions.
Because his Indian Ocean squadron was of limited size and was essentially
on its own without the ability to count on reinforcements or replacements of its
battle losses , Suffren was forced

to

be content with the immediate tactical

victory. Hence, he was compelled to forgo the exploitation phase of battle in
13
order to conserve assets . Upon returning to France, Suffren was promoted,

rightly, to vice admiral, but one should recall that he never commanded a great

battle fleet.
With its major victories over the British at Ushant and in the American War
of Independence, France rested comfortably on the success of its naval doctrine
and signals. Essentially, Pavilion ' s system seemed vindicated, and new
doctrinal development now slowed considerably . All subsequent signal books
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were further adaptations of the existing system. Naval commiss ions were
fonned to study the question of signals, and they reported that there was no
need for further development. Two tactical boo ks that appeared in 1 787 ,

Memoire sur la tactique navale by Commodore Verdun de la Crenne and
Tactique navale by Captain Buor de la Charouliere, advanced no new ideas in
doctrine.

There were a few exceptions to this general rule, such as L 'art de la guerre

sur mer, ou tactique navale ( 1 787) by Chef de Division (commodore) Iurien,
Vicomte de Grenier, a short book about navy tactics that did advance some new
14
concepts. This succinct work is based upon combat experience and is very
much oriented towards battle, not control. Grenier stressed mass ing strength
against weakness, much as had Morogues. He exposed the weaknesses of the
French line-ahead battle plan, attributing its successes to British ineptitude
rather than to the virtue of this fonnation. Despite some rather innovative
suggestions for tactical disposition of the fleet, L 'art de la guerre sur mer, ou

tactique navale was still essentially biased toward defense and wars of attrition.
Although this book was written by a serving admiral, it had little impact on the
French Navy. It was translated within a year into English, into Dutch in 1 799,
and it was apparently used by the Spanish.

Another exception that advanced new ideas in doctrine was Tactique navale,
ou traite sur les evolutions, sur les signaux et sur les mouvements de guerre
( 1 788) by Admiral Clause Fran90is, Comte d' Amblimont. Tactique navale was
also based upon combat experience but stressed innovation; d' Amblimont
promoted breaking the fleet into separate pelotons, or tactical groups, with
different functions. Subsequently Nelson used this device successfully at
Trafalgar ( 1 805). Tactique navale advocated the unrestricted offensive, but this
opinion was not shared by the fleet officers.
Generally, French Navy doctrine during the years of war with Great Britain
was such that the objective of an engagement with enemy ships was to cripple

their mobility. I S Although this doctrine would result perhaps in fewer shots per
engagement, it usually would not result in the elimination of the subsequent
threat. British warships were neither taken prize nor sunk, thus allowing their
subsequent refitting and eventual return to battle. According to French doctrine,
the ultimate purpose of naval warfare was not necessarily to engage enemy
ships. Indeed, a leeward escape to fight another day was an honorable alterna
tive to battle. The overall strategy was to expand control over new areas of the
globe rather than to contest other European powers in battles at sea. There were
obvious exceptions to the rule, and in fact some British commanders used the
French model rather than attempt to capture or destroy the enemy.
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French tactics were nonnally to fight on the leeward side and fire their
cannon on the upswell so as to maximize "mobility kills" by damage to masts
and rigging rather than attempt to sink the ship by aiming at the hull. For the
most part, except when led by Suffren, the French Navy fought from the
defensive when engaging an enemy fleet of equal strength. The French Navy

thus adopted a doctrine of battle avoidance and war by attrition. When coupled
with their generally better built ships, sound training, and a well-fonned tactical
line, the French frequently bettered the more offensive Royal Navy who sought

the decisive engagement. As discussed above, these successes included : Beachy
Head (B6veziers) in 1 690; the Second Battle off Cape Finisterre in 1 747;
Minorca in 1 756; Ushant in 1 778; and the Virginia Capes in September 1 78 1 .
French naval writings during the years of war with Britain included many of
the sophisticated doctrinal issues that were being debated in all navies. One
issue was the question of correct placement of the fleet commander. Should the
admiral ride in the van, at the center, in a heavily anned ship of the line or in a
fast frigate? Shifting the flag to a frigate had been tried by British Admiral Lord
Richard Howe off Rhode Island in 1 778, and Admiral Sir George Rodney did

the same off Martinique in 1 780. Following the capture of de Grasse at the

Saints ( 1 782), French Navy doctrine was changed to require that commanders
in chief fight from frigates; a flag officer embarked in a frigate could see better
and his signals could be seen better. Fighting from a frigate resembled the
placement of the general officer overlooking the battlefield. The policy was
later abandoned by the new government.
Although naval doctrine under the French monarchy was extremely
thorough, it was biased by factors beyond the control of naval officers. Tech
nology remained essentially the same during this era, and the major modifica
tions to doctrine were based upon geography, strategic culture, available
resources, and government policy. The impending change in the type of
government was to have a dramatic impact on naval doctrine, including the loss
of rich tradition and lessons learned by monarchist navy officers who had paid
for their lessons in blood.

Doctrinal Collapse with the First Republic
As the French became preoccupied internally with their own revolution in
1 789 and its aftennath, neither the aristocratic officer corps (Ie grand corps) nor
the new Republican leadership was overly concerned with advancing the fmer
points of naval doctrine. Many of the good ideas proposed by Grenier and
d' Amblimont had simply arrived at the wrong time, and many of the valuable
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lessons were lost on the guillotine. Instead, the navy of the Republic went to
war

in 1 793 using the basic naval doctrine of the ancien regim e against the

British, who had been experimenting and exercising their new tactical doctrine,
based

in part on the innovations advanced in the dying days of the French

monarchy. Similarly, doctrinal development ashore stagnated, and the French
Army preserved the same drill regulations until 1 8 3 1 . Even Napoleon

Bonaparte 's army used the regulations of 1 79 1 . 16

What the navy of the Republic lacked in doctrinal development, it made up
for

in spirit. The Battle of the Thirteenth Prairial

in 1 794 (known in Britain as

the Glorious First of June) was one of the greatest convoy battles in naval
history. Rear Admiral Louis Thomas, Comte de Villaret de Joyeuse, com
manded the Brest fleet in an engagement some four hundred miles out to sea.
Villaret de Joyeuse's objective was to ensure the safe arrival of a 1 30-ship
convoy with supplies from America. The loss of the Brest fleet was an
acceptable price to pay for the safe arrival of this convoy. To his credit, Villaret
de Joyeuse accepted combat against the well-trained and recently exercised
Channel Fleet under Lord Howe, one of the most skillful tacticians then in
command. Although the Brest fleet was severely mauled during the battle, it
succeeded in the overall objective and gave an extremely good accounting of
itself. Despite his losses and his being of noble birth, Villaret de Joyeuse was
neither court-martialed nor guillotined. 17

On the other hand, in one of his subsequent engagements with the British,

Villaret de Joyeuse, with the bulk of the Brest fleet off Belle lie in 1 795, failed
to capitalize on a clear advantage over a British squadron. He allowed himself
to be bluffed by the British commander, Rear Admiral Sir William Cornwallis.
Within one week, Villaret de Joyeuse suffered a humiliating defeat, the
debandade de Groix off the tie de Groix. Clearly the French Navy was to pay
a heavy price for the loss of an institutional ability to advance how it would
fight in war. This era marks the low point of the French Navy.
By the end of 1 795, the Committee of Public Safety resolved that the navy
would henceforth send out only small divisions, whose goals would be guerre

de

course and raiding distant colonies. With this official government policy

accepted subsequently even by Napoleon, doctrinal development could not help
being affected. Navy reforms were initiated under a former royalist lieutenant,
now Minister of Marine, Vice Admiral Jean Fran�ois Truguet. But all reforms
were within the context of the assumed role of raiding-not major fleet
engagements.
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The Napoleonic Era
Much has been written about the French loss at the Battle of Aboukir Bay,
also known as the Battle of the Nile ( 1 798). Suffice it to say that Vice Admiral
Fran�ois Paul Brueys d' Aigai1liers demonstrated that he did not know how to
fight at anchor, thus indicating a basic failure in doctrinal understanding and
development. In his correspondence with Napoleon, Brueys expressed in
decision over whether to fight at anchor or under sail if attacked. Brueys' ships
could have formed into a stronger defensive position and amassed firepower
against the attack; anchored closer together; loaded their guns on both sides;
and opened fire at maximum rather than minimum range. His captains lacked
necessary experience and there was no doctrine to address these tactical issues.
In 1 802, a former naval officer, Audibert Ramatuelle, published a major boo k
IS

on naval tactics, Cours eLementaire de tactique navale, didii a Bonaparte.

To his credit, Ramatuelle analyzed Nelson 's success at Aboukir. Unfortunately ,
he did not take advantage of the lessons of the d ' Orvilliers at Ushant and Suffren
in the East Indies or the writings of Grenier and d' Amblimont (although he did
embrace d' Amblimont's concept of the peloton). Ramatuelle stated that the
central point of war was to hold land rather than to capture enemy ships; this
reflected the strategic culture of France and its inability to come to grips with
how to defeat Great Britain. Napoleon saw victory as a result of defeating the
enemy 's army rather than defeating the enemy 's center of gravity.
A major result of the French Revolution was that it showed that men could
be motivated to fight for an idea and that such men could be fielded into armies
in numbers never before seen . With such numbers, commanders now had new
I9
tactical, operational, and strategic opportunities. Although this was obvious
in warfare ashore, it was not so clear at sea

.

Napoleon 's expertise in naval matters certainly is subject to question. His
ill-fated plan to invade England in 1 80 1 would probably have proved disastrous
if attempted. There had been no serious doctrinal development for such an
undertaking, since there had been no effort even to build a force that could
contest the Royal Navy for control of the Channel. Even the types of craft
selected for the invasion crossing were not the most seaworthy. The subsequent
expedition to San Domingo was a success from the perspective of the navy
covering force, but a military disaster ashore. When Napoleon became aware
of the crude submarine that had been designed by the American Robert Fulton,
his admirals dismissed it as uncivilized.
By August 1 805, however, Napoleon apparently had learned what was

required. He ordered his various fleets to sea and instructed them to join together
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but to avoid combat until they had massed -keeping in mind the ultimate
objective. The renewed plans to invade England were frustrated by Vice
Admiral Pierre Charles lean-Baptiste Silvestre, Comte de Villeneuve, who was
commanding the largest fleet that was to support the transport force. Villeneuve
had been engaged in extensive operations in which he sought to avoid engaging
the British while he sought union with the rest of the French fleet. The British
had maneuvered a large force in the Channe l, and because Villeneuve felt that
he could not possibly succeed in contesting control there, he was less than timely
in his response to support the Grande Annee . When presented with false
information about the location and strength of the British, Villeneuve aban
doned the field and sailed to Cadiz. Without naval support, Napoleon turned
his back to the sea and his attention to Continental enemies.
To understand the subsequent actions of the combined Franco-Spanish Fleet
at the Battle of Trafalgar ( 1 805), we must keep in mind the objective of its
commander. Villeneuve was under orders to sortie from Cadiz, join with ships
at Cartagena, and transport embarked troops to support an attack on Naples
Napoleon having now abandoned his invasion of England. Villeneuve knew
that Nelson awaited him, but nothing in his order said that he was to engage or
defeat the British fleet. Nelson was viewed as an obstacle to be overcome rather
than an object with which he had to deal.
Villeneuve was a brave man, but he also understood the limitations of the
combined fleet in training and the quality of its ships. 2o His misgivings were
shared by officers in both fleets, as they met in a pre-battle council of war.
Villeneuve, who held the advantage of being able to observe Nelson's block
ading, chose to emerge from the harbor when a squadron of British ships were
detached for logistical duties. The combined fleet commander thought, incor
rectly, he had the numerical advantage over Nelson and had even organized a
separate squadron of observation from what he believed to be his excess.
Villeneuve's final instructions, issued on the day of the battle, foretold accurate
ly Nelson's tactics but did not provide advice on how to combat them. 2 1 In short,
French Navy doctrine did not have constructive guidance to offer him.
Once at sea, Villeneuve failed to provide for tactical reconnaissance and
gained ess entially no significant information on Nelson's actual strength until
the morning of the battle when he hastily reintegrated the observation squadron
into the main fleet. A series of poorly executed signals and missed opportunities
doomed the combined fleet to fight on the defensive. Villeneuve even issued a
general signal: "Every ship which by her present position was not engaging [is]
to take any such steps as would bring her as promptly as possible into action. "22
In the hands of Nelson's captains, such a signal would have had meaning. For
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the combined fleet, the lack of combined doctrine, training, and sound ships
made the signal only an interesting footnote to history. The footnote is all the
more curious because, since the signal was addressed to no one in particular,
neither the French nor Spanish captains took any action based upon it. There is
no question, however, of the bravery of the men of the combined fleet who
fought at Trafalgar with honor.

The End of the Age of Sail
Following the defeat at Trafalgar, Napoleon ordered the fleet to resume
guerre de course and overseas raiding. Privateers supplemented the standing
fleet initially, which did attempt to engage the British in distant operations being
fought over colonies and which also occasionally fought the Royal Navy in
home waters.

A few tactical-level defensive victories did little to stem the tide

of ruin under Napoleon. Sailors from the Brest fleet were landed to serve with
the army, and even commerce-raiding efforts were unsuccessful. Despite
Napoleon's dismissal of the Battle of Trafalgar, he ordered the following words
to be painted prominently aboard surviving French men-of-war: "France ex
23

pects that every man will do his duty.,,

The French introduced their own version of the British telegraph system in

1 8 1 3 as a supplement to the official signal boo k. In 1 8 15, a French Navy

lieutenant, the Chevalier de la Rouvraye, published the Traiti sur I 'art des
combats de mer, advocating a true offensive spirit and stressing the respon
sibilities of the individual captain to carry on the battle even if outnumbered.
Unfortunately, the boo k arrived in an era when the new governments questioned

even the need for a navy. In 1 8 19, the newly restored monarchy published a

new signal book reinstating the traditional signals of Pavilion and Morogues.

In that same year, Father de Pradt published an Appel a La nationfranfaise au
sujet de sa marine, in which he concluded that the downfall of the French empire
was due to wasting resources on the navy. In 1 8 19 the government decided to
support a navy-but the overall employment of the fleet would be guerre de
course.

In 1 82 1 , a French artillery officer, General Henri Joseph Paixhans, wrote
Idies pour Ie blindage du baneries jlonantes, advocating modem ironclads
mounting only a few large guns. In 1 822 , he wrote Nouvelle force maritime,
which recommended the quick building of a modem steam navy that would

render Britain 's existing fleet irrelevant. In the Journal des sciences militaires,
a series of articles by a naval commander, Jacques Merigon de Montgery,

proposed ships of iron with watertight compartments as well as the use of mines,
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torpedoes, and submarines. These ideas were well ahead of their time, and they
had no effect on fleet building programs.
Some twelve years after Waterloo, a French squadron fought side-by-side
with British and Russian squadrons in an overwhelming and decisive defeat
of the Turks at Navarino ( 1 827). The Turkish fleet, c ommanded by
Admiral Ibrahim Pasha (with the advise of a group of French Navy officers
led by Captain Jean-Marie Letellier) was anchored in fixed, semicircular
defensive formation. The Europeans fought a mobile offensive under written
orders that were identical to Nelson's at Trafalgar, and at the end of the battle,
sixty Turkish ships had been destroyed without the loss of a single European
ship.
Rear Admiral Jean Baptiste Grivel explained his concepts for fleet doctrine
in his 1 832

Considerations navales en reponse d la brochure de Monsieur de

Pradt. Gri vel was one of the first to attempt to deal with the overall concept of
maritime power. His recommendations, however, followed existing govern
ment policies

guerre de course. Grivel stated that this would strike at the heart

-

of British power. It was a doctrine of necessity, since it was clearly foolhardy
to meet the Royal Navy head-on in a decisive battle. Then-Lieutenant Louis
Narcisse Chopart prepared a tactical textbook for sailing ships in 1 839, which
was translated into English in 1 859 and used at the U . S . Naval Academy.
The French military, in general, has always considered

elan to be one of its

national strengths and incorporated fighting spirit into its military and naval
doctrine. The wars of the age of sail, however, indicated that spirit alone will
not compensate for material and training deficiencies. Early doctrinal decisions
to fight at sea reflected disdain for the crude broadside employed by the British;
unfortunately, the alternative method of more specific attacks and attempts at
mobility kills did not always yield the desired results. On the other hand, a
doctrine that included escape as an option allowed for some advantages over
the British, whose formal doctrine was biased in favor of avoiding defeat.

Doctrine in the Age

of hmovation and the Ironclad

The pioneering work of Stanislas Dupuy de LOme in the 1 840s served to
introduce the ironclad into the world 's navies. The first screw-driven ship of
the line participated in the multinational naval operations in the Black Sea
during the Crimean War ( 1 8 53- 1 856). This war also stimulated French
development of rifled artillery. Naval attention returned to fleet engagements,
due to the Peace of Paris which outlawed privateering, thereby turning French
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Navy emphasis away from guerre de course. After much effort. La Gloire. an
open-ocean steam battleship. was launched in 1 859.
Admiral Louis Bouet-Wi ttaumez wrote a series of publications that
pioneered advances in French Navy doctrine. His Batailles de terre et de mer
( 1 855) was attached to a project de tactique navale -outlining provisional
tactics for screw-propelled steamships. This doctrine included ensuring a
superior force with a combined effort at the decisive point. Bouet-Willaumez
annexed to his book a plan of attack with eight main orders.
Bouet-Willaumez's work was then adopted by the Ministry of Marine under
the doctrinal title. Provisory tactics ( 1 857) . The Ministry also published Tacti
que navale that same year. outlining doctrine for ships of sail and steam.
Tactique navale was an official naval doctrinal publication whose contents
junior officers were expected to master for promotion examinations. Bouet
Willaumez's new doctrine was tested in the fleet. reviewed by the Ministry of
Marine. and officially sanctioned in a new signal book in 1 86 1 . Admiral
Bouet-Willaumez was well-experienced with the fleet-he finished his service
as commander in chief.
These early doctrinal writings followed. rather than led. the introduction of
new technologies. They were paralleled by the Second Empire, under Napoleon
ill ; the emperor kept his naval programs in check so as not to irritate the British,
who dominated at sea. In 1 863 an experimental submarine was developed but
abandoned due to technical difficulties. In 1 864 Russ ian Admiral Gregoire
Boutakov published a book on naval tactics which was translated by a French
Navy officer and then published by the French Ministry of Marine for domestic
use under the title Nouvelle bases de tactique navale. In 1 866 the Revue
Maritime et Coloniale provided an unofficial forum for the discussion of new
doctrine and other naval matters outside of official circles.
Bouet-Willaumez's writings, such as his Tactique supplementaire d l 'usage
d 'une flotte cuirassee ( 1 865), had an impact outside of the French Navy. 24
Similarly, the offensive tactics of Austrian Rear Admiral Wilhelm von Teget
thoff in 1 866 off the island of Lissa (now Vis) in the Adriatic, in the first battle
between annored fleets, had an impact on the doctrinal development of the
French Navy. Admiral Jurien de la Graviere took command of the squadron of
evolution (charged with tactical development) in 1 868, and after studying the
Lissa battle he embraced the ram, the milie, as well as the "charge" employed
by Nelson at Trafalgar and by Tegetthoff at Lissa. There was a worldwide
debate as to which was supreme, the ram or the gun, with virtually every major
navy embracing the ram.
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Naval operations in support of other overseas maj or regional contingencies
2S
The navy 's role was to

generally followed the pattern of the Crimean War.

transport troops to foreign locations, ensure their resupply, and participate in

blockades and attacks on fortifications. With no enemy at sea and operations
confmed to the littoral, there was little glory in duty at sea, although the French
fleet in 1 870 was the second most powerful in the world. Defeat during the
Franco-Prussian War ( 1 870- 1 87 1 ), in which sailors again served ashore as

ground forces and received national recognition for their efforts, turned French

military concerns back toward land warfare. After all, how could the fleet obtain
the return of the lost provinces?

La

grande guerre versus jeune ecole

French doctrinal development during the mid-to-late 1 800s continued to
include the peloton and to form tactical groups as parts of larger fleets. In the
1 890s, France led the world in the development of the submarine as a practical
weapon of war. The naval ministry supported research into alternative methods
of contesting British domination of the seas. The French submarine Narval was
launched in 1 899, whereas the British Admiralty did not place orders for

submarines until 190 1 . On the other hand, although the submarine received

development in France, its full potential was not recognized. At ftrst it was
thought of as a submerging torpedo boat suitable for coastal defense. French
Navy matters turned to expansion of the empire and to military operations other
than war.
French naval thought flourished again at the end of the nineteenth and
26
beginning of the twentieth centuries. After years of defeat by the British, the

legacy of a defensive navy doctrine, and preference for guerre tk course and

attrition warfare over warfare of annihi lation and decisive battle, the French
Navy considered some different ideas. Its Ecole superieure tk guerre tk La

Marine the French Naval War College-was founded in 1 895 . La grande
guerre concept, favoring the decisive battle and deep-sea warfare (guerre tk
haute mer) in order to achieve command of the sea, was the centerpiece of a
-

number of French Navy offtcers' writings in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.

Writings that supported La grande guerre included: Admiral Jurien de la

Graviere, "La marine auj ourdhui," Journal o/the RUSI (Royal United Services
Institute for Defence Studies), 1 874; Vice Admiral Gabriel Darrieus, La guerre
sur mer ( 1 907) ;27 and then-Commander Rene Daveluy, Etutk sur La strategie

navale ( 1 905), Lefons de La guerre russo -japonaise, La Iutte pour I 'empire tk
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/a mer ( 1 906) and L 'esprit de /a guerre navale in three volumes ( 1 909- 1 9 1 0).
These writings paralleled those of the American Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer
Mahan. Although they were not official doctrine, they fonned a point of
departure for official debates over navy doctrine and programming . The
mainstream of thought by the French naval officer corps supported concepts
found in these writings.
The Naval Banle: Studies of the Tactical Factors ( 1 9 1 0), by Lieutenant
Adrien Edouard Baudry, was translated into English for use by American and
Royal Navy officers. Indeed, the writings of Darrieus, Daveluy, and Baudry
were provided to ships' libraries by the U.S. Navy Department. Unfortunately,
thought about /a grande guerre and /a guerre de haute mer found a skeptical
audience following the defeat of France in 1 870- 1 87 1 in a war wherein sea
power was clearly secondary .
An alternative view was championed by another group of officers and
civilian thinkers whose movement became known as the jeune ecole. These
were, primarily, Vice Admiral Baron Richild Grivel (son of Rear Admiral Jean
Baptiste Grivel), De /a guerre maritime avant et depuis les nouvelles inventions,
etude historique et strategique ( 1 869); Admiral Hyacinthe-Laurent-Theophile
Aube, La guerre maritime et les portsfranfais ( 1 882), A terre et a bord, notes
d 'un marin (1 884). and De /a guerre navale (1 885); the journalist Gabriel

Channes, La reforme de /a marine ( 1 886); Commander Gabriel Fontin (pseu
donym H. Montechant) and Lieutenant Paul Vignot (pseudonym Commandant
Z). &sai de strategie navale ( 1 893). The jeune ecole did not represent
mainstream naval thought and should be interpreted as a temporary sidetrack
resulting from the introduction of, and opportunities afforded by, new tech
nologies in an austere fISCal environment.
The jeune ecole argued that capital ships were becoming vulnerable with
advances in technology and that a well-designed fleet of inexpensive commerce
raiders could strike at the heart of British (an assumed enemy) prosperity and
cause British shippers and manufacturers to demand peace from their govern
ment. Coastal defenses should also be emphasized. Pertinent historical navy
battles were offered to prove the inadvisability of contesting a superior force at
sea in /a grande guerre and /a guerre de haute mer. Grivel in particular argued
that naval battles at sea were rarely decisive for the overall war effort as were
many ground battles.
The jeune ecole must also be understood in the context of the political and
economic situation at the time. French governments lacked the political impera
tive to devote significant resources to the fleet. Professional officers like Aube
and Grivel were trying to develop concepts of operations based upon these
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political and fISCal realities?9 Grivel understood especially that his government
would be unwilling to compete with the British in naval force structure and was
looking for an alternative theory for support for the fleet. 30 Naturally govern

ments were attracted to doctrinal developments that promised the required
political objectives at low cost.

The doctrine of the jeune ecole was offensive (at the tactical level), but the

assoc iated force structure was much less capable than that required for

guerre

de haute mer. The new high-speed torpedo boat epitomized the type of ship

conceived of by the jeu ne ecole. As Minister of Marine, Aube argued that these
torpedo boats could sortie from port and attack British ships in their own

harbors, thus making squadron engagements between main battle forces more

successful. These smaller ships were to be used as well in coastal defense

(guerre de co te)

-

indeed defense of France from blockade by the Royal Navy

was the major objective of fleet engagements. Aube also had great hopes for

guerre de course both to scatter the Royal Navy, making possible squadron
sized engagements near France, and to strike at the basis of British power.
Essentially Aube argued that France should take advantage of new technologies
and that the fleet's doctrine should be based upon a division of labor.3 1

With such a force, an offensive capability at the operational or strategic levels

of warfare was impossible. If France were to fight a war of revenge against
Germany (another assumed enemy), it would be fought primarily on land.

France began to build torpedo boats and a system of bases on the northern and

southern shores of the western Mediterranean. Admiral Aube 's vision was that
of a far-flung network of French bases, all linked by the Panama Canal being
built by French engineers.32 S ince the French Navy had bee n the administrator
of most overseas colonies, the views of the jeune ecole were thus entirely
consistent with existing government policy. At the height of the influence of
the jeune ecole, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russ i a abandoned
their battleship-building programs and even the British Admiralty appeared
embarrassed by its continued development of large surface vessels.

During the thirty years between 1 87 1 and 1 90 1 , France had thirty ministers

of marine. With such changes in government, consensus on a coherent naval
program was extremely difficult, as was agreement on "how to fight" doctrine.

After some thirty years of debate, wild oscillations in government policies, and
a shift in the threat from the British to the Germans, Italians, or Russians, the
French government settled on the need to contest command of the sea by
engaging an enemy battle fleet and then conducting operations against the
enemy shoreline.
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France's need for a high seas fleet was validated by its embarrassment during
the Fashoda Incident

( 1 898),

the Gennan naval building program, the un

reliability and vulnerability of the less expensive forces demonstrated in fleet
maneuvers, and the experiences of Russ ia and Japan in the Battle of Tsushima

(1905). In addition, the low-cost option was coupled entirely to a single scenario

that fell apart in the face of a multitude of poss ible enemies and miss ions. Vice

Admiral Fran�ois-Emest Fournier dissented from this approach in La flotte

necessaire: ses avantages strategiques, tactiques et economiques ( 1 896), argu

ing that the battleship itself need not be built to obtain sea control, but that larger
torpedo boats and armored cruisers would suffice. Official naval doctrine soon
returned under the influence of Admiral Gabriel Darrieus and professional

officers attached to the tcok superieure de guerre de

Ia Marine, but the ideas

of the jeune ecole surfaced in France and in other nations from time to time.

Certain government ministers were weary of the years of debate and the
impotence of the nation; hence the Ministry of Marine ordered the wholesale

retirement of active flag officers. This second "decapitation" of the navy 's
leadership had a disastrous effect. Future admiral Raoul Victor Patrice Castex
lamented in

1908 that the navy lacked a general staff dedicated to the develop

ment of defLnitive navy doctrine.

33

The new Minister of Marine, Vice Admiral Augustin Boue de Lapeyrere, in

1909,

ordered a new building program that was to be completed in

19 19. 34

Unfortunately, in its desire to save money and in its preoccupation with a
vulnerable border with Gennany, the French government failed to pay suffi
cient attention to its navy prior to World War I; the French fleet slipped in world
3$
ranking from second to fifth place. How much of this situation was due to the
debate over doctrine is open to speculation.

Twentieth Century World Wars
During the First World War, the fleet's initial primary task was to maintain
the sea lines of communication (SLOes) with Algeria and then to patrol French
maritime frontiers. The SLOes were the vehicle that would enable a half-million

colonial soldiers and two hundred thousand workers to assist France in her hour
of need. Hence the navy 's contributions were strategic in nature, although it did
not engage in decisive battle with the Gennan High Seas Fleet. Without a major

guerre

de haute

mer role, there was no way to validate prewar decisive-battle

doctrinal development from actual performance in combat. Due to the French
Navy 's lack of compatibility with the Royal Navy and inability to operate with
the Grand and other allied fleets, the Mediterranean theater was split into
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national zones of responsibility, with the French Navy assigned the lion's
36
share. The resulting over-commitment of naval resources to the Mediter

ranean theater was a direct result of the inability to fonn an allied fleet, although

the French Navy did operate with the British in the Dardanelles. As in previous
wars, a naval brigade, the Brigade desfusiliers marins, fought ashore.
Following World War I, the French Navy became influenced by the
writings of Admiral Raoul Castex, whose influence endures today. His five
volume Theories stratigiques is perhaps the most complete theoretical survey
37
of maritime strategy ever.
A sixth volume, Melanges strategiques, was
published in 1 976 after his death. Castex completed an additional eighteen
major works and more than fifty journal articles. His Les idees militaires de La

marine du XVIIre sieck: De Ruyter a Suffren ( 1 9 1 1) makes major contribu

tions with respect to the differences between official doctrine and actual tactical
practices. The essence of Castex 's work can be found in a summary of some

2,600 pages of original

text in French, translated into

428

pages of English in

Strategic Theories. 38 His conclusions were that decisive naval battles were rare
in history and that the enemy fleet was not always the main object of an
operation or battle. Castex believed that naval doctrine should be offensive and
oriented toward a decisive battle. Suffren was Castex's professional role
model-standing doctrine should be abandoned if warranted by the tactical

situation. 39

On the other hand, Castex recognized that his task was to provide doctrine

for a second-ranking navy, one that would never hope to challenge the British.
Thus he fonnulated the concept of Laforce organisee, a main force that could
be mustered for a limited counteroffensive against a superior enemy. There is
some similarity between this concept and some of the ideas of Julian Corbett
40
in Britain.
Castex gave significant attention to commerce raiding, raids,
blockade, mine, and amphibious warfare. The centerpiece of his writings is
strategic manoeuvre, not battle. Castex wrestled with the influences of technol
ogy on doctrine but concluded that the aircraft did not signal the end of the
surface ship. In the final analysis, Castex is a blend of La grande guerre and the

jeune ecole.
Castex 's writings appear to have had only modest direct impact on the
41
On the other hand, his writings played the

behavior of French governments.

same role as did those of Admiral Mahan in the United States and elsewhere in
the world-they were used as textbooks and points of departure for internal
government position papers-and Castex is credited with saving the battleship.
One can also trace ideas from Theories strategiques to the creation of the new

College des Mutes etudes de defense nationale in 1 936. The existing Ecok de
59

guerre navale was supplemented by the Centre des Mutes etudes navales.
Theories strategiques was translated into Japanese and, for the Argentine
Navy, into Spanish. Various sections were translated into Serbo-Croatian,

Greek, and Russian. It has been widely used in Latin America and Mediter
ranean countries. In 1 943, the renowned American strategic thinker, Bernard
Brodie, recognized Castex in his A Layman 's Guide to Naval Strategy by stating
that .. the underlying value of the teachings of men like Mahan, Corbett, and
..42
Castex is still largely intact.
A few other French Navy officers had some influence during World War I
and the interwar years. Rear Admiral Jean-Baptiste Degouy wrote a series of
articles and books which, although illogical , nonetheless demonstrated a fun
damental failure of the naval officer corps to come to grips with the issue of
offensive versus defensive warfare. Others wrote articles and books in which
the failure of the battleship to obtain a decisive victory at Jutland was, incor
rectly, attributed to the submarine and concepts previously advocated by the

jeune ecole.
French Navy pol icy during the interwar years was also influenced by
Admiral Rene Daveluy, who, along with Naval Minister George Leygues
(minister from 1 925 to 1 933), became concerned with coastal defense and
implementing the various naval arms control treaties that would make large

scale battles at sea obsolete. On the other hand, for the first time since the Second
43
Daveluy wrote Les

Empire, France had a coherent navy policy and doctrine.

enseignements maritimes de la guerre anti-germanique ( 1 9 1 9), which pulled
no punches and admitted that the battleship had failed to deliver as expected in
the previous war. This book, however, had no real influence in France. Even

tually Daveluy advocated an all-submarine fleet and a policy of "sea denial"
rather than sea control-but his recommendations were ignored.
It was not until 1 938, under Fleet Admiral Fran�ois Darlan, that a naval
construction program began in earnest. That program, however, paid insuffi
cient attention to naval aviation, antiair warfare, and antisubmarine warfare.

France had over-committed herself with the promise to defend overseas pos
sessions. Honor prevailed, and resources that could have been devoted to a
defense of France herself were squandered on naval forces that neither saved
colonies nor contributed to protection of the homeland.
The French Navy participated in a number of brief operations with the Royal

Navy in the very early days of World War ll. Those forces of the French Navy
(the fourth l argest in the world at the time) that remained loyal to the Vichy
government were never put into a position where they would engage in major
44
Hence there was generally no

combat actions against their former allies.
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opportunity on either side to validate the prewar navy doctrine developed from
the thoughts and writings of Castex on general warfare. In 1 940, the French
force de raid at Mers-el-Kebir (Oran), Algeria, refused to sortie to allied,
neutral, or Caribbean ports, and Vice-Admiral Marcel Gensoul rejected an
ultimatum since it would have contravened the conditions of the armistice with
Germany. His force was dealt with effectively in port by the British Force H

under Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville. The French force X at Alexandria,
Egypt, under Vice Admiral Rene Godfroy, was demilitarized, and elements in
the West Indies remained out of the war. Vichy forces fought off a British and
Free French invasion of Dakar later that same year. In short, the French fleet
4S
was dismantled.
The value of the French Navy, however, can be measured by the efforts of
former allies to ensure that the fleet remained out of Axis hands. These efforts
must have been due to a healthy respect for French Navy capabilities, which
were, in part, a measure of French Navy doctrine. During the years of the Vichy
government, all doctrinal development ground to a halt. The French general
staff forbade the updating of doctrinal manuals, fearing that changes would be
interpreted by the Germans as being directed at them. This forced doctrinal

development to be done in secrecy. The fleet performed no major training
exercises, nor was it integrated into either the Italian or German force structure.

Germany negotiated for the use of the French Navy for some time, but the bulk
of the remaining French fleet at Toulon was scuttled at the end of 1 942 when
the Germans tried to seize it.

French forces that escaped the German occupation and chose to continue the

war operated outside normal political control. Eventually, most of the Fighting
Free French forces operated with the permiss ion of General Charles de Gaulle
but under the operational control and as an integral part of allied forces. Their
experiences while operating with foreign forces was to forever alter French
military and naval doctrine. Eventually French Navy forces participated in
integrated convoy escorting and amphibious assaults. Fighting Free French

forces operated at the same level of combat efficiency as their allies.

Doctrine during the

Cold

War

Free French Navy forces had been quick to adapt to allied naval doctrine
during the war, but where there was a choice between allies, the French were
usually more likely to accept the American way of war rather than the British
way. Simply put, the bitter aftertaste of Mers-el-Kebir was to last many years.

For example, following World War II France turned a good deal of its attention
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to the recovery and defense of overseas colonies. Most of this effort did not
require forces for fleet-versus-fleet interaction, yet the French concepts for
operations from the sea, using aircraft carrie rs, were based upon American
doctrine rather than the extensive British history.
One of the more interesting authors on naval matters during the 1 950s was
Vice Admiral Pierre Barjot. Admiral Barjot embraced the American method of
antisubmarine defense (offensive striking forces) and not the British (convoys).
Admiral Barjot wrote a number of substantive documents that were strategic,
46
doctrinal, and programmatic in nature. An unabashed supporter of aircraft
carriers and naval aviation, Barjot authored Vers la marine de l 'age atomique
47
Admiral Adolphe
( 1 955) and Histoire de la guerre aeronavale ( 1 96 1 ).
Lepotier prepared some excellent articles for publication in the Revue de la
defense nationale as well as two books, Mer contre Terre and La guerre dans
les trois dimensions. Unfortunately, these works were never followed up with
additional in-depth strategic thought.
On the other hand, France developed her own doctrine for naval diplomacy.
Rather than having large numbers of overseas-stationed combat forces as the
Americans did, or the "swing-through" doctrine of the Royal Navy, the French
often achieved the same political purpose with station ships of limited combat
potential. Although France still maintains the limited ability to intervene
48

overseas, the formal Force Amphihie d 'Intervention was disbanded in 1 969.

France was an original member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
and even though it did not routinely participate in its military command
structure during most of the Cold War, the French Navy developed into a serious
combat force with the most modem implements of war. Technological innova
tion continued, with France leading the West in development of surface-to-sur
face cruise miss iles. France did not attempt to challenge the superpower navies
of the United States or the Soviet Union but rested comfortably with its status,
which was equivalent essentially to that of Great Britain. French Navy doctrine

was developed for interactions against fleets of minor powers or to deny a major

power the full use of its fleet.

The commitment by various governments to maintain a navy portion of the

force defrappe limited France 's development of conventional warfighting
capability.

49

A lack of resources precluded both a nuclear and a serious

conventional warfighting capability. The French recognized that nuclear war

fighting at sea might be required if nuclear weapons had already been used

ashore. The only major role for conventional naval forces might be to sweep
the seas ahead of a miss ile-firing submarine to ensure that it would get to its

launch position unaffected by enemy antisubmarine forces. so The aircraft
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carrier represented a pre-strategic but nuclear-capable force that pennitted
some operational flexibility.

Admiral Marcel Duval 's new courses at the Ecole superieure de guerre de
Ia Marine enhanced doctrinal development. Then-Commander Michel Tripier

completed the "Fondements et principes de strategie maritime" ( 1 977), but this

paper was circulated within only navy circles until an extract appeared in 1990
51
in the journal Stratigique. R ear Admiral Hubert Moineville, French Navy

(Retired), published an excellent book, La guerre navale ( 1 982), which was
52
translated into English.
Although most of the boo k is devoted to overall

military strategy, the last three chapters deal with choices to be made in advance

of naval actions and the problems in conducting them. La guerre navale
examines many of the doctrinal issues that were being debated during the Cold

War, among them the issue of using conventional, or general purpose, forces
to ensure the combat stability of nuclear missile submarines.
Admiral Moineville correctly concludes that the introduction of long-range
nuclear-armed miss iles into navies has altered fundamentally the role of flrst

rank navies. For example, he reasons that the threat of using nuclear weapons

is now inherent in grand-scale naval warfare. His analysis of nuclear naval
warfare was in keeping with the thinking of most admirals and navies-nuclear
war at sea must be deterred because one weapon detonation would result in the
loss of a ship, if not an entire fonnation.
Old French patterns of interest in guerre de course can be found in
Moineville ' s appreciation for the economic vulnerability (especially with

respect to oil) of modem nations. In general, Moineville appreciates the

widening political role of naval forces but, like most naval officers, fails to get

into the doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons when used against shore targets.

In 1 98 1 Admiral Pierre Lacost published Strategies navales du present,

which was well received in France. A more recent work outlining the history
of naval thought in France and elsewhere is L 'evolution de Ia pensee navale,

edited by Herve Coutau-Begarie ( 1 990- 1 993) . Although not on doctrine direct
ly, L 'evolution de Ia pensee na vale provides an excellent source of doctrinal

history and should be translated into English for the wider audience that it
deserves. Finally, Vice Admiral Michel Tripier completed Ie Royaume
53

d 'Archimede in 1 993, just prior to his untimely death.

Military Doctrine in the French Anny
The French model would not be complete without an analysis of doctrine in
S4
The Belgian-invented and French-developed Montigny

the French Anny.
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mitrailleuse (machine

gun)

was introduced by the French Anny during the

Franco-Prussian War of 1 870- 1 87 1 .55 Although the mitrailleuse increased the
effective firepower on the battlefield over the rifle by an order of magnitude,
its introduction failed to turn the tide of that war in favor of the French. The
reasons were that the French Anny guarded their new capability too well and

were caught up on the technical details of development; it failed to devise an
effective doctrine for the new weapon or to test various tactics. Furthermore,
the mitrailleuse was ass igned to artillery units, where it was viewed as only a
rather short-range weapon that was extremely vulnerable to counter-battery
fire. Although the introduction of the mitrailleuse alone might have swung the
war in favor of France, its operational employment was disastrously ineffective.
The machine gun, however, was rapidly assimilated into the German and
Russian ground forces.
At the outbreak of World War I, the French Army was committed to the
defense of France, which would occur via a decisive engagement fought under
an offensive doctrine. The moral superiority of the offensive would yield an

eian that would be decisive. The defense of France would be achieved by a
clash against the German armed forces fought on foreign soil. An offensive war
of annihi lation was thought to be short, cheap, and more effective than the
defensive, but a correct analysis of the technology available at the time would
have concluded that the defensive was the proper doctrine to follow. (In
fairness, the same criticism can be made of the Union army during the American
Civi! War.)56

When the war did not develop as planned, and the defense of France required
a defensive doctrine, the army proved incapable of adapting, and millions of
men died in military operations that had no significant political purpose. The
French Ann y had a virtually inexhaustible supply of troops that it could throw
57
into mindless attacks-a by-product of the French Revolution.
This same
army was governed by a doctrine that did not allow for individual judgment to
resolve crucial questions and assumed that preplanned violence was enough to
overcome the enemy. 58
The conduct of the First World War on the ground has led some scholars to
conclude that "military professionals . . . usually incline toward the offensive. �9
60
When

There is the obvious need to motivate troops in the face of obstacles.

the political leadership of a nation assumes that the military is an acceptable
tool to obtain decisive political results, the military themselves will probably
be forced to favor an offensive doctrine from which decisive and positive results
61
will be obtained. Perhaps another lesson from World War I is that eian can
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and should be exhibited at the tactical level of warfare, but it need not exclude
fighting on the operational and strategic defensive.

The catastrophic and unexpected failure of the French Anny in the early days

of World War n can be attributed, in great part, to their strategy, and doctrine

for war.62 In general, the strategy and doctrine were compatible, but the French

Anny doctrine was based upon a fatally flawed strategy, and the strategy was
based upon an obsolete operational concept. S imply put, the French Anny
attempted to fight an attrition-styled war based upon defense, firepower,
centralization, and control in a series of sequential, methodical battles, while
the Gennan Anny had adopted a maneuver warfare doctrine of one continuous
battle that made the French response inadequate and self-defeating. Unfor

tunately, due to the nature of French Anny doctrine, there was no alternative.

When the need for change was recognized after defeats in the first phase of the
war, it was, simply, too late.

Essentially, France created an anny that could not cope with the unexpected

or respond to limited threats. One of the very few officers who dared to criticize

the overall plan for defense, General Charles de Gaulle, found his opinions
subsumed by political necessity. French military doctrine in the interwar years
became too pedantic and too theoretical; it was impractical, more suited for the

class room than the battlefield. Yet in the class room, officers were rewarded for
repeating huge quantities of rote data rather than for innovation.

The French Anny had in fact changed its doctrine from that of the annihila

tion-based approach of World War I to that of attrition, but did not do so quickly
or thoroughly enough. Technological developments in France were not viewed
as "revolutions in military affairs" but rather as minor modifications on the
existing consensus. Perhaps because the Gennan Anny had to divest itself of
equipment following World War I, it was better able to view the essence of the
new technological opportunities.

French Air Force doctrine was similarly deficient. Not only had the Air Force

failed to prepare a correct doctrine for the war, it overlooked significant voids
for employing existing forces in the war for which the anny prepared. France

simply did not have the right type or a sufficient number of aircraft to contest
local air superiority. During the interwar years, the air force and anny had

engaged in a bitter struggle over whether the proper role for aviation was

annihi lation by independent strategic bombing or by cooperating tactically with

the land forces engaged in attrition warfare. The result of this struggle was a
compromise force that was supposed to do both, but could do neither.

Blame for the fall of France can be laid at the feet of the political leadership

for its improper preparation of the anny ( poor high command structure, tenns
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of service, and the size of the active duty officer and non-comrnissioned officer
corps), although the officer corps as well deserves censure. The military
leadership of France was more concerned with bureaucratic details than with
the development of strategy and doctrine and with asking hard questions.

E

ven this brief review of over three hundred years of French Navy and
military doctrine in France reveals a treasure trove of lessons that should

have been learned. As the Royal Navy has, so the French Navy has emphasized
the development of tactical-level service-unique doctrine. That is not to say that
other forms of military doctrine have been ignored, but this is clearly where the
emphasis has been . There are many interesting lessons to be learned also by
contrasting the differences as well as noting the similarities between French
and British navy doctrine.
Contrasting French and British navy doctrine is somewhat unfair-an un
fairness compounded if we rely upon only traditional English language sources
that stress Britain's offensive victories. The French monarchy had a sophisti
cated concept of attrition warfare and defensive doctrine for its fleet. The Royal
French fleet achieved levels of success that were appropriate for France's
geography, strategic culture, overall strategy, and available resources. The fact
that the French naval doctrine would not have been appropriate for the Royal
Navy of Great Britain is immaterial and misleading.
Quite frankly, the hubris displayed by many American officers and scholars
in rebuffmg French Navy doctrine because of the lack of combat victories by
the French Navy during the Revolution or under Napoleon is shocking. We
should be looking for the lessons of doctrinal development and not prejudging
its value based upon what happened ashore or the actions taken by anny officers
or governments who set policies for the navy. To disregard the lessons of the
French Navy based upon such reasons is extremely poor scholarship and
considerably shortsighted. In the words of a well-respected scholar, "France

has had little just cause to be ashamed of her navy: the navy may have had some

just cause to be ashamed of France ..63
.

When the Comte de Grasse came to the aid of an embryonic United States
fighting for independence. his decisions off the Virginia Capes in 1 78 1 were
shaped by a defensive doctrine that gave primary importance to the protection
and support of actions ashore rather than the taking of enemy ships as prizes.
It is because of those decisions and actions that de Grasse supported success 
fully General George Washington and earned that officer's praise. America
remembers the strategic and operational-level vision of Admiral de Grasse , a
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fonner anny officer, rather than his modest tactical abilities at sea, defeat at the
Battle of the Saints, and eventual humiliation.

A review of French Navy doctrine practiced by a variety of commanders

reveals the strengths and weaknesses of defensive doctrine and warfare by
attrition. Reviews of French Anny warfare of both annihi lation and attrition,

and offensive and defensive doctrine, also demonstrate the inherent weaknesses
and strengths of these four methods. These positive and negative lessons have
value today-most importantly, that there is no one correct military doctrine
for all times and all places. French soldiers have paid heavily for their search
for the one correct doctrine that could ensure victory-"a cult of the correct
military doctrine." The search for such enduring and eternal principles can
discourage the adaptability and flexibility that is required in successfu l doctrine.
Doctrinal rigidity can also impede appreciation of potential technological
64
improvements.
Unlike doctrinal development ashore, France had few such major doctrinal
debates at sea-there was general consensus on the defensive doctrine and

guerre de course-although doctrine continued to evolve, even while technol

ogy remained relatively constant. Even with a defensive doctrine, at times
France was able to meet Britain as an equal at sea, while devoting her primary

attention to events ashore. The defensive doctrine and guerre de course warfare

of attrition employed by the navy often allowed significant victories at minimal
cost-a conservation of effort at sea. This was highlighted in the years 1 780-

1 782 with convoy victories and Suffren's operations in the Indian Ocean.
France also deserves credit for pioneering work on success fu l multinational
naval doctrine, major innovation in fleet organization as an aid to unity in action,
as well as for accepting the concept of fighting spirit, elan, as part of combat
potential. Clausewitz noted the valuable contribution of elan to the Grande
Annee of Napoleon Bonaparte; however, the unfortunate consequence of the
concept of elan was an unwarranted faith by French governments that supe
riority in spirit would make up for material and training deficiencies. Further
more, the history of French military doctrine reveals the dangerous

consequences if elan, as a concept to motivate warriors, is transferred from the

tactical level of war, where it belongs, to the operational and strategic levels or
to programming, where it does not.
One of the more interesting differences between French naval and military
doctrine was their treatment of elan. The navy fully accepted the fighting spirit
as

part of a defensive doctrine that would lead to strategic level victory, while

anny general officers, especially prior to World War I, assumed that a defensive
doctrine would signal moral weakness and lead to strategic defeat. Naval history
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suggests that fighting spirit and initiative can be an integral part of a defensive
doctrine-meaning that these tenns do not necessarily need to be synonymous
with

offensive warfare.

That the individual field commander ashore was often not granted the degree

of judgment accorded the co mmander at sea is another significant difference

between the French land and sea forces. To some extent, this can be explained
by the lack of modem long-range communications systems, but perhaps it was

due also to the lack of familiarity with warfare at sea by the governments ashore,
which resulted apparently in far less oversight and fewer courts-martial of naval
officers by French governments than were suffered by officers in the Royal
Navy.
The brutal effects wrought on doctrine by the changing governments in
France following the Revolution or during and after World War n may still be
instructive today. During the drastic changes in French governments, the officer
corps, in general, suffered greatly. When the corporate memory of an officer
corps is lost, the potential arises for both wholesale change (as during and after

World War

m

and a period of danger. During the first years of the Republic

and Napoleon, the French Navy fought without benefit of the experience gained
by its royalist warriors-experiences that had yet to be reflected in official
written doctrine. Had the French monarchy not been overthrown and its military
leadership not decapitated, subsequent naval battles against the British might
have ended quite differently. A lesson worth leaming here is that military
services should bridge drastic changes in governments as well as wholesale
doctrinal modification.
On the other hand, the speed with which great changes occurred in navy
doctrine during and after World War n were probably possible only because of
government changes brought about by that war. Although the changes in
government resulted in mass ive l osses of corporate military knowledge, the

ability to rapidly substitute new ideas also unfolded. Today, when we witness
the wholesale release of combat-proven officers into civilian life, we risk losing
the corporate knowledge of how to fight unless we take the time to document
that knowledge in formal written doctrine, but we also have the opportunity for
major doctrinal change. It is well to note that doctrinal change is most easily

feasible when there is a change in a government or during events that lead to
mass ive disruption of an officer corps.

Without combat to stimulate doctrinal development, we must tum to other

sources for such kindling. One source of doctrinal stimulation is new technol
ogy . Generally , new technologies are often thought to lead automatically to
improvements in combat potential. The jeune
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unless the full implications of new technologies are explained to governments,
there is a good chance that governments wi ll seize the opportunity to reduce
force structure (and therefore capability), resulting in

impaired

military ser

vices. Today we face similar challenges.
Force structure reductions may nonetheless come about if governments are
told that a new technology also allows attainment of political objectives at
reduced cost. In short, before revealing new technologies to government,
military specialists ought to well understand the potential negative consequen
ces. On the other hand, many of the officers of the jeune

ecole have earned an

unfair reputation for being short-sighted when, perhaps, they were trying to do
the best that they could under the reality of their political and fiscal circumstan
ces.
The governments of France have generally issued specific orders for the
overall missions of their fleets. Navy missions rarely, if ever, have included the
enemy fleet as the main objective. As at Trafalgar, the enemy fleet was an
obstacle to be overcome, not an objective. One problem of such a system is that
it assumes that the top governmental leadership understands what fleet missions
should be. Generally, however, governments consist of "landlubbers" with no

real knowledge of fighting at sea. Whose responsibility is it, then, to ensure that
the fleet is properly tasked?
The history of the French Navy is one of mismanagement by governments
who could have known better. If the navy itself does not educate its government,
then who will? If it is the role of the navy to educate its governments, then there
may be a need for officers who are skilled in administrative tasks and
bureaucratic maneuvering within the shore establishment and at the head
quarters level. There is a rich history of such officers in the French Navy, but

there is no clear-cut answer as to which efforts were more successful in doctrinal
development, those of the administrative officer or those of the warfighter.
Perhaps it would be more correct to view the relationship between administra
tive and combat officers as a partnership that makes a complete whole. Clearly,

doctrine must be acceptable to those at sea, but there is a long history of superior
warriors who departed the field of battle without leaving behind a legacy of
doctrine or even lessons that were worthy of their triumphs.
The Frenc h and British navies operated under formal doctrine during
the better part of their histories. They faced similar concerns but used
different approaches in their attempts to solve doctrinal issues. By compar
ing and contrasting the history of doctrine in these two great navies, we can
examine doctrinal issues that all navies undoubtedly need to address , regardless
of the technologies involved or the government being served. Simply put, a
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comparative approach to the history of naval doctrine yields the process
common to both.
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Doctrine in the Spanish Navy
James J. Tritten

THE

FIRST WRITfEN NAVY DOCTRINE was issued in Spain in the year
1 270 by the king of Castile. I Ten laws fonned the legal code of maritime
warfare, the first of which stated that warfare at sea and warfare ashore are
different and that each requires its own type of individual. The code also
recognized two basic forms of naval warfare-that between major fleets and
that between only a few ships. The second law discussed the types of men
required for maritime warfare. The third through the sixth dealt with the
necessary qualifications and selection of admirals, ships' captains, navigators,
and other officers. The seventh law considered what types of ships are to be
employed for warfare at sea, and the eighth drew a comparison between the
support requirements of ships and horses. The ninth law stated that ships must
be supplied in order to fight, and it established what stores warships were to
carry. The last law readdressed the differences between land and sea warfare;
it also explained how to divide the profits of victory.

Early Years-C l ose

Aboard Battl e

The union of Castile and Aragon in 1 479 fonned the embryonic modem state
of Spain. The next substantive work of navy doctrine was written by Alonso de
Chaves between 1 520 and 1 538, during the reign of Carlos I (and during two
2
wars with France- 1 52 1 - 1 529 and 1 535 - 1 538). De Chaves advanced the
concepts of squadron fonnations, the use of artillery, and the taking of the
weather gauge (i.e., the upwind side) during battle. This is the earliest written
record that we have of fighting fonnations and tactical principles. De Chaves '
work was adopted and modified by King Henry VIII of England and became
the first written navy doctrine issued in Britain. 3
De Chaves argued that when two fleets meet, one fonnation is usually better
than the other. With this in mind, he recommended battle fonnations that would
maximize combat potential. His concept called for close-order engagement
based upon galley tactics. But de Chaves failed to take into account the
uncertainty of seamanship with ships of sail and assumed mistakenly that
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relative positions could be maintained easily. In other words, navy doctrine
failed to account for the new technological environment. 4
The navy was fmally separated from the army in 1 586, and from the
mid-sixteenth through the seventeenth centuries Spain maintained divisions and
squadrons of naval forces in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific.
In addition to operational missions, the divisions performed administrative and
logistical functions. The Capitan General de la Mar Oceano held overall
command of the Atlantic division, an ocean-going fleet of three subordinate
squadrons based at Vizcaya, Guiplizcoa, and Portugal, as well as the Guard of
the Straits of Gibraltar. The Atlantic division also included an independent
squadron at Dunquerque (which maintained station in los Paises Bajos [the low
countries]) and an independent Armada de Barlovento based in the Antilles.
The Capitan General de la Mar commanded the Mediterranean division, which
consisted of subordinate squadrons in Spain, Naples, Sicily, and Genoa. The
Pacific division consisted of the Armada de Peru (also known as the Armada
del Mar del Sur) as well as task groups of various sizes that were deployed to
the Philippines.
From 1568 to 1 648 Spain and England fought the Eighty Years' War (otherwise
known as the Dutch War of Independence), largely over control of Holland. In
1588, the one hundred thirty ships of the Spanish Armada, manned by 30,000 men
(two-thirds of whom were soldiers), attempted to invade England. The concept of
operations for the Armada was to fight a close-in battle at sea, which would enable
the Spanish to use their superiority to board enemy ships. After all, Philip II's
brother, Don John of Austria, had used this same galley-oriented doctrine to win
at the recent Battle of Lepanto ( 1 57 1 ), as had Philip's own forces, who achieved
success over the French in the Battle of Punta Delgada in the Azores ( 1 582). The
overall tactical obi:tives in these battles were to select an opponent and board in
a general milie. The battle of 1 582 in the Azores, under the command of
Captain-General Don Alvaro de Bazan. Marques de Santa Cruz, reinforced the
need for sailing ships that could engage in distant water combat. The undefeated
Santa Cruz planned the Armada and would have been its commander had he not
died (in 1 588).6 Copies of the instructions that Santa Cruz issued at sea in July 1587
to govern the fight near the island of San Miguel in the Azores are housed in the
national archives at Simancas.7 The instructions to the Armada from Philip II in
April 1 588 are also stored there. 8
The English recognized that the sailing skills of the Spanish, the size of their
forces, and their tactics gave them the advantage. The ships of England therefore
kept their distance and used long-range artillery to wreak havoc on the defensive
galley-oriented formations of the Armada. The English held a logistical
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advantage, being close to their ports for reprovisioning, and while the

Spanish commander, Don Alonso Perez de Guzman, Duke of Medina
S idonia recognized this , his written sailing orders made clear that he

e x p ected Spai n ' s relig ious and moral superiority to overcome that

advantage.9 The previous destruction of twenty-three merchant ships at
Cadiz in 1 587 and the failure of the Annada in 1 588 began a major naval

decline in Spain. As a result of a combined Anglo-Dutch effort in 1 596,

Cadiz was occupied and the Spanish fleet again neutralized.
Combat instructions

used

by the fleets of the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries were modified to abandon galley concepts. These changes were
contained in various books and instructions issued by local commanders

throughout these years. The fundamental source of navy doctrine through the

eighteenth century was Bernardino de Mendoza's Theorica y practica de

guerra ( 1 596). It contained the basic fundamentals of theories of war, including
warfare at sea, for the Spanish.

During the Eighty Years ' War, Spain battled France ( 1 635- 1 659) and

suffered naval defeat at the hands of the French embryonic fleet. The Spanish
battled the Dutch throughout the Eighty Years ' War, but it was the Battle of the

Downs ( 1 639) that conflnned Spain 's naval eclipse. The consequences of a

subsequent Anglo-Spanish War ( 1 654- 1 659) were also unfortunate for Spain.

After years of war with England, Spain found it essential to devise a method

that would ensure the security of treasure ships, and in the mid-sixteenth

century it introduced the concept of convoy escorts. 10 These escort ships were
essentially armed merchantmen, and although they were stable gun platfonns

because of the large cargo capacity of their hulls, they lacked maneuverability,

even with improved designs.

Command of Spanish ships of the line was divided: one officer was in charge

of the soldiers at sea, and another commanded the ship's company.

This system of
command and manning
policy reflected a naval doctrine that called for a warship to be both a platfonn for

dual command lasted for nearly a hWldred years. The

small-arms shooting by troops as well as a platform for artillery fire by seamen.

This result was that Spanish crews were generally half of marines and half of
seamen-consequently they could do the job of neither kind of platform very well.
French Influence
In 1700, under Philip V (the fll'St Bourbon king, a Frenchman and a descendent
XIV), a true national navy, the Armada Real, was organized in Spain.
Early on, during the War of the Spanish Succession ( 170 1 - 1 7 14), this new
of Louis
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national navy did not have a particularly successful record. A Spanish treasure
fleet escorted by a French squadron under Admiral Chiteaurenault was attacked
successfully in port at Vigo in 1 702 by the Dutch and the English. The
engagement of the Dutch and English against the combined Franco-Spanish
fleet off Malaga in 1 704 reaffmned the defensive control-oriented doctrine

advocated by the French naval theorist Pere Paul Hoste, I I who influenced
12
Spanish Navy doctrine until the early nineteenth century.
Spain could not
prevent an army from landing in Catalonia, and Madrid was subsequently
captured. The War of the Spanish Succession at sea was largely a guerre de

course; both sides lost some 1 ,500 merchantmen.
The Bourbon rule in Spain instilled many bureaucratic and administrative
refonns in addition to the creation of a national navy. There was the important
provision in 1 7 1 7 that midshipmen would serve as the Royal Company of
Marine Guards. This young national fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral
Antonio Gaztaiieta y de lturri balzaga, was virtually destroyed by British
Admiral George Byng at the Battle of Cape Passaro ( 1 7 1 8) (also known as the

Battle of Messina). The defeat at Passaro , a battle that was initiated just prior
to the formal declaration of the War of the Quadruple Alliance ( 1 7 1 8 - 1 720),
resulted in Spain's further loss of control of the Mediterranean Sea and the
subsequent inability to defend her coastline from disastrous English raiding

attacks. Although the defeat of the escorting force at Cape Passa ro did not
interfere with the arrival of the 340 transports with 33,000 troops that recaptured
Sicily, it did affect Spain's abi lity to support a distant army. The defeat at Cape
Passaro and the end of the wars with the Quadruple Alliance resulted in a
resurgence in Spanish naval construction.

Founding a Modem Navy
Admiral Gaztafieta, who had fought at Passaro , was the father of modern
Spanish Navy shipbuilding methods. He wrote Proporciones de las medidas
mas esenciales ... para lajtibrica de los navios yfragatas de guerra, que pueden
montar desde ochenta canones hace diez . . ( 1 720), an excellent boo k on
.

warship design. Gaztafieta also served as the First Director of Naval Construc
tion. Spanish fleet construction shifted to warships designed to provide convoy
escorts rather than fight decisive engagements against an enemy battle fleet.
Francisco Cornejo's Instrucciones y ordenes ( 1 732) furnished naval doctrine
and planning for an amphibious operation at Oran between June and November

1 732. A Spanish fleet of some fifty escorts and five hundred transports brought
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an anny of 30,000 men who captured a large fortified city being defended by
Bey Hassan.
Jose Patmo, the father of the modern Spanish Navy, was Intendent and later
Minister of the Navy-one of the Bourbons' better appointments. His early
service to the crown was with the anny as an administrator. Patmo 's main task
was to rebuild the navy and develop shipyard locations that could be defended,
thereby making them safer and less vulnerable to British attack from the sea.
Under Patmo the fleet expanded its capabilities with ships of the line that were
designed for decisive sea battle. At the time of his death in 1 736, Spain
possessed a professional fleet of considerable strength. 1 3
In an interesting interpretation of international law , a defensive alliance with
Spain obligated France to provide warships to Spain during the latter's War of
Jenkins 's Ear ( 1 739- 1 743) with England. A French squadron of twenty-two
ships operated essentially as part of the Spanish fleet and convoyed a division
of Spanish ships to North American waters, deterring a British attack on the
Spanish. Otherwise during this war France claimed the rights and privileges of
a neutral. Cooperative interaction between the French and Spanish fleets over
the years led eventually, however, to the development of multinational navy
doctrine.
The worst defeat the British suffered at the hands of the Spanish in the
eighteenth century was the abortive amphibious invasion of Cartagena de
Indias, led by Admiral Edward Vernon and General Wentworth between 1 740
and 174 1 . The defending Spanish naval commanders-Vice Admiral Bias de
Lezo and General Sebastian Eslava, Viceroy of New Granada-fought with
6,000 sailors and troops in their defended fortifications against 30,000 troops
and 120 ships. Admiral de Lezo, a Basque, fought with courage and tenacity.
He had served at Oran in 1732 and put his knowledge into practice in the
subsequent defense of Cartagena; he fought the English at the outer fortifica
tions and refused to surrender. His personal presence was reminiscent of
Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson; Admiral de Lezo fought with one leg, one arm,
and one eye. He had lost the leg fighting at Velez-Malaga in 1 704 and his eye
at Toulon. 1 4
The Spanish Navy again demonstrated its strength against the English during
the War of the Austrian Success ion ( 1 740- 1748), in actions off Cape Sicie
( 1 744), near Toulon. In that battle, a French fleet under Admiral La Bruyere de
Court escorted a Spanish squadron under Don Juan Jose Navarro through a
blockading English fleet under Admiral Thomas Mathews. De Court, who was
under orders not to fire unless attacked, offered to mix his ships amongst the
Spanish. Navarro refused and, although the subsequent tactical engagement was
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indecisive, the Spanish squadron made its way

to

Cartagena, where Navarro

was decorated with the title of Marques de la Victoria. Spain remained neutral

during the Seven Years War ( 1 756- 1 763), although she took advantage of the
•

opportunity to recapture Minorca from the British.
In 1759 Carlos ill took the throne and ushered in another era of administra
tive reform. In 1 776, then-Lieutenant Jose de Mazarredo Salazar wrote a tactical
IS

Rudimentos de tdctica naval para instruccion de
los oficiales subalternos de marina contained only minimal sections on how to

treatise for junior officers.

actually fight an enemy, but it did introduce innovative methods for breaking
the line and using ftreShips. Mazarredo later wrote a signal book that bore the
strong influence of French works by Jean Fran�ois de Cheyron, Chevalier du
Pavilion. This signal boo k was prepared for use in combined operations of the
Franco-Spanish fleets; it was far simpler than the French book that was actually

used. The close cooperation between the French and the Spanish fleets was no

doubt a result of common Bourbon rule.
A combined Franco-Spanish fleet in 1779, during the American War of
Independence, prompted the issuance of French Navy doctrine for both fleets.
Admiral Louis Guillouet, Comte d'Orvilliers, was given overall command, and
he prepared a revised instruction and signal book

to be used

by both fleets.

Spanish ships were integrated within the French fleet as well as maintained as
a national force in a separate Squadron of Observation that would join the battle
once the enemy was engaged.
Under the command of Admiral Lord George Brydges Rodney, a consider
able portion of the British Channe l Fleet seized the opportunity to attack a
Spanish convoy and then a Spanish squadron under the command of Admiral

Langara, at the Battle of Cape of Santa Maria <also known as the "Moonlight
Battle," or the Battle of Cape St. Vincent, 1780) . British convoys were lost in
subsequent strikes by the combined fleet, and in 1780 and 178 1 Admiral of the
Fleet Luis C6rdoba y C6rdoba inflicted two of the most destructive attacks on
English convoys. In the 1780 victory by a combined fleet under Spanish
command, fifty-five British ships, 3,000 sailors, and weapons and supplies
bound for Jamaica were captured. Between 1779 and 1782, Spain unsuccess

fully engaged in a siege and an amphibious campaign against the British at
Gibraltar. On the other hand, between 1779 and 1782 Carlos ill supported the
American and Spanish forces, capturing eastern Florida < 1 780) and the
Bahamas (178 1). In 1 782 the Spanish once again recaptured the naval base at
Minorca from a British garrison .
Spanish Navy doctrine was now influenced by two additional French

theoretical works. 16 The fll'St was L 'art de la guerre sur mer,
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( 1 787) by Commodore Jurien, Vicomte de Grenier. This succinct work was
very much oriented towards battle, not control. Grenier stressed massing
strength against weakness. Despite some rather innovative suggestions for
tactical disposition of the fleet, he was essentially biased in favor of defense
and wars of attrition. Admiral Clause Fran�ois, Comte d'Amblimont, wrote in

1 788 an influential book, Tactique navale, ou traite sur les evolutions, sur les
signaux et sur les mouvemens de guerre, which also emphasized innovation.
D ' Amblimont advanced the idea of breaking the fleet into separate pelotons,
or tactical groups, with different functions.

Toward the end of his reign ( 1 759- 1 788), Carlos ill ordered the fonnation

of "working-up squadrons" to train crews in navigational exercises and tactics.
Retired senior officers with proven combat experience provided their services
to the two squadrons that were eventually fonned. Because of the humiliation
he had suffered at the hands of the Royal Navy in 1744 while King of Naples,

Carlos ill now gave a great deal of support to the Spanish Navy. In 1785 the
navy was officially christened IA Armada Espanola (a title it retains today
despite the subsequent frequent changes of government). In 1 793 navy regula
tions were issued to prepare ships for battle-a battle that was to occur
immediately; 1 7 France declared war on Spain in 1793. By 1 795 the two nations
had made peace with each other, but one year later Spain and France were once
again at war, with Britain.

Deve l opment during the French Revo lution
While they had excellent signal books and tactical manuals, the Spanish fleet

during this era was not well trained and was wanting in men and supplies. As

a consequence, an escort under the command of Vice Admiral Don Jose de
Cordoba y Cordoba, accompanying an extremely valuable convoy, suffered a
crushing defeat against the well-trained British Mediterranean Fleet at
the Battle of Cape st. Vincent ( 1 797). The British had benefited from the
experiences of frequent combat against the French and were thus fighting at the
height of their combat potential. Fortunately for Spain, the British commander
at Cape St. Vincent, Rear Admiral John Jervis, did not understand the value of

the convoy to the Spanish economy and concentrated his attack on their
8
warships rather than on the capture of their transports. 1
Admiral Jose de Cordoba's report following his defeat at Cape St. Vincent,

which was published in the Gaceta de Madrid ( 1 797), indicates that he was
quite unprepared for command and battle fleet maneuver. During this era,
the Spanish Navy was inundated with officers who had little experience in
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aggressive sea duty. This was in direct contrast to the leadership and command
qualities of the Royal Navy officers, whose practical knowledge drew from

longer periods at sea and longer periods of combat engagement. 1 9 Under

manned ships with crews that lacked camaraderie compounded Spain's
problems.

Jose de Mazarredo Salazar, whose next publication was Advertencias para

caso de combale ( 1 797), achieved a fme combat record and eventually rose to
the rank of vice admiral. He was never defeated at sea, but because he publicly

expressed concern over the condition of the fleet and its lack of combat
capability, he was never entrusted with major fleet command at a critical
moment during Spain 's history. Mazarredo also criticized the Spanish method
of manning ships, which denied interchangeability of tasks among crew mem

bers by devoting a large part of the crew to one task (marines shooting small
arms) and the other crew members to another task (sailors manning long-range
20
cannon). Mazarredo also had the audacity to question Spanish foreign policy.
Commodore Cosme Damian Churruca y Elorza was another fme combat

officer and superb seaman. He wrote Instruccion sobre punteriLJS para el uso

de los baxales del Rey, a publication that attempted to deal with the problems

of naval artillery, advanced mathematics, and navigation. He served as a

consultant on seamanship to the French Navy, and had he not died at Trafalgar,
he certainly would have been destined for higher leadership in the navy.

Tratado de seflales de dia y noelle, e hipotesis de ataques y defensas,

dispuesto por el &tado Mayor de Marina para auxiliar III instruccion de este

ramo ( 1 804) is one of the most sophisticated tactical and signalling books ever
produced. This official navy doctrine book excelled in its analysis of battle

tactics and clearly put the offensive ftrst. An extremely complex signalling

system allowed the commander to indicate some 576 signals by flag. The book
also includes a translation of two of the major doctrinal ftghting and signalling

works published by British Admiral Lord Richard Howe as well as summaries
of the extremely innovative works of Grenier and d' Amblimont.

Napoleonic Era
During the Napoleonic Wars ( 1 803- 1 8 1 5), Spain again fought the British,
and at times Spain also fought the French. At the Battle of Trafalgar ( 1 805), the
Spanish and French fleets operated as a combined force, although in separate
national squadrons. Prior to the battle these two navies had not exercised as a
combined fleet and therefore had not attempted to tack thirty-three warships
from south to north, a maneuver made all the more awkward by light winds that
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prevented the fonnation of a solid defensive battle line?l Admiral Don Federico
Gravina, perhaps more pliant and diplomatic than the cantankerous Mazarredo
(who probably would have made a more effective commander), was unable to
override the defensive doctrine of the French Navy and put into practice the

new offensive Spanish doctrine outlined in Tratado tk seflales.22 Mazarredo
certainly would have objected to his ships being manned with crews that were

combined of marines and other infantrymen, which resulted in a close-aboard
battle rather than engagement of the British at a distance. The bravery of the
Spanish officers and men at Trafalgar cannot be questioned, and we can only

speculate on what the outcome might have been had the Spanish fleet operated
under their new navy doctrine and under a proven combat leader such as
Mazarredo. Given Gravina's role as a diplomat in France prior to Trafalgar, his

selection as the commander of the Spanish fleet is understandable. The disaster
at Trafalgar, however, resulted in another major decline in Spanish naval
preparedness .
The immediate threat was from the French forces that crossed the border in

1 808. As with France's preoccupation with the Gennans later in the nineteenth

century, neither the French nor the Spanish fleets could affect the outcome of
more important threats from across the border. cadiz, from which the combined
fleet sailed, became the hotbed of resistance to French occupation forces and

the seat of the government in exile. The Bourbon king abdicated in 1 808 and
was replaced by Joseph Napoleon-Bonaparte's brother. By the next year,
France had conquered most of Spain.

With the loss of her overseas colonies, Spain faced the immediate need to

resolve the problem of lost income. Using her limited naval forces, Spain

attempted to pacify her American colonies during the Spanish-American wars
of independence ( 1 8 1 0- 1 824) but was unable even to protect them from
privateers. Her weakened navy proved incapable of supporting such a major
undertaking.23 Great Britain, which used its fleet to thwart Spain's attempt to
regain the colonies, thus secured for itself a favorable trade status. The newly
independent Latin American republics secured the services of foreign seamen
who successfully defended their new status.

Napoleon was defeated in 1 8 1 4, and the Bourbon monarchy was reinstated.

Civil unrest in Spain followed and resulted in another French invasion to quell
the unrest. Spain turned increasingly inward during the nineteenth century and

undertook to set up a constitution to address various uprisings and separatist
movements; the first Spanish Republic was proclaimed by 1 873. During this

era, which introduced the ironclad, there could hardly have been consistent

advancement in navy doctrine.
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The Spanish Navy followed the doctrine advocated by M azarredo and

contained in Tratado de senales until Lobo Malagamba prepared a revised text

on naval tactics in

1 862.24 This first such doctrine for Spanish Navy steam ships

was the basic doctrine for fleet employment during the campaign in the Pacific
in

1 866 against Chile and Peru, under the command of Rear Admiral Mendez

Nunez.25

The next two doctrinal publications were written by Federico Ardois in

1 884-Cuaderno de evoluciones and COdigo de escuadra. These two publica
tions governed fleet actions during the Spanish-American War ( 1 898) and were
kept as the basic doctrine for the fleet (with modifications in 1 929 and 1935)

until the end of World War II. The absence of continuous combat (it was also
true for the British Navy) appears to have discouraged naval thought.

The Spanish-American War
Spain 's major combat at sea following Trafalgar was the war with the United

States in

1 898. Two major maritime campaigns were fought in the Spanish

American War. In the Philippines Campaign, Rear Admiral Patricio Montojo
recognized the inferiority of his forces and planned to fight at anchor, sup

plementing his naval guns with artillery from shore batteries. The crew 's

inadequate practice in gunnery, the ships' anchorage beyond the range of most
shore batteries, and a surprise attack at night by Admiral George Dewey, U.S.

Navy, made the Battle of Manila Bay a one-sided contest-though Dewey

himself congratulated Montojo for the bravery of the Spanish sailors. Respon
sibility for the debacle can be assigned to the government that sent the ill

prepared forces and to the colonial leaders in Manila who would not allow a

retreat. Montojo's error was primarily in allowing the Americans to enter the

bay unopposed, much the same as had the Turks at the Battle of Navarino

(1 827). Had Montojo fought at the outer part of the bay, he might have

succeeded in forcing the Americans to blockade rather than engage. Montojo

was court-martialed but exonerated-due partially to the support that he
received from Admiral Dewey!26

The Caribbean campaign was more interesting and controversial, starting

with the recommendations of Admiral Pascual Cervera, who recognized that

the offensive strikes and blockade ordered by the government were beyond the

capability of his small fleet. Cervera believed that his forces were capable of
merely defending the homeland. Despite this, he was ordered, and at least

attempted, to defend Puerto Rico. Cervera outmaneuvered the American fleet
and managed to enter the harbor at Santiago,
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fleet-in-being. The Americans eventually drew out the fleet as a result of joint
actions taken ashore and at sea. and Cervera was defeated in the resulting
27
battle.

The Twentieth Century
Spain remained neutral during the First World War. Spanish naval actions
during the Civil War ( 1 936- 1939) consisted primarily of blockading and
breaking blockades. After years of constitutional and governmental upheaval,
some degree of stability arrived with the rule of General Francisco Franco, who
maintained Spanish neutrality during the Second World War. After 1945, the
navy accepted an American light aircraft carrier into her fleet. Spain undertook
a major revision in navy doctrine in 1 966 with efforts by the National War
28
College faculty and an ad hoc group of senior officers. Most of their work
appears to have been programmatic in nature-deftning future navy require
ments rather than basic battle doctrine. With Franco 's death on 20 November

1975, a constitutional Bourbon monarchy was restored. While Spain entered
into NATO in 1982 and adopted Alliance navy doctrine, there remain a few

national concerns that are outside NATO's area of operations and for which
Spain must maintain her own separate concepts of operations, such as defense
of North African territories.
Establishing doctrine was easy for the Spanish Navy. The predominance of
Catholicism in the nation may be an explanation for why the average officer

accepted easily the concept of doctrine. Indeed, profess ional writings in the
29
United States have noted this parallel between doctrine and religion. As in
other navies, doctrine was not the province of just the warri or; it often involved
participation of those outside the navy. Perhaps the most important lessons to
be learned from Spain's experiences with written navy doctrine are:
•

It took a very long time to change doctrine in the Spanish Navy, that is, to

shift from close-aboard battle to long-range artillery engagements and to update
basic steamship doctrine, which remained unchanged until the end of World
War n.
•

Doctrinal development moved along an oblique path, due to the frequent

changes in Spain's government as it gradually became a modem nation.
•

Close doctrinal cooperation between France and Spain during the age of

sail was a disaster for true Spanish interests-a result of political rather than
military considerations.
•

Successful innovation was virtually imposs ible without a champion at

court.
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•

Doctrinal innovation does not build and develop without frequent combat.

•

And, fmally, for reasons of history, officers of the Spanish Navy take for

granted that there will always be written navy doctrine.
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The History of Italian Naval Doctrine
Vice Admiral Luigi Donolo, Italian Navy (Retired)

M

ILITARY

DOCfRINE AND NAVAL DOCTRINE are tenns used only

rarely by Italian authors. and when used, they often mean military art,

naval art, and sometimes, strategy. To consider, therefore, what is meant by
mil itary or naval doctrine in Italy. it is necessary to address first these concepts
of military and naval art and strategy .
To Italians, a rt is th e combination o f techniques o r methods used t o achieve
goals (for example in a profession or in a business). Military art, therefore, is
the complex of knowledge, techniques, and methods acquired through study or
experience and used to prepare the military instrument. The purpose is to obtain
a sound decision-making instrument and an effective combat leadership. The
goal is victory.
Lieutenant General Raimondo Montecuccoli, an Italian, fought for the
Austrian Hapsburg empire in the seventeenth century. He won more than forty
battles and wrote extensively on military art. His major work was

guerra (Treatise

Trattato della

on War). The quality and originality of his thoughts deserve
1
be
mentioned,
as
they have a dignity equal to that of Clausewitz. The military
to
art of Montecuccoli is the art of fighting well to win.
Another interesting definition of military art has been proposed by Rear
Admiral Luigi Fincati in his book

Milita ry Aphorisms ( 1 882).

Military art for

him was "the complex of knowledge and capacities needed to coordinate, move,
and lead a group of armed men against the other side, obtaining the best from
each element and maintaining the group's cohesion at the same time . 2
..

According to Admiral Giuseppe Fioravanzo, in his A

Histo ry of Naval

Tactical Thought ( 1956), military art is a combination of strategy

and tactics,

wherein strategy is defmed as "the art of conducting war" and tactics as "the

art of fighting war . 3 This latter definition of military art, which see ms incom
..

plete and excess ively general, shows how difficult it is to circumscribe the
meanings of some words. In Italian usage, the tenn doctrine has also meant
tactics when referring to tactical-level doctrine.
Strategy in Italy is generally understood as the concept of using the battle
for the purposes of war, or using military means in support of politics. Today 's

military strategy is usually defmed as the element of general strategy that
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specifies the way the military should act to achieve the objectives of national
military politics, an alliance, or a coalition.
The tenn military politics is commonly used to denote a distinct component
of general politics. It is based on the nation's historical and social background
and is driven by a current situation and the resources available. Military politics
establishes the general objectives to be achieved by the military to fulfill the
needs of the country, associated international institutions, or alliances. It must
operate to preserve, support, and integrate the overseas policies where and when
relationships have been established.
According to current Italian interpretations, the tenn doctrine is the whole
of notions or principles, organically elaborated and ordered, to be considered
either as an object to study or as a standard for theory and practice, or the whole
of knowledge acquired and coordinated through study, which forms the culture
of a person or of an organization. Doctrine, therefore, can be either fmnly
prescriptive, as in religion or in a political ideology, or basically descriptive.
As a complex of principles, military doctrine may deal with more than one area.
It is therefore acceptable that this tenn be used as a substitute for military
politics, strategy, or tactics.
In Italy, therefore, the tenn military doctrine is controversial and allows
several interpretations. Many writers believe it should be mainly descriptive,
leaving the necessary freedom of action to deal with particular events or
exceptional situations. For the purpose of this study, it is sufficient to consider
mi litary doctrine as the collection of rules and principles that specify how to
conduct military operations with the aim of fulfilling strategic objectives.
Doctrine takes into account the lessons of history, the decisions in military
politics, and the strategies chosen to deal with crises, conflicts, and so on. This
definition places military doctrine on a level of hierarchy that stands below
military politics and strategy, and above tactics.
Doctrine is closely connected to military art. A graphical representation
could be a circle wherein lie military politics, military strategy, military
doctrine, naval doctrine, and tactics, connected sequentially but also linked with
one another by lines indicating reciprocal influence and dependence.
Synonymous with naval thought, doctrine includes the preparation of assets and
their planned use in war or in emergencies. Doctrine impacts on the navy 's
organization and administration, training of personne l , naval strategies and
tactics, and the procurement of annaments. Hence, the core of naval doctrine
is the set of principles (as well as beliefs and values) that guides a naval
organization in war or in carrying out other maritime operations in peacetime
or during crises. These rules indicate what the navy must be, who or what it
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must represent, how it must behave, and for what future contingencies it must
prepare itself. It must also consider all fonns of cooperation with other services

and allied nations, all possible miss ions, as well as assoc iated specialized

doctrine for cooperation with air forces and doctrine when operating under

NATO or United Nations Organization auspices.
Naval doctrine, therefore, represents the essential link between strategy and
tactics: if there is no doctrine, strategy cannot be translated into tactical actions.
Doctrine generally has a long lifetime, while strategy and tactics are more
dynamic. Naval doctrine is also subordinate to military doctrine and must be a
guide and reference point for the navy on all occasions and for all undertakings.
In reconstructing the history of naval doctrine in Italy, it is well to bear in
mind that, while military literature on land operations boasts a very rich ancient
bibliography, there is little treatment of naval doctrine. This lack of doctrinal
literature probably resulted because events at sea were not suitable to academic
inquiry, and naval operations were often seen as complementary and paralleling
those ashore. With this in mind, we will undertake to ascertain the navy 's actual
doctrine through observations of its behavior and from examples of the litera
ture that codified the doctrine.

Early Italian Navies
Some of the greatest medieval battles were fought in the Mediterranean by
the maritime republics of Genoa, Pisa, and Venice . A fourth republic, Amalfi,
had a merchant navy tradition. The maritime tradition established by these
republics has been kept alive, and their coats of anns have bee n carried on the
Italian Navy flag since the republic was established in 1 946.
The battle of Meloria in 1 284 (between the Pisans and the Genoese), Curzola

in 1298 (between the Venetians and the Genoese), and Bosphor and Loiera in

1 352 (between the Genoese and a coalition led by the Venetians) provide
examples wherein tactical art was written "at sea" by successful admirals in the
age of oar. Fireanns were used aboard ships at the Battle of Zierikzee in 1 304,
where the Genoese admiral, Ranieri Grimaldi, defeated the Flemish.
At the Battle of Curzola, Genoese Admiral Lamba Doria's superior tactics
resulted in the defeat of the numerically more powerful Venetian fleet. The
admiral's tactics were, essentially, to close in on the enemy quickly, break
through their defensive formation, concentrate his force against only a part of
the enemy line, and then commit his reserves at the height of battle. Reserves
were considered so important that they were maintained even at the expense of
a reduction in main forces. The Genoese were the unbeaten masters in applying
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this doctrine. Their attacks were always carned out at the right moment, in a
very decisive way, and using stratagems such as hiding the reserves.

Written fighting instructions were issued occasionally by various naval com

manders operating in Renaissance Venice. The earliest of these efforts was the

Orders and Signals of the Venetian Fleet in

1365.4 These orders included specific

operational fonnations as well as signals to indicate the fleet commander's intent
By the time the Battle of Lepanto

( 1 57 1 )

occurred, the primarily unwritten

doctrine and tactics of galley warfare in the Mediterranean had been perfected
to the degree that each side could have been considered a master of the naval
art. Indeed, the battle was fought much the same as a joust between knights,

with all of the fonnalities accorded gentlemen under anns . Although the
Christian commander at Lepanto, Don John of Austria, was Spanish, many
ships were from Italian city-states, the largest contribution coming from Venice.

The Christian fleet numbered well in excess of two hundred galleys, galleasses,
and subsidiary ships of sail, and the Turkish fleet had roughly the same strength.
The Christians, who held superiority in numbers of cannon (roughly

2.4: 1),

fought as an integrated multinational force . Overall political objectives were
set by Pope Pius V and Philip II of Spain.
Before sailing, each Christian captain received written orders from Captain
General Don John outlining specific cruising and battle stations. The overall tactical

objectives were to select an opponent, ram, and then board in a general milie. The
Turkish commander in chief, Ali Pasha, fought a brave hattie but in the end lost

his life, and his force was defeated. In part, this was due to Christian superior
firepower, technology (ship construction, providing protection for the crew, and
personal

armor), new ship design (galleasses), favorable winds, and doctrineftac

tics (galleasses placed ahead of the galleys and cannon used more freely and at

point blank range). Lepanto signalled the virtual end to traditional galley tactics
and the age of oared ships, and the superior ships of sail were ushered in.

The general concepts of doctrine were rarely described by the admirals or
routinely codified on paper during medieval times. Doctrine at that time was

deduced from events that happened at sea. One significant exception to this rule
was Pantero Pantera, who was an academic and a ship commander of the

Pontiffs navy. His L 'armata navale (The Naval Fleet), in two volumes ( 1 6 1 4),
managed to condense all that was known about the art of warfare at sea. �

Pre-Unitary Navies: 1 750- 1 86 1
During most of this period, pre-unitary navies carried out independent
campaigns and rarely fought as a single fleet. It is important to examine their
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histories separately, up to the birth of the Italian Navy after the establishment
of the Kingdom of Italy in 1 86 1 .
Among the navies of the Italian peninsula, those of Naples and the Kingdom
of Sardinia were most significant, although they were minor in comparison to
great oceanic navies such as those of England, France, and Holland. Most of
the time, the navies of the Italian peninsula were used in cooperation with the

British or French fleets to counter piracy in North Africa or contain wars in
progress in the Mediterranean. Warfare at sea consisted primarily of combat
involving single ships or squadrons, naval blockades, and off-shore bombard
ments.
The frequent foreign invasions and the ever-present political instability in
the numerous states affected the preparedness of the fleets. Navy personnel.

especially the officer corps, were often recruited from the army. from other
Italian states, or from foreign nations. A truly national consciousness of a
national navy would have to await unification.

Neapoli.lan Navy. The history of Naples is intertwined with that of Spain. hence
Neapolitan Navy doctrine has a strong Spanish influence. In the mid- 1 700s.
the situation in the fledgling Kingdom of Naples 's navy was anything but good.
It was not well organized. and it had no recognized doctrine for the employment
of its forces. The arrival of the British adventurer, Admiral John Edward Acton,
in 1 779 marked a clear turning point. Acton. who was summoned by Bourbon
King Charles m. had served previously in the French Navy and with Tuscan
naval forces. He started a thorough renewal program with the objective of
providing the navy with more wide-ranging international experience. Acton
brought experienced foreign officers and skillful engineers to Naples. and he
sent Neapolitan officers and technicians to other countries to be trained. Several
Neapolitan officers embarked on Spanish and French ships and took part in the
American War of Independence.
Acton 's concept of naval force employment went beyond coastal defense; it
counseled an active role in distant-water multinational operations. Neapolitan
ships were active and successful during the hostilities between Spain and
Algeria in 1 784 as well as in other circumstances. In a few years, the Neapolitan
fleet reached the level of capability needed for the political role to which the
Kingdom of Naples aspired. At that time Naples was the major coastal state in
Italy.
With the outbreak of the French Revolution, Naples fought bravely with
Britain to defend Toulon. In 1 795 the Neapolitan Navy fought at Capo Noli

with a British squadron commanded by Admiral Lord William Hotham. against
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the French fleet led by Rear Admiral Pierre Martin. One British ship was
commanded by Horatio Nelson and a Neapolitan frigate was commanded by
Admiral Francesco Caracciolo.
Naples was subsequently conquered, and King Ferdinand IV escaped to
Palenno, Sicily, on board one of Nelson's warships, escorted by a Neapolitan
naval division commanded by Admiral Caracciolo. The remainder of the fleet
was burned to prevent its capture. After this mission, Caracciolo returned to
Naples. He was disappointed by the surrender of his king and turned against
the British. Caracciolo was eventual ly captured by Nelson, court-martialled,

condemned, and hanged on board the Neapolitan corvette Minerva that he once

commanded when he held the rank of commander.

Despite various contrasting eva luations, Caracciolo is considered a patriot
by many. This episode reveals how the doctrines of the Royal Navy and the
Neapolitan Navy differ in duty and loyalty. Nelson was governed by his duty

as a cotnmander to maintain absolute loyalty to his sovereign under all condi

tions and in all situations. Caracciolo, howev er, could no longer be inspired

with duty and loyalty toward a sovereign who had abandoned the capital under
foreign threat; Caracciolo felt that supporting the new ideals of liberty , equal ity,

freedom and justice was his first duty as a citizen and as a soldier.
This sense of perceiving and interpreting is found again in the history of the

Neapolitan and Italian navi es In this period, the old Neapolitan Navy was
.

divided in two-fighting each other. A small Neapolitan Navy was all ied to the

French, while the larger Sicilian Navy was allied to Britain. The conduct of the
Neapolitan Navy was very aggress ive and they showed determination against
a far more powerful British fleet.

In 1 8 14, an interesting book by Giulio Rocco (who had served in the Spanish
suI potere marittimo (Considerations on Maritime
Power), was printed in Naples. Considerations on Maritime Power introduced

Navy), titled Riflessioni

the tenn maritime power, which was nearly unheard of at that time. The boo k
defmed the tenn's most important e lements and the relationships between those
elements.

After the defeat of Napoleon in Russia, the Bourbons returned to Naples

( 1 8 1 5) and once again the navy was reorganized. Maritime responsibilities were

shared between three maritime areas (Naples, Palermo, and Messina) and new
doctrine was established. Admiral Acton 's doctrine was updated with the
publication of the

Regulations of the Royal Navy,

which was also influenced

by French and Spanish doctrine.
For example, as contained in earlier Spanish doctrine, some Neapolitan

officers (vesse l officers) were tasked to fight, while others, known as pilots,
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were responsible for seamanship. Vessel officers were predominantly of noble

origin, while the pilots came from all cl asses . Enlisted specializations were
similarly split into artillery cannoneers, whose duty included vigilance over
the ship, and sailors who handled the sails and other seamanship duties. The
Neapolitan Navy had a fleet with good material condition, but one that was
not particularly useful because of the poor level of training for officers and
crews. Military and patriotic spirit were lacking, and the cannoneers were not
convinced either of the sailors ' good will toward them or of their own good
chances for survival.
During the periods 1 820- 1 830, the Neapolitan Navy became aware of the
new technical possibilities in propUlsion. In the 1 8 30s the Kingdom of the Two
Sicilies (Naples and Sicily) built many steamships of excellent quality. In 1 825
Neapolitan ships had carried out a bombardment against Tripoli to convince
the Bey of Tripoli to suspend his piracy activities. A similar operation was
carried out in 1 833, in conjunction with Sardinian ships, against Tunisia.
The Neapolitan Navy did not normally deploy outside their national waters.
The government feared that crews could be contaminated by liberal thinking,
and given the 1 820 revolt in Naples as well as elsewhere in Italy, its fears were
probably justified. One exception to this rule was its deployment of ships to

Brazil and to the Rio della Plata in 1 843.

In 1 848 the Neapolitan Navy deployed with some sections of the army to

the Adriatic Sea where they joined Sardinian and Venetian ships to defend a
new republican government in Venice against Austria. This campaign was led
by Admiral Raffaele de Cosa. Later, after facing a revolt in Naples, the king
withdrew his ships and troops and sent them to attack republican secessionists
in Sicily. This withdrawal created severe problems of conscience for Admiral
de Cosa, who was tom between obedience to the king 's orders and his desire
to participate in events that were crucial to the independence and unity of Italy.
De Cosa resigned from the navy in a situation similar to that faced by
Francesco Caracciolo.
The Neapolitan Navy operated for the last time in 1 860 in an unsuccessful

opposition to the landing in Sicily of General Giuseppe Garibaldi and his corps
of volunteers . The navy also supported the abortive attempt to retake the island.
During the conquest of Sicily, Garibaldi set up a small but aggress ively trained
Sicilian navy. It created its own regulations and was equipped with crews and
ships that were mostly from the merchant navy. The Sicilian Navy captured
Neapolitan ships and supported landing operations which resulted in the even
tual capture of Naples.
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Sardinian-Piedmontese Navy. The island of Sardinia also has a mixed heritage,
with Spanish ancestry. Piedmont is located near the French border in the region
of Turin. These two regions were once combined as the Kingdom of Sardinia.
The establishment of a Sardinian-Piedmontese navy, or Sardinian navy, took
place sometime after the founding of the Kingdom of Sardinia under the
leadership of Savoy (part of Piedmont). It was originally a small navy with light

units, dedicated mainly to battle with the pirates infesting the coasts of Sardinia.

By 1 764, this navy had grown to include frigates that could be operated at a
considerable distance from the shoreline. Crews were composed mainly of
Ligurians (Genoa's region). The service was managed in the British custom,
and commands were given in French. This small navy also had a naval infantry
that was used more to defend coastal areas than for offensive tasks.
Sardinia defended itself successfully against French attacks under Napoleon.
In 1 796, the king, Carlo Emanuele IV of Piedmont, escaped to and obtained
refuge in Sardinia. The navy continued its primary activity of coastal defense
and actions against pirates-but now in cooperation with the British. Napoleon
could not tolerate having Sardinian ports available to the British and attempted,
unsuccessfully, to prevent their use of Sardinian waters .
After the Napoleonic wars (Vienna Conference, 1 8 1 5), Sardinia reclaimed
Piedmont and acquired Liguria. The Sardinian Navy became better regulated,
and a new navy commander, Admiral Giorgio des Geneys, established two
naval infantry regiments that included their own organic artillery. The maritime

areas of Genoa, Villafranca, and Cagliari, and a marine school ( 1 8 1 6) were
established as well. The number of ships was increased, and the Sardinian Navy
became a particularly efficient instrument. Ships were used for diplomacy and
to

support a coup at Tripoli ( 1 822).
In 1 826 Admiral des Geneys published a new set of regulations concerning

service, discipline, uniforms and artillery, and the administrative regulations
were enacted in 1 830. All regulations were in French; the Italian language
became obligatory later.
During the Greek War of Independence ( 1 82 1 - 1 8 30), the Sardinian Navy
was used to protect the merchant traffic of Sardinia and its consulates in the
Mediterranean. From 1 834, Sardinian warships operated in South American
waters, especially off Brazil and in the Mar del Plata. Cruises to the Pacific
were made via Cape Hom.
In 1 837 steam propulsion was introduced, starting with merchant ships and
corvettes. In March 1 840, the Sardinian Navy was reorganized once again, and

a general staff of the combined forces was introduced. A solid merchant fleet
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developed gradually alongside the navy. and Giuseppe Garibaldi was one of

the captains of this merchant fleet.

After the Milan uprising in 1 848. King Carlo Alberto declared war against

Austria. Sardinian naval infantry took part in the land campaign. while a

squadron under Admiral Giuseppe Albini was sent to the Adriatic and joined
the Neapolitan fleet in support of the new Republic of Venice. On 15 April

1 848. Sardinian ships hoisted for the ftrst time the Italian tricolor flag with the
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Savoy 's coat of anns . The Sardinian squadron was involved in actions against
the forts and in blockades of Trieste and in action along the Venetian coast.
Following the Annistice, the Sardinian Navy cooperated extensively with the
French and the British.

In 1 855, the Kingdom of Sardinia participated with France and Great Britain
in the Crimean War against Russia. A IS,OOO-man expeditionary corps was sent
by sea to the Crimean peninsula. The Sardinian Navy, in cooperation with the

British, sustained the main logistic effort, assuring the continuous flow of

supplies from Italy and managing merchant ships' requisition and hire. Its
integration with the allied naval forces was outstanding, and the experience
acquired was extremely important five years later when the Sardinian Navy
became the core of the Italian Navy.

Venetian Navy. The Venetian Navy was famous for its rigorous regulations,

healthy administrative principles, and the close relationships between its Su

perintendents and the Senate of the Republic. In wartime, the Republic selected
a Captain General to whom absolute power was given. When the war was over,

the Captain General was not to return directly to the city of Venice itself; he
was to berth his ships in some other port and travel from there to Venice in
civilian clothes. There, his action was judged by the Senate.

Trade relations with the East, which once constituted the fortune of the

Venetian Republic, were reduced greatly after the discovery of America, when
trading interests switched from the Mediterranean Sea to the Atlantic Ocean.
The Venetian Navy, which had maintained absolute dominion of the Adriatic

Sea and part of the Mediterranean for centuries, became a modest one, operating
in a limited number of areas after the loss of foreign bases. By the middle 1700s,
Venice had become an advocate of peace and neutrality. Yet the Venetian Navy
still held some military power and could not be ignored. On the other hand, it

lacked the spiritual and political energy necessary for a warfighting force.

In 1749 the Republic conceived a league with the Knights of Malta's naval
forces, those of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and the Pontiff's fleet to
counter the threat of North African piracy. In

1767 Venice took the initiative

and sent a naval squadron under Admiral Angelo Erno, which landed in Algeria

and forced the Bey of Algiers to take action. In 1784 Venice sent Admiral Emo
again to North Africa, where he bombarded the port of Susa, set a naval
blockade at Tunis and Susa, and then monitored from Malta the pirates '
activities. Admiral Erno 's transport of heavy cannons through shoal waters

deserves mention. Cannons were off-loaded on special rafts; thus he surprised

the enemy and created a tactic that since then has been copied by many others.
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After Napoleon's conquest of Venice in 1 797, many of the best ships and
crews of the Venetian Navy were incorporated directly into the French Navy.
When Napoleon was defeated, Venice was turned over to Austria and its navy
became the Imperial Royal Venetian Navy. In 1 848, the Venetians

rose

up

against Austria and proclaimed a short-lived republic. Many of the Imperial
Royal Venetian Navy ships stationed at Venice, whose crews were mostly of
Italian origin, chose to side with the new republic. The biggest part of the fleet
was stationed at Pola (on the Istrian Peninsula) and remained loyal to Austria.
The Venetian Republic was reincorporated into Austria in 1 849 and remained
within the Austrian empire until its cession to Italy in 1 866.
Other Pre- Unification Navies. There were many other states in pre-unification

Italy that had navies. Two of them are covered here-the navies of the Pontiff
and that of Tuscany-although their influence on Italian Navy doctrine is

negligible.
The main objective of the Pontiff's navy was to take an active part in the
struggle against the non-believers, the Moslems. The Vatican navy was
particularly active in the sixteenth century when it participated, with a large
number of ships, in all important naval encounters of that period-including
Lepanto ( 1 57 1 ) . It also cooperated with navies belonging to several knightly
military orders. When Napoleon conquered Rome in 1 808, the Pontiff' s
navy was disbanded; and in 1 860 all papal ships were incorporated by the
Italian Navy, when the papal port city of Ancona became part of the
Kingdom of Italy.
The Tuscan Navy, inheritor of the medieval Pisan Republic Navy, decayed
progressively over the years due to the constant reduction of budget. Despite
this, Tuscan ships participated, along with the Venetians, in battles against the
Turks. Its last major combat was during a war over Corfu ( 1 7 1 5 - 1 7 1 8). From
the mid- 1700s, the Tuscans limited their naval operations to defense against
the Turkish and the North African pirates infesting the Tuscan coasts. In 1775,
a Tuscan squadron operating off North Africa was under the command of John
Acton, who later went on to serve with the Neapolitan Navy.
Due to the limited number of ships available, the Granducato of Tuscany
eventually needed the help of other Italian states to protect his trade lines along
the North African coast. Generally, it was the Kingdom of Naples that supported
this suppression. In the nineteenth century the Tuscan Navy was reduced to
even more modest dimensions.
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The Birth

of the Italian Navy: 1 86 1 - 1 8 82

The official date of the birth of the Italian Navy is 1 7 March 1 86 1 . when the
Sardinian. Neapolitan. and Tuscan navies. and a few remaining ships from the
Pontiff s navy. joined together. The intent of the new Kingdom of Italy was to
create a navy appropriate for the international role the government wanted to

fulfill. This became evident when Camillo Benso di Cavour. the first prime

minister. stated that "it is the duty of a state located in the middle of the
Mediterranean to create [the basis for] the widest development of its naval
resources. taking advantage of the elements of force of its own provinces."
But Italian naval policy was strongly conditioned by the prevalent land

mentality of the politicians. The ships belonging to the kingdom were extremely
diverse. with crews of different cultures and no common doctrine. From the

doctrinal point of view. an autonomous Italian idea was slow to emerge. Even
the recent events of the American Civil War were not well known. and the
technological innovations adopted in those circumstances received only mini 

mal attention. On the other hand. the tactics of French Admiral Luis Bouet-Wil
laumez and Russian Grigorij Boutakov were followed closely.

Bouet-Willaumez wrote a series of publications that pioneered advances in
navy doctrine. His Batailles de terre et de mer ( 1 855). attached to a Project de
tactique navale. outlined provisional tactics for screw-propelled steamships.

Bouet-Willaumez's work was then adopted by the French Ministry of Marine
in the form of their own doctrinal boo ks . They were published in 1 857. outlining
doctrine for ships of sail and steam. These French ministry doctrinal works and
Bouet-Willaumez's other writings. especially his Tactique supplementaire: d
[ 'usage d 'uneflotte cuirassee ( 1 8 65). were adopted by the Italian Navy in 1 8 66

as

the Regolamento di tattica (Tactical Regulations) .6 This doctrine paralleled

a government decision in 1 863 to shift from sail to steam and ironclads.

The tactical principles of French doctrine were applied. at least theoretically.

in the famous and instructive Battle of Lissa ( 1 866). They inc luded principles

of war-rules for combat-and movements of war- maneuvers to be executed
by the main body and the flanks of the steam-propelled fleet to gain ad
vantageous positions for combat. The general strategy for employment of the

fleet at sea was to form up with the French. Spanish. or British against a common
foe. Yet in its first battle. the Italian Navy fought alone.

In 1 866. the Italian fleet. under Admiral Count Carlo Pellion di Persano. met

an Austrian force. commanded by Rear Admiral Wilhelm von Tegetthoff. off
the island of Lissa (now Vis) in the Adriatic in the first battle between annored
fleets. Persano 's objective was to cover an abortive landing operation. Upon
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sighting the Austrian fleet, the Italians sortied their ironclads from the landing
area to engage the enemy. Tegetthoff committed both his ironclads and wooden
ships and scored a resounding defeat of the Italians. preventing the seizure of
the island and driving off the Italian fleet.
Persano's fleet had twice the combat potential of the Austrians. Persano,
however, had neither conducted practice drills nor met with his captains to
discuss how best to employ an ironclad fleet in conformance with the new
doctrine. Instead, he assumed that the standing instructions and the new tactical
doctrine were all that were needed and would be followed. The result was a
disastrous melie. The embryonic Italian Navy had not yet had the time

to

exercise its new doctrine or formulate a national officer corps. It certainly had

not had the years of experience that Horatio Nelson could count on when he
trusted his "band of brothers" to carry out his standing orders.

In what has been described as one of the most unfortunate ideas that

an

admiral could have ever conceived, Persano changed his flagship while his
battle line was still forming and did not inform anyone; due to a squall. his

subordinates did not see it. Unfortunately, Tegetthoff observed the slow-down
of ships and a break in the line. He aggressi vely maneuvered his force

to take

advantage. After the presumed flagship was sunk. one of Persano's subor
dinates signalled for chase and freedom of maneuver, but that signal was
cancelled by Persano who, in doing so, made it known that he was aboard
another ship.
The lessons of the Battle of Lissa weighed heavily upon the Italian Navy for
many years hence. Although most analysts have demonstrated how this battle
mistakenly influenced warship construction for the next thirty years (a resur
rection of the ram), it was also to have a dramatic impact on understanding the
importance of doctrine. Persano formed his fleet to maximize the performance

of their guns, rather than the ram. but then spoiled the plan with his decision to

shift flags. The Italians failed to take advantage of their superiority in combat
potential or their formation's superiority over that of the Austrians (who were
formed to maximize ramming) .
The defeat must be imputed primarily to the lack of understanding between
Admiral Persano and his commanders and to the modest qualities of the admiral

himself. Persano did not take advantage of the greater flexibility of his line
formation against Admiral Tegetthoff's wedge. Furthermore, afte r losing two
ships, he did not counterattack despite the fact that he still outnumbered the
Austrians. Austria

used

older and less well-armed ships, but the strong per

sonality of Admiral Tegetthoff fixed trust in his crews and commanders, leading
them to success .
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The negative results of the Battle of Lissa had serious political and moral
repercussions for the navy. The battle, however, increased the public 's and
politicians' awareness of conditions in the navy. Political leaders began to
understand the importance of sea control and its relationship with land opera
tions. They began to realize that the transport of troops and coastline defense
were not the only roles that navies played in influencing land operations directly
and strategically .
The Battle of Lissa also marked the starting point of new naval thought. The
Rivista Marittima (Naval Journal), born in 1 868, became an important vehicle
for the discussion of new doctrine and strategy. Its writings captured the
attention of the public and Parliament. It demonstrated the importance of the
navy. It proposed new fleet assets and organizational reforms as a consequence
of the lessons learned from the defeat at Lissa and of new technological
innovations. It was recognized that many of the ships that had fought at Lissa
lost in one-against-one battles, so shipbuilding concepts shifted toward larger
ships.
The follow-on debates on the pages of this journal helped to obtain the funds
necessary to achieve qualitative and numerical levels comparable to those of
both the Spanish and Austrian maritime forces. Despite some disagreements,
from there on, the navy was considered an indispensable instrument in the
conduct of solid foreign policy, ruling the colonies and assuring territorial
defense.
The total renovation of the fleet was conceived and committed with a
ten-year plan. In 1 869 and in 1 87 1 , the Minister of the Navy, Rear Admiral
Augusto Riboty, presented an Organic Plan/or the Navy to the Parliament. In
1 870, planning started for new battleships as well. These included the first
warships with revolving towers and 450mm caliber naval artillery; they were
considered by many, especially the French, to be the most powerful ships of
the time.
Italian Navy units stationed in the Red Sea from 1 879 on, sometimes for very
extended periods, carried out naval diplomacy missions in support of Italian
colonies. The ships also carried out operations in direct and indirect support of
the army, using arms and providing logistic sustainment, especially during the
occupation of Eritrea ( 1 882- 1 890).
In 1 88 1 the navy was debated again. The debate, involving both offtcers and
Parliament, was about building battle cruisers instead of battleships. Numerous
boards on the subject expressed different views. The new technologies had
introduced many innovations, which gave rise to numerous questions about how
to proceed. Old prejudices slowed down innovations. Despite the positive
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results obtained with the new warships, many people believed that the navy was
too ambitious; they argued for a fleet of smaller units.

The supporters of large ships used examples from the British and American

navies ' experiences as ammunition against the idea that large ships were too

slow or awkward in modem combat. Big ship supporters also had to refute the
idea that the combat potential of a small number of large ships could be obtained
equally by adding together the tonnage of a large number of small ships. Such
an approach provides only equivalent tonnage and has no bearing on combat
potential. This discuss ion was useful to defme criteria for shipbuilding and to
start considering political-military objectives, given fmancial possi bilities.
Under Minister of the Navy Ferdinand Acton ( 1 880- 1 8 8 3), Italian naval
shipbuilding programs and doctrine were strongly influenced by the French

jeune ecole. Italian ship procurement shifted to fast, lightly armored ships. The
navy supported coastal fortifications and mine fields in conjunction with small

well-armed naval units in defense of the coast. A few large battleships were
also maintained, not to contest command of the western Mediterranean but to

act rather as a mobile fleet-in-being. If actually used in combat, they would act
primarily as coastal defenders, breaking up enemy formations that attempted a
landing, or engaging in shore bombardment.
Acton 's program was opposed by Admiral Simone Pacoret de Saint Bon and

questione delle navi
(The Question of the Ships) by Saint Bon, and La nostra Marina Militare (Our

Admiral Benedetto Brin. Each wrote boo ks in 1 88 1 , La

Military Navy) by Brin, which sought to argue the case for large capital ships
and the decisive battle.
The role of the navy during the occupation of Somalia was to support the
initial invasion and subsequent diplomatic and military actions. During this
period, the navy gained vast experience in distant operations. Numerous
diplomatic missions outweighed efforts to limit the navy to the defense of
maritime boundaries, and naval expeditions in the Far East and in South

America supported this expanded role. Some twenty-one circumnavigations
around the world also contributed to developing the navy's views and to
supporting a greater role for the navy.
People became more aware of the need for harmonizing the basic preparation
of naval officers. The two existing naval schools at Genoa and Naples were

unified to form a single naval academy in Livorno, between 1 878 and 1 8 8 1 . In

the meanwhile, some profound changes were occurring in the international

situation. The French conquest of Tunisia in 1 8 8 1 affected Italian interests and
drew Italy out of isolation. France, rather than Austria, became the assumed
enemy. A costly arms competition with France overtaxed Italian resources and
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left its navy with an excellent theory of naval construction but inadequate assets
in the water.

From 1 8 82 to World War I
In

1 882 Italy signed the Triple Alliance Treaty with Gennany and Austria

Hungary. The main objective of this treaty was the defense of the coastal
regions. The French threat was assumed to be an initial strike at the Italian fleet,
bombardment of the Ligurian and Tyrrhenian coasts, then neutralization of the
railways followed by an amphibious landing which would cut Italy in two and
outflank the land front. The Treaty was renewed in

1 89 1 .

Admiral Giovanni Bettolo, Minister of the Navy at the tum of the century,
succeeded in starting a new shipbuilding program. His plan consisted of
building small, fast, annored ships carrying large caliber artillery, as wel l as
new torpedo units.
One of the more important naval theorists of the 1 880s and 1 890s was
Commander Domenico Bonamico. Bonamico first attained prominence with
the publication of La difesa marittima dell 'Italia (Maritime Defense of Italy)
in

1 88 1 . In this first work, Bonamico argued that navies were as im portant as
land forces for the defense of Italy. Bonamico's ideas evolved with the publi
cation of a subsequent book, La situazione navale mediterranea (The Naval
Situation in the Mediterranean). In this later book, Bonamico aimed to develop

a new regional organization able to control the vital points of the Mediterranean
and thereby prevent general European wars.
Bonamico ' s major work was II problema marittimo dell 'ItaUa (The
Maritime Problem of ltaly) in

1 899. Bonamico accepted the increased role for

the navy in the defense of the national coastline. He outlined the fleet's main
tasks as cooperation with the anny, control over the Tyrrhenian Sea, prevention
of attacks from the sea, and monitoring the mainland and island coastal areas.

Additional duties were the protection of coastal cities and installations against
naval bombardments, the defense of maritime trade, and the safety of the
colonies. Following his prescriptions, Italy established a series of fortified naval
bases on its own soil, from which the fleet-in-being would maintain its vigil .
In another major work, II potere marittimo (Maritime Power). Bonamico

detailed the movement and dynamics of maritime power. Using historical case
studies from the age of sail, he introduced the basic principles of war at sea.

Bonamico argued that the military importance and influence of navies was no
less than ever before. Bonamico states that: ..the entity and the character of a

fleet must depend, first of all, on the objectives that the nations wish to achieve."
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Bonamico pointed out that while French strategy had to be essentially against
Britain, Italian strategy should be based on defense against maritime invasions.
Without having attained success in defense against maritime invasions, success
in other mission areas was irrelevant.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the writings of Captain Alfred Thayer
Mahan in the United States, Vice Admiral Philip Colomb, and Major Charles
E. Callwell in Britain had also added to the knowledge of naval war in the age
of sail. Bonamico, Mahan, Colomb, and Call well collected lessons of maritime
history and recorded the naval doctrines of the time. These authors had a
resounding effect on the Italian Navy. Bonamico even wrote a book about
7
Mahan and Callwell. Mahan and Bonamico are considered to be, in Italy, the
most important philosophers of naval theory because of their ability to learn the
proper lessons of naval history.
Another significant author at the century 's end was Commander Augusto

Vittorio Vecchj, also known as Jack La Bolina. Veechfs book. Storia generale
della Marina Militare (General History of the Military Navy) in 1 892, docu

mented the history of the Italian Navy, an essential step in the formulation of
doctrine. Between 1 898 and 1 902, Camillo Manfroni wrote a complete history
of medieval Italian navies from the middle of the ftrst millennium to the Battle
of Lepanto. Manfroni developed historical information on construction techni
ques, naval customs, crew composition, armaments, and the nature of expedi
tions and the organization of the fleets.
Italian naval doctrinal thought received a further impulse from Lieutenant
Giovanni Seehi. Seehi, an instructor at the Naval Academy, published his

Elementi di arte militare mllrittimll (Elements of Military Maritime Art) in two
volumes between 1903 and 1 906. In addition to a standard and orthodox
treatment of naval strategy, emphasizing war at sea and the deeisive battle,
Sechi 's book expressed an interest in combined operations and the role of
logistics.
Seehi emphasized principles of naval strategy based on a clear definition of
objectives, followed by a deduction of the operations that are possible, given
the capability of the fleet He completed a theoretical treatment indicating which
situations required temporary and which the absolute control of the sea. Seehi
argued that strategic success, not tactical, could be pursued with two possible
altematives: a strategic offensive war or a strategic defensive war. Unusually,
he interpreted the concept of fleet-in-being as an option that maintained naval

forces deployed at sea rather than in port. Seehi, who influenced the Italian

govemment to obtain fast dreadnoughts, was promoted eventually to admiral
and served as Chief of Staff of the Navy after World War I.

1 07

The Newport Papers
Two additional boo ks, Stona delle evolutioni navali (History of Naval
Evolutions) in 1 899 and Tattica nelle grandi battaglie navali (Tactics in the
Great Naval Battles) in 1 898 by Rear Admiral G. Gavotti, were mostly descrip
tive but again fonned the basis of an understanding of how navies fought so
that doctrine could be fonnulated by the navy. Lieutenant Lamberto Vannutelli
8
attempted to analyze night combat between ironclads and torpedo boats.
Lieutenant Romeo Bemotti published a series of articles in Rivista Marittima
which addressed doctrinal issues being debated in the fleet. His book,

Fondamenti di tattica navale (Fundamentals of Naval Tactics) in 1 9 10, was
9
translated into English and published by the U.s. Naval Institute. This book
address es both elements of maneuvering as well as specific tactical maneuvers
and the conduct of battle as a whole. Bemotti argued that "war is decided by
means of a decisive battle." He also addressed the dividing of fleets into
principal and flying squadrons (whose job it was to execute an envelopment
maneuver, or crossing the "') , the proper distance for engagements as being
that which allows the employment of all the fleet's assets, tactical versus
strategic victory, and warfare of annihilation versus attrition. Bemotti did not
develop historical examples for his doctrinal and tactical discuss ions but rather
assumed the reader already knew these.
The writings of foreign naval scholars also received attention in Italy . The

pro-jeune ecole book, &sai de strategie navale ( 1 893), by French Commander
Gabriel Fontin (pseudonym H. Monrechant) and Lieutenant Paul Vignot (pseu
donym Commandant

Z),

was translated into Italian. Sir Julian Stafford

Corbett's historical analyses of doctrine, strategy, and tactics in the days of sail,

Some Principles ofMaritime Strategy ( 1 9 1 1), was also studied in Italy. Russian
Admiral Stephan O. Makarov wrote a book, Rassuz.Jukniia po voprosam
morskoi taktiki (Discussion of Questions in Naval Tactics) in 1 898, which was
translated into Italian.
At the beginning of the new century, the Triple Alliance had begun to weaken

and appeared somewhat unreliable. Rivalry and disagreement arose with
Austria. By the end of 1 905, Austria was again a potential adversary, stimulat

ing an Italian-French reconciliation. The navy was encouraged to strengthen
coastal defenses around Venice and to improve the support capability of the
port of Brindisi. Joint exercises with the land forces were intensified. More
attention was given to increasing the combat potential of the fleet. The lessons
learned from the Battle of Tsushima ( 1 905) led to the construction of dread
noughts and other fleet modernization efforts.
There were still many disagreements in the country and controversies over
the utility of the fleet and expenses needed to improve it. Building was started
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on coastal annoted ships and lightweight submarines designed to operate in the
Adriatic. Naval strategic thought was inspired by Admirals Bettolo (Chief of
Staff from 1 907 to 19 1 1 ) and Thaon di Revel (Chief of Staff from 1 9 1 3 to 1 9 1 5

and from 1 9 1 7 to 1 9 19). The navy budget was increased i n 1 909 and in 1 9 1 1 ,
allowing the acquisition of new fleet units.

In the meanwhile, the training of officers was becoming much more ap
propriate to the level of technological and doctrinal progress in the navy. The
School of Naval Warfare was established at La Spezia in 1908 and was
transferred after World War I to its present location in Livomo with the new
name of Institute of Maritime Warfare. The school was the location of official
naval doctrine development.
Around 19 10, Italian naval preparation begin to consider the difficulties

assoc iated

with warfare in the Adriatic. The Adriatic 's geography was a

challenging factor.
•

Its shallow waters facilitated minelaying but hampered the employment of

submarines.
•

Well-protected enemy coasts were close by.

•

The Austrian fleet could move with relative safety through the islands of

the Dalmatian coast.
•

Italy lacked bases between Venice and Brindisi.

•

The low national coastline made defense difficult.

The mainstream of the Italian Navy concluded that a potential war with Austria,
therefore, had to be fought on the offensive at sea. Results of the analysis fueled
additional debates between the proponents of battleships and those who desired
to reinforce the coastal defenses.

In the meanwhile, the Italian Navy saw extensive service in the war with
Turkey ( 1 9 1 1 - 1 9 1 2). The main Italian flotilla was under the command of the
Duke of Abruzzi. The navy supported the successful landings of troops and
too k much territory . Coastal towns were shelled and blockades were main
tained. Successful amphibious landings were made in Tripolitania, Cirenaica,
and some of the Dodecanese Islands.
After the war, the navy began to plan for amphibious landings along the
Adriatic coastline. Plans were made and assets prepared to carry them out,
taking into account the experience gained with the successful conquest of
Tripoli during the 1 9 1 1 war against Turkey . At Tripoli, new doctrine was
developed that required the support of sailors specially trained as land fighters.
These seagoing soldiers prepared the way for the follow-on landing of regular
army troops, which were to be transported to the objective by the navy .
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Also during the war against Turkey, aircraft were used by Italy for military
purposes (in Libya) for the first time in history. Chief of Staff Admiral di Revel
realized the importance of aircraft in naval war and directed the Navy General

Staff to study and develop this element. Additional articles on the subject of

naval operational art by then-Commander Bernotti appeared around this time,
and some of them were translated into English and published in the u.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings.

10

World War I
The Italian Navy 's situation before World War I, with its commitments to
the defense of Libya and the Dodecanese Islands, appeared to be anything but
easy. The opinion was that the navy was far from prepared to support Italian
foreign policy. When hostilities broke out involving Austria, Italy 's position
was not initially clear. The navy began preparation to fight in the Adriatic .
Training was intensified, the defense of ports increased. Light units prepared

to sortie and plans for landings on the eastern Adriatic coast were reviewed.
Landings on the coast in support of the Italian Army were intended to distract
the Austrian forces from the northern theater.
At the beginning of 19 15 a sound plan for operations in the Adriatic was

drawn up. It required Italy to maintain an offensive posture with its larger ships
against a more prudent Austrian Navy, and assumed that the enemy would use
mines and submarines. The Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary
officially ended in May 1 9 15. A new agreement between Italy and the Entente
(France and the United Kingdom) was signed on 10 May 19 15, and Italy entered
the war against Germany and Austria-Hungary. The combined naval assets of
the Entente and Italy allowed them to dominate the Adriatic instead of just
preventing Austrian transits through the Strait of Otranto.
The contribution the Italian Navy gave to the war effort was important. The
strategic objectives of the navy 's employment were:
•

To cut off Austria from the rest of the world by interrupting its sea lines of

communication.
•

To protect the maritime flow of friendly supplies to and from Albania and

in the Mediterranean.
•

To prevent enemy naval operations along the coast.

•

To provide naval support in the Northern Adriatic to Italian land operations.

S ince the Adriatic is essentially a narrow gulf, clashes between large naval
formations were unlikely and did not take place. During the Italian Army 's
withdrawal to the Piave River in December 1917, Lieutenant Commander Luigi
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Rizzo sunk the Austrian battleship

Wien inside the port of Trieste, using two

motor torpedo boats. He pioneered a new form of attack in ports against major

units that refused to fight at sea.

Italian destroyers and motor torpedo boats struck against the Austrian fleet
at Porto Buso, Trieste, Parenzo, Fasano, and Buccari. Assault teams attacked
enemy naval forces twice at Pola. During the latter of these two actions the
Austrian battleship

Viribus Unitis was sunk by a slow-speed , two-seat, manned
mignatta . The Italian Navy also was instrumental in the
withdrawal operation of about 1 1 2,000 soldiers of the Serbian Army and 10,000

torpedo called a

horses from Vlore (in Albania) to CorfU (Gree ce), and later the transportation
of an allied expeditionary corps consisting of 97,000 men from Italian harbors
to Vlore.
A 66-kilometer-long antisubmarine barrier made of nets was laid down in
the Strait of Otranto to prevent the transit of Austrian submarines to the
Mediterranean. This measure was extremely effective and the Austrians tried
to destroy the barrier. Initial Austrian attempts to break through the Otranto
Strait barrier ended with a naval clash against Italian and Allied units based in
Brindisi. The Italians used their motor torpedo boats effectively, hindering the
Austrian effort. During a second attempt, on

10 June 19 18, near the island of

Premuda, the Austrian battleship Svent Ivstan was sunk by a motor torpedo boat
from a section commanded by Lieutenant Commander Luigi Rizzo. Rizzo
became a national hero, and this date was chosen as Italian Navy Day.
The Italian Navy also gave a valuable contribution to the development of
maritime aviation. In

1914 a special aviation organization operated at sea, and

later, two seaplane support ships were built. During the war Italy used six
hundred and fifty seaplanes and twelve airships for bombardment, aerial search,
and blockade operations. The navy ' s aircraft were also used against ships, but
with no significant results.
During the First World War, Italian naval employment was tempered by a
fear of risking their fleet on unfavorable terms against the Austro-Hungarian
ll
fleet. The navy developed an excellent doctrine for the use of their torpedo
boats and achieved remarkable results at very low cost. The Italian Navy took
no part in Allied convoy efforts and refused to put its fleet under a Mediter
ranean multinational command. It did, however, form combined units with the
French. In the closing days of the war, Italian naval forces executed a successful
amphibious operation at the head of the Adriatic.
Now-Captain Bernotti continued his writings in Rivista Marittima during the
war and his work was again translated into English and appeared in the u.S.
Naval Institute

Proceedings. 12
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Interwar Years
At the end of World War I, Italy, like many other nations, faced very difficult
fmancial conditions. The difference between pre-war doctrine and on-the-field
results was debated, and opinions fell initially into two main camps. One
opinion was that the lessons of the jeune ecole had been validated by the war.
Large capital ships had proven vulnerable to small vessels. Now-Admiral
Bernotti accepted that Italy should take advantage of new technologies afforded

[

by the eune ecole and that fleet doctrine should be based upon a division of
labor. 1

Bemotti wrote that war "had several fonns : guerrilla, military and

commercial blockade, troop transport, coastal actions, combined operations
with the Army." He also noted that during the past war, the main battle fleets
had been almost inert, while escorts and submarines operated freely. The other
school asserted that the mere presence of the armored battle squadrons as a
deterrent to other main fleet units had allowed the smaller vesse ls more freedom
of action. German Admiral Reinhardt Scheer's statement that ..the force of
bigger armored ships was the handle of the dagger and the blade was the
submarine force" was appreciated in Italy as well.
Several Italian military experts supported the so-called "underwater revolu
tion," which emphasized the role of submarines, considering them to be a
decisive weapon. These experts were countered by others who believed that the
submarines' success in World War I was due to the lack of preparation of
surface ships and their low speed. They also considered submarines to be
unsuitable for night or defensive operations.
Eventually two main theories emerged on the type of surface naval units to
be built. One, which we will call the "naval tradition," supported the concept
of a kernel of traditional warships with large caliber guns and robust self-·defen
ses.

Despite their self-defense capabilities, additional antiair and antisubmarine

protection would be provided by escort ships. The other theory, which may be
called the "naval compromise," highlighted the role of quick, light, and heavily
armed cruisers against primarily non-first-level navies. Their employment was,
however, limited to offensive operations and required aircraft carriers for
support.
During this era, Commander Oscar di Giamberardino wrote extensively
about these issues. Although di Giamberardino recognized the need to prepare

for both offense and defense, he was primarily a supporter of the offensive
form of warfare, i.e., destruction of the enemy fleet and forcing the enemy

to fight in decisive combat. He recognized the usefulness of a small fleet of
assault vesse ls, such as in commando-type operations, but considered them
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non-decisive. The most important of di Giamberardino's works was L 'arte
della guerra in mare (The Art of War at Sea) in 1937, in two volumes. Its

theories influenced many politicians and military men, and di Giamberardino
was eventually promoted to admiral.
Even more influential were the writings of Commander Giuseppe Fioravan
zo. 1n a 1 925 article in Rivista Marittima, he postulated the need for what would
eventually become command ships (LCC) in the u.S. Navy. Fioravanzo also
wrote fA guerra sui mare e Ia guerra integrale (War on the Sea and War as a
Whole), in two volumes (1 930- 193 1). Fioravanzo examined the relationship
between politics, strategy, and maritime power, and he became a supporter of
the defensive form of warfare. He defmed the defensive in terms of an
operational-level strategy used to protect the sea lines of communications by
means of a navy employed on the tactical offensive.
Fioravanzo felt that the most important characteristic of a military unit
designed to operate in a relatively small sea, such as the Mediterranean, had to
be invulnerability. On the other hand, the most important quality of forces
designed to operate in the open oceans had to be autonomy. Fioravanzo's
conclusion was that in narrow-sea areas light cruiser types were the worst
option, as they were "not small enough to be naturally immune, but not big
enough to be artificially immunized."
In 1 922, Admiral Bemotti was asked to reestablish the Instituto di Guerra
Marittima (Naval War College) in Livorno. He wrote a series of important
books, including Fondamenti di strategia navale (Fundamentals of Naval
Strategy) and II potere marittimo nella grande guerra (Maritime Power in the
Great War) in 1920; and fA guerra maritima (The Naval War) : studio critico
sull 'impiego dei mezzi nella guerra mondiale in 1 923. Fondamenti di politica
navale (Bases of Naval Politics) was published in 1 927.
In The Naval War, Bernotti discusses how the navy should be linked to
politics, the general naval policies of various nations, the maritime character of
the World War, and new strategic possibilities. He believed that sea lines of
communication had to be defended with methods other than those used during
World War I, and he advocated a mixed system of direct protection, including
antisubmarine and antiair capabilities, and indirect protection. The latter was
to be achieved by means of offensive actions against enemy forces in port and
at sea.
Bernotti shifted his favor to large warships, but he warned that the type of
ships available in the late 1920s were no longer adequate and could create
unrealistic illusions, hiding real and urgent problems. Admiral Bernotti sup
ported the need for aircraft carriers, recognizing that even if Italy was in a central
1 13
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position in the Mediterranean, "a naval force needing aircraft at any time had
to

include units capable of transporting a relevant number of aircraft."
Bernotti rejected the construction of a ship-half as an aircraft carrier and

half as a light cruiser-as

a

compromise solution to the need proposed at that

time for naval air power. Admiral Bernotti's thoughts stimulated debates with
the air force over the control of naval aviation and conflicted with the views of
Admirals di Giamberardino, Angelo Iachino, and Virgilio Spigai, who were
against the construction of aircraft carriers. In the end it was Fioravanzo' s
theory o f defense that influenced the navy 's leaders and resulted in the actual
employment of the fleet during the next war.
The theories of General Giulio Doubet received attention as well. Because

airplanes appeared to be so capable, he assumed that in future wars the greatest
effort would be sustained in the air. Doubet's doctrine considered the sea to be
just a space

to

be flown over. He suggested that the air force would lead

offensive action, and that the navy and anny would intervene

a posteriori

to

exploit the results of the air battle. In Doubet's opinion, cooperation between
the armed forces was not necessary , since the action carried out by "one head
only" was better. Those who supported Doubet 's air theories thought that a
naval war could be won by aircraft alone. Air power advocates held the view
that surface ships could not be defended successfully from air attack. It would

become evident that the sea allowed surprise air bombardment missions against
land targets, and fleets would be unsafe when in port.

In

1 923, the Regia Aeronautica was established, and all the aircraft were put

under the control of this new service. The consequences were that for many
years air doctrine in support of maritime operations was inadequate, and the
effectiveness of airborne assets in naval warfare was reduced, with grave
consequences.
Most Italian strategic decisions were made without consideration of the naval
elements. This problem was typified by the experiences of war in Ethiopia

( 1 935- 1936), which was fought to enlarge the empire,

tion of the increased vulnerability at

sea .

Italy now had

but without considera
to use

the sea and was

pitted against the strongest maritime nations of the world. Italy's successfu l
participation in the Spanish Civil War from

1936- 1 93 9 created false illusions

of Italian naval strength; success had actually resulted from the enemy's
weakness .
Italian naval thought between the two world wars developed doctrine based
on a strategy that called for little more than interference with a superior fleet or
convoys in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean was especially suited to light
and swift forces built by Italy, which would quickly sortie from bases and strike
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at a fleet offshore. The fleet would naturally retain a role for coastal defense.
Another logical role for the Italian Navy was safeguarding the sea lines of
communication to North Mrica.

In 1940 Admiral Guido Po, historian of the navy, wrote La guerra sui mari

(War at Sea), which stated that current Italian naval strategy was based on:
•

The offensive use of warships and extensive use of submarine packs.

•

The exploitation of Italy's geographical position in the Mediterranean to

disrupt the enemy's communication lines.
•

Seeking the maximum cooperation with the Regia Aeronautica to over

come the lack of aircraft carriers.

The Italian Navy did not completely follow this doctrine in the next war.

Before World War II, Italian naval plans were to keep forces together to
maximize combat effectiveness against the presumed enemy, France. Due to
the preponderance of French naval power in the Mediterranean, Italian doctrine
was defensive, consciously avoiding doctrine for distant operations or even

guerre de course. 1 4 More difficult to understand was the lack of doctrinal
development for counterblockade techniques, night operations, or even convoy
defense.

World War II
Italian Navy units that fought during the war were conditioned by interwar
era doctrine. For example. cruisers were capable of very high speeds , since
speed rather than armor was believed to be the best weapon to use against
numerically and technically superior navies. Despite doctrinal debates on the
wlnerability of surface ships and the theories of air power, the navy entered
the war without its own aviation forces, aircraft carriers, and many of the latest
technical improvements that might have aided air defense. Night-fighting
equipment and radar were not introduced into the fleet until after their lack was
felt in actual combat.

Pre-war doctrinal development and training proved to be inadequate. There

was no doctrine for joint actions with the Regia Aeronautica. and insufficient
attention had been given to the management of maritime shipping and its
protection, the doctrine for night fighting, and the role of aircraft in war at sea

.

The lack of aircraft carriers and inadequate cooperation by the Regia
Aeronautica in maritime missions afflicted the navy throughout the war.
Fascist government policy was ambitious, and it overestimated the level of
military preparedness . The Italian military was told by Benito Musso lini in
March 1 940 to plan for an air-naval offensive in the Mediterranean; a ground
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offensive in Yugoslavia, while the anny maintained a defensive posture in
Albania, Libya, and the Aegean; and a wait-and-see attitude on the French
border. In April 1 940, the Chief of Staff of the Navy, Admiral Domenico
Cavagnari, summarized the navy ' s key shortfalls to the head of the government.
Cavagnari believed that the only poss ible strategy was defensive, but his
recommendations were made to an Italian Supreme Command dominated by
Mussolini and the anny , neither of whom understood naval warfare.
Concepts for initial operations in the Mediterranean were released by the
Chief of Staff on 29 May 1 940, about two weeks prior to Mussolini's declara
tion of war. This initial guidance directed the navy to maintain a defensive
attitude but to exploit opportunities for medium-sized clashes. The navy was to
prepare to defend itself and act as a fleet-in-being. In fact, no decisive clash
occurred during the war, although there was a series of minor engagements
throughout.
Mussolini assumed that the resupply of Libya would not become an issue
and mistakenly predicted a short war. Hence, more than two hundred ships of
the merchant fleet were located and captured outside the Mediterranean at the
beginning of hostilities.
The command organization of the Italian forces included a Chief of General
Staff and three high commands for each of the three anned forces. These high
commands were headed by the respective service chiefs of staff. Strategic-level

tasks were issued by the Chief of the General Staff. Centralized strategy and
doctrine were oriented toward the centralization of responsibilities. Super
marina, the high command of the navy, converted these strategic-level direc
tives into orders and forwarded them to subordinate naval commands. These
Supennarina orders were very detailed, leaving little freedom of action to local
commanders. The tactical commander was given only limited decision-making
authority.
After the brief conflict with France and the removal of the threat of the
Toulon fleet (i.e., the French fleet}, the Italian Navy was tasked with interdicting
British ships resupplying Malta and Alexandria; preventing the massing of the
British fleet; and attacking the British in port. The navy was also told to protect
Italian shipping going to North Africa. Due to the limited capacities of North
African ports, the navy had to fonn numerous small convoys instead of a few
big ones; more than 1 , 200 convoys were fonned in one thirty-six-month period.
The need to protect its own convoys drained resources and limited the Italian
fleet's freedom of action against the British. Navy tasking was eventually
modified to require offensive operations in only the central Mediterranean.
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Malta produced a number of important

clashes between the British and Italian fleets.

is

The most memorable are: Punta

Stilo (9 July 1 940) ; Cape Teulada (27 November 1942) ; Channel of Sicily ( 1 0
January 1 942) ; Sydra ( 1 7 December 1 94 1); and operations "Mid-June" ( 1 2- 1 6
June 1942) and "Mid-August" ( 1 1 - 14 August 1942).
When Germany strongly suggested to Italy that it sortie a fleet to disrupt

British sea lines of communication to North Mrica, the Italians complied. The
resulting Battle of Cape Matapan (28 March 1 94 1) was an unequal match

between the British (who had radar, air support, and "Ultra" cryptanalysis data) ,
16
and the Italians (who had none of these). Admiral Angelo Iachino, Com
mander in Chief Afloat, paid heavily for his fleet's inability to fight at night and
for its lack of proper weapons-a price that arose from the positions that he
himself had adopted in programming debates prior to the war. Although the

severe losses suffered at Matapan are traditionally imputed to the lack of radar

and suitable doctrine for night fighting, the lack of information and of a clearly
stated mission are

to blame as well.

Both opponents used the strategy of attacking the enemy in port. The British

used shipbome planes at Taranto ( 12 November 1 940). The Italian Navy was
successful using assault vesse ls at Souda Bay (27 March 194 1) , midget sub
marines at Alexandria ( 19 November 1 94 1 ), and in later attacks at Gibraltar,
Haifa, and Malta. Forces were trained during the 1 930s for the now well
developed doctrine for raids by assault. During the war, Italy also employed
naval forces outside of the Mediterranean. Italian Navy submarines operated in
the mid-Atlantic during the war, and they achieved a high degree of combat
success, perhaps in excess of that of the average German V-boat. The German
high command requested assistance for naval operations on the Black Sea
against the Soviet Vnion and the Italian Navy obliged. Additional units fought
against the Soviets on Lake Ladoga.
By the end of 1 942, the strategic conduct of war became solely defensive,
but the effort

to

maintain the sea lines of communication with Tunisia con

tinued. On 10 July 1 943, the Allies landed in Sicily. As this phase of the war
approached an end, Italy attempted to maintain what was left of its fleet for use
in diplomatic negotiations. This decision disappointed many crews and com
manders who wanted to prove their worth in combat. When the armistice was
declared (8 September 1 943), 65 percent of the remaining Italian fleet was
moved to Malta in accordance with the orders of the new government; the rest
were scuttled, disabled by the crews, or taken over by the Germans.
War against Germany was declared by Italy on 1 3 October 1 943. Its ships
began to cooperate with the Allies for escort operations, withdrawal of Italian

1 17

The Newport Papers
soldiers from the Balkans, and for special miss ions. The San Marco Naval
Infantry Regiment had an active role in the struggle for the liberation of the
peninsula. Many cadets from the Naval Academy fought under the command
of the Italian Corps of Liberation.
Not everyone had originally supported Italy 's

1940 entry into the war, but

everyone in the navy did his job, nonetheless , even when all was lost. On 8

September

1 943, each individual had the opportunity to choose on which side

to fight. Some went with the ships to Malta, and some decided to stay or to
move to the North because they believed their duty was to continue the war
supporting the Gennans. Such complications for naval personnel, rare in many
navies, appear to be frequent in the history of Italy.

There have been many assessments of Italy's perfonnance during the war.

According to Admiral Iachino, commander of naval forces from

1940 to 1943,

Italy found itself fighting a modem war with an obsolete naval organization.

I?

In 1 956 , retired Admiral Bernotti clearly and concisely evaluated Italian

naval perfonnance in the Second World War in 1 principi

della guerra nel

secondo conflitto mondiale (The Principles of War in the Second World War).
He affmned that the lessons learned from history emphasized that war presup
poses risk and that the necessary aggress ive attitude consists of both the will

and the capability to act. In Bernotti 's opinion, the policy of avoiding battle
with superior forces Was flawed. Bemotti also argued that centralized com
mands should not expect automatic and pass ive obedience to orders but should
encourage initiative and ingenuity by subordinates in combat.

Italian naval doctrine in World War II can also be criticized because it did

not acknowledge that when a defensive posture is applied, it must be pursued
to the end. Cooperation between the anned forces Was not efficient, due to the

absence of joint doctrine. Furthennore, doctrine did not provide for an assess 
ment of risk that considered the advantages that can be gained even from lost
battles when the behavior of the forces has been admirable. The gallant behavior
of officers and crews, even in defeat, must be mentioned because it led directly

to some of the Italian successes .

Italian Navy doctrine in World War II was probably proper for the conditions

at the time. The problems that beset the fleet were beyond the navy 's ability to
correct. Given the resources provided, the overall strategy of the war effort,

individual service and overall strategic culture, geography and demographics,

and the type of government, the Italian Navy performed about as well as could
be expected. Italy had been a unified nation for about only a hundred years, and
its navy 's performance against the Royal Navy during the war, despite serious
handicaps, speaks well of its combat effectiveness .
118
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After World War IT
At the end of the 1 940s and at the beginning of the 1950s, the tasks of the
navy were defmed as ..the defense of the Adriatic and Ionian maritime fronts
against Yugoslavia." Italy's naval role changed over the years as it adhered to
the North Atlantic Treaty, the European Economic Community, and the
Western European Union, and due to its strategic position in the Mediterranean.
Italy became the link between Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East.
Although Italy had become a medium-sized power, it had first-class respon
sibilities and duties.
NATO's southern flank was generally considered less vulnerable to direct
Soviet aggression, but the likelihood of an air-naval threat in the Mediterranean
placed a great deal of responsibility on the Italian Navy and imposed the need
for adequate numerical and qualitative strength. When Italy first joined NATO,
its tasks were ..the protection of merchant and military shipping, coastal
defense, and mine countermeasures operations." Over time, the navy's main
tasks shifted to providing support to the U.S. Sixth Fleet, contributing to the
maintenance of sea control and to the protection of the sea lines of communica
tion in the Mediterranean.
The General Staff of the Navy published a white paper in 1973 entitled
Prospettive e orientamenti di massima della Marina Militare per il periodo

1 974-1 984 (Principal Perspectives and Orientations for the Military Navy in
the Period 1974- 1 984). The white paper defmed the navy's missions and tasks:
• A credible and continuous presence.
• The protection of trade.
• Offensive operations wherever required.
• The direct and indirect participation in the protection of the allied naval
deterrent.
• Limited-scope immediate reaction with amphibious forces.
It further outlined fleet improvements that would be required if the navy were
to be expected to carry out autonomous missions. This document was very
important because it represented the first exhaustive official statement on the
naval situation since the end of World War II.
In the post-World War II period, most commentary on the navy derived from
unofficial sources. The lack of forceful personalities able to express their ideas
on naval policy and doctrine was felt strongly. Old writers like Admirals
Bernotti, Fioravanzo, and di Giamberardino continued to express ideas based
on their experiences in war and how they applied in the new international
situation.
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Admiral di Giamberardino wrote a short piece entitled Il prossimo eon
fUtto mondiale (The Next World Conflict) in 1 947. He also updated his
classic L 'arte della guerra in mare (The Art of War at Sea) . In the revised
version, di Giamberardino stated that "doctrinal preparation in the world war
turned out to be in part erroneous and lacking. " He explored the relations
between politics and the art of war, and defmed the way in which strategic
maneuver and the employment criteria for naval air forces should be con
ceived.

Admiral Bemotti retired in 1 940 but continued to write on tactics and

doctrine for many years. His later works included 1A Guerra sui mari 1 939-

1941 (The War at Sea 1 939- 1 94 1) in 1947. He published several articles
defming a new naval strategy for the Mediterranean and supported emerging

NATO strategies. In 1956, Admiral Bemotti wrote a fmal piece for the U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings in which he attacked the fonner fascist regime in
9
Italy during World War 11. 1 This article criticizes the Regia Aeronautica for
its overly optimistic claims and overriding influence. Bemotti 's Cinquanta anni
nella marina militare (Fifty Years in the Military Navy), in 1 97 1 , was extremely
wel l received.

In 1 956 Admiral Fioravanzo wrote the Storia del pensiero tameo navale (A
History of Naval Tactical Thought) in which he discussed the appropriate
doctrine for the new international situation in which the use of nuclear
weapons was possible. The boo k is a concise work that summarizes naval
tactics, tactical concepts (doctrine) , and provides illustrative battles in the
age of oared ships, the age of sail , the age of the screw propeller, and the
age of naval aviation. It was translated into English and published by the
2
U . S . Naval Institute in 1 979 . 1

Fioravanzo also wrote that the disannament policies of the interwar years

stimulated scholars and engineers to fmd legal technological improvements to
warships, resulting primarily in increased speed and weaponry. Because of the
inevitable security leaks and the resulting exchange of infonnation on tech

nological progress , retaining superiority in any one area became impossible.
Fioravanzo advocated a compromise between speed , weaponry , and armor.

Admiral Fioravanzo co-authored The Italian Navy in World War II, which was
published in 1 957 by the U.S. Naval Institute.
Another post-war author was Admiral Virgilio Spigai, who became Chief
of Staff of the Navy in 1 968 . Spigai documented the Italian Navy 's
shortcomings in relation to its tasks in Il problema navale Italiano (The
Italian Naval Problem) , in 1 963 . He always worked to have the navy 's
problems expressed in terms of the broader issues of global naval strategy
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and developments. Spigai dedicated himself to convincing the politicians that
Italy, a nation that was deeply involved with the sea for its economy and
security, needed a strong navy.
Other writers, many of whom were civilians, wrote also on naval matters,
but their approach was more historical than doctrinal. These writers included
Commander Marc 'Antonio Bragadin, Admiral Angelo Iachino, Mr. Franco
Micali Baratelli, Professor Virgilio Ilarl, Professor Alberto Santoni, Dr. Giorgio
Giorgerini, Commander Ezio Ferrante, Professor Carlo Maria Santoro, and
many others.
Italy, according to the current Chief of Staff of the Navy, Admiral Angelo
Mariani, will be called to a more active participation in international affairs and
must reconsider the relationships between foreign policy and military
capabilities. Italian Navy units have contributed to multinational operations in
Lebanon ( 1 98 1 - 1 984), the Persian Gulf ( 1 987 - 1 99 1 ), Somalia ( 1 992- 1 994),
and the Adriatic ( 1 992-ongoing).
Even if it will maintain a limited numerical level, the Italian "naval
instrument" must be able to support a maritime-oriented policy no longer
dedicated to the defense of the national boundaries. According to this vision,
Sir Julian Corbett's joint strategic concept is considered more important than
the one, typically naval, expressed by Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan.

O

ne of the most important outcomes of this research is the conclusion that
rmding a word that equals the term doctrine in other countries is very
difficult. When looking for parallels, it is necessary to explore the full range of
possible topics that are sometimes referred to as strategy, operational art, tactics,
military art, and naval art and science, etc. Whereas in the U.S., doctrine is
generally considered guidance, in many other nations doctrine is more directive
in nature. Hence, there are problems in rmding parallel meanings. These
problems must be overcome before any meaningful discussions on doctrine can
take place.
Second, because the doctrine of many navies was not written, in order to
uncover past doctrine, it is necessary to ascertain behavior by reviewing navy
and military history. This does not mean that doctrine did not exist-on the
contrary, naval doctrine always existed but not necessari ly in the form most
recognizable by those more familiar with land armies.
Third, the difficulties in building a true national Italian Navy doctrine can
be compared to current efforts to build multinational navy doctrine. Italy
attempted to integrate a number of national fleets and found that integrating the
121
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traditions and doctrines of the Sardinian and Neapolitan navies appeared to be
the best solution.

Next, it seems that the influence of doctrine in foreign navies was strong in

the case of ltaly . Similarly, there has been a great deal of interest in Italian naval
doctrine in the United States-evidenced by the frequent translation of many
important theoretical works by the U.S. Naval Institute. All of these theoretical
works that were translated were written by serving or retired uniformed officers.
Apparently , in Italy, writing theoretical works on naval warfare is not an
impediment to promotion. Civilians do not appear to have had nearly the impact
that they do in other nations.

Fifth, there appears to have been a great deal of doctrinal innovation in the

Italian Navy. Whereas in other navies, the age of sai l shifted emphasis from the
improvement of combat capability to the procurement of new hardware, the

Italian Navy has a tradition of continuing to look for improvements to combat
potential by attempting to fight better with the technologies that have been made
available.

Sixth, the Italian case study is important because there is no tradition of

superpower status for unified Italy. France, Spain, and Britain all enjoyed

superpower status at one time, whereas modem Italy has only attempted to be
a dominant regional power. Hence, the Italian Navy is an excellent case study

for the concept of a medium-power navy. Medium power does not mean less

than first class , rather it only refers to the desire to "tty to create and keep under

national control enough means of power to initiate and sustain coercive actions
whose outcomes will be the preservation of its vital interests

.

..2 1

Italy's naval

strategies, art, doctrine, etc., appear to have been in conformance with its
national self-identity .
Finally, Italy has a strong tradition in the analysis of past wars and lessons

learned. Needless to say, although the navy may have learned the proper

lessons, they do not appear to have discovered the "magic elixir" to explain

those lessons to politicians who are unfamiliar with the sea environment.
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"Revolutions in Military Affairs,"
Paradigm Shifts, and Doctrine
James J. Tritten

HE
T

u.s. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS established the Naval Doctrine

Command, which is charged with the preparation of multiservice naval

doctrine, navy service-unique doctrine, and multiservice input to joint and

multinational doctrine. As part of that process, new concepts for the use of na val
power are being addressed in the context of what many claim to be an ongoing
"revolution in military affairs" today.

This paper describes the role that military-including naval-doctrine could
play in such a revolution in military affairs and associated paradigm shifts. It
also looks at lessons from historical shifts in past paradigms and "revolutions
in military affairs." This study suggests that we need a theory of "revolutions
in military affairs" and paradigm shifts. The military today is being asked to
embrace a new revolution in military affairs, or at least a new paradigm of
warfare, and cannot do so without understanding how major changes in warfare
occur. It is also suggested here that "maneuver" warfare is a new paradigm that
needs to be managed once we have developed appropriate theory. This essay
is intended to be suggestive rather than prescriptive, but it questions the basic
assumption that technology leads doctrine in a "revolution in military affairs."

Revolutions in Mil itary Affairs
A revolution in military affairs is a fundamental shift in military strategy,
doctrine, and tactics, which occurs generally, but not always, because of a
change in technology. With a revolution in military affairs comes the need to
reconsider all existing military theory and a transition to a new process of
warfare. New types of military formations have caused new types of military
organizations, tactics, doctrine, and military strategy. Heavily armored,
mounted knights disappeared from the battlefield as a new branch of troops and
artillery appeared. This kind of example is common in history.

At sea, the introduction of firearms resulted in a fundamental shift in the form

of combat, from rammin g, boarding, and hand-to-hand fighting as the decisive
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form, to that of stand-off destruction by artillery. This shift from close to distant
combat was not well recognized initially. During the defeat of the Spanish
Annada ( 1 588), the Spanish concept of combat operations remained a close-in
battle by boarding enemy ships in a general milie. The English recognized the
Spanish sailing skills, numbers, and close-in tactical abilities and kept their
distance, using long-range artillery to wreak havoc on the Annada.
The introduction of artillery on warships changed both the design of ships
and how they would be used in battle. Eventually navies learned how to mass
their firepower in the maritime battle space and introduced the line of battle
similar to lines of battle found ashore. Today we still see surface ships using
firepower to engage distant opponents, although with new technologies and
without formal lines of battle.
The shift of paradigms to distant battle with artillery did not occur overnight.
Boarding and hand-to-hand combat, which were initially considered a comple
ment to artillery, lasted for many years. Although boarding and hand-to-hand
combat may occur occasionally today, they will never again determine the
outcome of a fleet engagement. Ramming also died out, although it resurfaced
for a short time following its success at the Battle of Lissa ( 1 866).
The subsequent development of rifled firearms and machine guns con
tributed to a new revolution in military affairs ashore-the demise of lines of
battle in ground warfare and their replacement by the infantry skinnish and
forms of maneuver warfare. The new weaponry increased the spatial and
temporal scope of combat, requiring better logistics support and planning.
Imperial Germany attempted to master this new revolution in military affairs
with its domination of Europe via the Schlieffen plan and short wars with quick
decisive battles. Rather than a quick war of annihilation, however, Germany
fought an extended war of attrition from 1 9 1 4 to 1 9 1 8 .
At sea, the introduction of rifled artillery, steam propUlsion, annor, and
modem communications systems all contributed to new combat uses for the
fleet-but they did not constitute a revolution in military affairs. New forms of
warships appeared that had combat potential far exceeding their nominal
tonnage-giving rise to the French jeu�

ecole (new school) theory of less
Dreadnought, could make

capable forces. New designs of ships, such as HMS

entire national fleets obsolete. Steam power and radio allowed many ships to
assemble temporarily for decisive engagements. Navies were less at the mercy
of the wind and could steam more autonomously to meet temporal commit
ments. Also, steam-powered transportation could affect the maneuver of
strategic-level formations of ground forces. 1
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Navies, however, despite all the infusion of technology, thought they were
still about "slugging it out" with an enemy line of battle in artillery duels. The
battle of Jutland ( 1 9 1 6) became the model to be studied at naval war colleges
throughout the interwar years, because fundamentally war at sea seemed not to
have changed. Therefore, for every revolution in military affairs ashore, there
is not necessarily a parallel at sea.
The marriage of airplanes, tanks, and mobile artillery gave rise to another
shore-based revolution in military affairs. The blitzkrieg, a form of maneuver
warfare that doomed positional warfare, gave rise to the theory that rapid
annihilation warfare could again be practiced ashore. Although Nazi Germany
succeeded initially, and in many cases continued to do so at the operational and
tactical levels of warfare throughout the war, Germany was unable to win an
extended war of attrition.
By the end of World War n, allied military forces were engaged in multiple,
simultaneous, strategic-level combat actions in more than one theater of a global
war. One of the most successful examples of blitzkrieg was the August 1 945
Soviet Manchurian Campaign of annihilation, which achieved the unheard of
sustained rate of advance of up to fifty kilometers a day, and on individual days
2
between ninety and one hundred kilometers a day. This campaign became a
model for the type of maneuver blitzkrieg warfare that the West anticipated
would be waged by the Warsaw Pact against NATO.
At sea, there was a revolution in military affairs that paralleled, although not
exactly, the blitzkrieg. The development comparable to the blitzkrieg was the
mobile fast carrier task force and its accompanying logistics train. Such forces
were able to roam the oceans, virtually at will, in search of enemy battle fleets
that could be engaged at vast distances from one's own fleet. Alternatively,
naval task groups could be formed to attack enemy shore installations, using
their own form of maneuver warfare which bypassed strong points. The battle
line, with surface ships "slugging it out," fmally died at Surigao Strait during
the Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 1 944), and naval artillery generally yielded
to the airplane and the missile. Naval warfare had fmally changed from the basic
battle line artillery duel to a more complex form of combined arms warfare.
The most recent revolution in military affairs occurred when nuclear
warheads were married to intercontinental delivery systems. Due to the massive
accumulation of nuclear weapons in the mid- 1 950s, the main and decisive
arm of warfare shifted from ground forces to nuclear forces. In the U . S . ,
the Eisenhower administration used the arrival of nuclear weapons as
justification for the "New Look" -a massive downsizing of conventional war
fighting capabilities. Similarly, NATO chose not to field a credible conventional
127
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warfighting force capable of defeating the Warsaw Pact, opting instead to use
nuclear weapons as a substitute.
The postwar revolution in military affairs also caused nations to reevaluate
military theory. Some theorists said that nuclear warfare could not possibly be
war in the Clausewitzian sense-there could never be a political purpose to it.
Others questioned the need for war termination strategy, since nuclear warfare
would be irrational and therefore devoid of theory. Many disagreed and argued
that all wars in the future between nuclear powers would automatically be
nuclear wars. Hence, policies, strategy, and doctrine were required for the
continued deterrence of nuclear weapons during the initial conventional phase
of future war.
A tremendous amount of literature was generated in the former Soviet Union
over the concept of a revolution in military affairs, which had occurred at the
end of World War n. Their army was large and needed to be modified
significantly to fight under the new technological conditions. In 1 946, for
example, there were still over one million horses in the Soviet armed forces.
The term "revolution in military affairs" was selected as a Communist Party
slogan that would explain the changes in warfare that would be required in the
nuclear age. 3 A series of pamphlets was prepared by the Soviet armed forces
from the 1960s into the 1980s to explain how the revolution in military affairs
affected each branch of service and combat arms.
In addition to the nuclear revolution in military affairs, the Soviet military
argued that there was an on-going fmal stage of the latest "revolution in military
affairs," which was being caused by the introduction of radio-electronics and
cybernetics. During their last years, the military of the USSR worried that
advancements in technology would permit conventional ordnance to perform
tasks assigned previously to nuclear weapons, resulting in a new revolution in
military affairs.
There has been substantial discussion recently over a revolution in military
affairs, with emphasis on the technical aspects of it.4 For example, a shift in
paradigms occurred with the introduction of stealth technology into the air
combat environment. Stealth allowed a shift from active to passive defense of
individual aircraft. Due to increased costs and fewer platforms, stealth drove
the need for even greater precision in delivered ordnance. With the capability
to deliver conventional ordnance safely and with increasing accuracy, we might
be able to usher in a counter-revolution in military affairs, whereby nuclear
weapons could be replaced with modern conventional ordnance, some of which
could be delivered via unmanned systems. Such capabilities could result in
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major shifts in doctrine, drastic shifts in military organizational development,
and parallel shifts in programmatics.

The Basic Model of the "Revolution in Military Affairs"
The general, or basic, model for the "revolution" is that new technological
opportunities must parallel organizational and doctrinal development. One
common approach in the thinking is for industry, or the research community,
to present new technological opportunities to the military, who will then
consider development of new capabilities and a doctrine for their employment.S
From these technological opportunities, major shifts have occurred in the very
nature and theory of warfare, requiring new strategy, doctrine, and tactics.

An example of technology that led a paradigm shift and a revolution in

military affairs was the introduction of artillery at sea Naval artillery changed
.

the fundamental nature of war at sea from close to distant battle. Eventually
professional navies were needed to master its potential, which resulted in the
demise of the privateer. The end of privateering and the dual use of commercial
6
ships as warships was a major paradigm shift for naval warfare. All of these
events were caused by the opportunities that technology afforded.
Revolutions in military affairs usually cause changes in a military organiza
tion. In antiquity, the basic branches of combat forces included the infantry,
7
chariot troops, elephant troops, and cavalry. The infantry eventually learned
how to defeat chariots and elephant troo ps, and these exotic formations disap
peared from armies. Cavalry, although not as numerous as infantry, was the
decisive branch. With time, cavalry became a supporting arm, eventually being
replaced by new troops -armor. Further, the marriage of tanks, aviation, and
mobile infantry led to other types of ground force units being formed which
8
capitalized on the doctrine of blitz./crieg warfare. We now have mechanized
infantry and aircraft in close support of armor.

As mariners mastered the revolution in military affairs that added artillery
to ancient sail, navies were able to take on other missions, and fleets were soon
9
reorganized accordingly under national command and controt. Parts of fleets
remained subordinate to the desires of European ground force commanders in
need of support on their maritime flanks. Other naval forces, including ground
forces, were organized into distant-water expeditionary forces. Some units were

dedicated to the interdiction of the sea lines of communication and others for

the protection of the sea lines. Main battle fleets were retained to deal with their
enemy counterparts.
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With the introduction of long-range ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons,
some nations fonned new and independent military services to field these
weapons. Where new services were not created, the operational chain of
command for nuclear weapons release was distinct and separate from that of
conventional warfighting, and new classes of weapon systems were produced

to carry the new weapons. For the first time, navies were capable of direct attack
on the centers of gravity of continental powers and determining decisively the
outcome of a global war.

Inadequate Doctrinal Development Can Stifle A
"Revolution in Military Affairs"
Case studies demonstrate that many opportunities for a revolution in military
affairs have been lost when technologies were available but military doctrinal
development lagged behind. This suggests a rather strong relationship between
the need for both technology and parallel doctrine development. For example,
we have the case of the French Anny failing to adapt to the Belgian-invented
and French-developed Montigny mitrailleuse (machine gun), first introduced

during the Franco-Prussian War of 1 870- 1 87 1 . 10 Although the mitrailleuse
increased the effective firepower on the battlefield by an order of magnitude

and might have swung the war in favor of France, its introduction during this

war failed to tum the tide because its initial operational employment was judged

ineffective. I I On the other hand, the machine gun was rapidly assimilated into
the Gennan and Russian ground forces, and it was the Gennans who developed
new and successful military doctrine by capitalizing on the technological
opportunities presented by the gun.

The blending of the tank, aircraft, mobile artillery, and the radio into a

powerful tool for "maneuver" blitzkrieg warfare-or the fast carrier task force

counterpart at sea-is a similar story. Yet it was not the individual technological
opportunities afforded by any one specific weapon system that constituted a
revolution in military affairs; the revolution in military affairs occurred when
someone put together all of the pieces. Synthesis of how to use individual
components occurred during doctrinal development.

Paradigm Shifts
There have also been less dramatic but nonetheless significant examples of

major changes in warfare that do not meet the full criteria of a revolution in
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military affairs. These major changes in how we go to war are described more
correctly as paradigm shifts and will be considered next. For the purposes of
this paper, a paradigm shift is an important change in military policy, program
matics, strategy, doctrine, or tactics, which is important but does not fundamen
tally alter the nature of warfare.
Some examples of paradigm shifts are related to a concurrent revolution in

military affairs. For example, with the advent of modem aircraft with extremely
accurate delivery systems, air forces no longer needed the capability or doctrine
for massed bomber formations attacking enemy cities as was done in World
War n. This paradigm shift in strategic bombardment was not significant
enough to be a revolution in military affairs, but it nonetheless was important.
The bomber paradigm shift was due both to improved conventional delivery
systems-creating the capability for precision strikes by single aircraft-and
the understanding that strategic bombing would be carried out using nuclear

weapons that did not need to be delivered so accurately.

With the nuclear revolution in military affairs, some nations chose to forgo
the manned bomber altogether and to rely instead on new long-range missile
systems. Forgoing manned bombers required new strategic-level doctrine for
the completion of strategic-level tasks. This paradigm shift was the result of
both the nuclear revolution in military affairs and the qualitative improvements
in antiaircraft defenses.
Nuclear propUlsion, a by-product of the nuclear revolution in military affairs,
resulted in new opportunities for endurance and stealth, making it possible for
submarines to deploy long-range missiles with nuclear warheads. In tum, this
resulted in a major paradigm shift whereby navies were able to influence
directly the outcome of general wars through strikes and the threat of strikes by
the decisive weapons of war.
The nuclear revolution in military affairs spawned other shifts in existing
paradigms, such as how best to defend Europe, achieve strategic objectives

against distant centers of gravity, and fight tactical engagements at sea. The
Soviet Union, and subsequently NATO, considered the nuclear revolution in

military affairs so successful that it permitted the attainment of strategic tasks

at a fraction of the previous cost-maximizing the benefit-cost ratio. Benefit
and cost analysis dominated Western programming during the Cold War. Along
with the multitude of fundamental changes caused by the end of the Cold War
was yet another that made affordability as important as military capability.
Yet nations that faced severe budgetary restrictions have managed to be
innovative and produce prototypes of new and sophisticated hardware-inter

war Germany being the classic case in point. Doctrinal and technological
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innovation continued in the U.S. even during the Great Depression. In other
words, affordability need not stifle creativity. There is no reason that efforts to
increase efficiency cannot be part of a current revolution in military affairs or
a paradigm shift undertaken during time of severe fiscal austerity.
Other major postwar paradigm shifts, such as the mass introduction of the
jet engine into air forces, were not necessari ly by-products of the nuclear
"revolution in military affairs" and are not sufficiently significant to constitute

their own "revolution in military affairs." For example, the jet engine resulted
in increased aircraft speed requiring reduction in decision time for the man-in

the-loop. This paradigm shift has had an enormous impact on aviation, but is
insufficient to be termed a "revolution in military affairs."

Recent Naval Paradigm

Shifts

With the end of the Cold War and associated reductions in military expen
ditures has come a shift in the paradigm of fleet versus fleet being replaced by
fleet versus shore. The most important message contained in ..... From the Sea"
was that the U.S. Navy is now focused on naval operations in the context of a
joint task force involved in a major regional contingency rather than as a
12
semi-independent force engaged in global conventional war.
With this
paradigm shift, the Navy moved its focus from fleet engagements to power
projection ashore, and the Naval Doctrine Command was founded to explore
fully the implications of this move.

In 1 994 the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps published their initial centralized
multiservice doctrinal publication,

Naval Waifare, NDP- I P This

document

serves as an overview and introduction to the more substantive follow-on
doctrinal pUblications that address naval intelligence, operations, logistics,

planning, and command and control. Of note is the naval services' embrace of
the three levels of warfare, the concepts of center of gravity and critical
vulnerability, and the principles of war-none of which are doctrine, but all of
which are major statements of policy.

The doctrine in Naval Waifare establishes that naval forces will be organized

by task and will favor offensive and maneuver warfare. The document reviews
the historical and current roles, missions, and functions of the naval services
and highlights inherent operational capabilities emphasized under current con
ditions.

Naval Waifare also commits the naval

services to full partnership in

joint and multinational operations. This commitment to jointness and multina
tional operations is another example of a major paradigm shift.
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Likewise, the fundamental consideration in procurement has been
revolutionized. When the new attack submarine was first developed as an
alternative to the Seawoif S SN 2 1 , programmatic directives made it clear that
capability was important, but cost was more important. Similarly, naval
aviation's stealth aircraft was doomed, in part, by the budget cutter's ax because
of this new paradigm, regardless of the capability that the A- 1 2 would have
brought to the fleet. This consideration is now paramount. and the Clinton
administration has made it clear that we need to free resources if we are to build
the "next Navy.,, 14

Problems with the Existing Model of
"Revolutions in Military Affairs"
Examination of historical examples suggests that the model of technology
leading a revolution in military affairs is inadequate. In some cases, a new
technology has not been recognized immediately as having caused a revolution
in military affairs or given rise to the need for new doctrine. The failure of
cavalry and infantry to adapt to the firearm during the Renaissance is perhaps
the classi c case in point. 1.5 The firearm was not initially recognized as having
caused a revolution in military affairs; it took about four centuries for these
weapons to become so perfected that the transformation was complete. 16
During the Middle Ages, foot soldiers gradually lost their ability to fight as
cohesive units and were upstaged by men on horseback. The Swiss Confedera
tion discovered, however, that infantry could counter the men on horseback by
improving tactical formations alone. In short, a doctrinal solution was found to
counter the threat of the mounted knight.
The knight was countered by infantry squares, resembling the old
Macedonian phalanx, armed with an equally old technology-very long pikes
or spears-which permitted the foot soldier to withstand the charge of a
mounted horse. Having been kept at bay, the horse was attacked with hand
weapons, resulting in the dismounting of the knight who then lay helpless on
the ground. 17 These changes in tactical doctrine unseated the knight, although
this lesson has been lost and folklore persists that the demise of the man on
horseback was due to the invention of the ftreann .
A lesson learned from studying the age of knights is that improved military
doctrine does not necessarily need to have a technological push-pull. Combat
potential can be improved by perfecting how to fight with existing, or even
antiquated, skills and procedures. Eventually, however, the scope of the
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flrearm's capabilities came to be understood, and the fundamental nature of
warfare changed, resulting in a revolution in military affairs.
Paradigm shifts, however, do not necessarily have to result from tech
nologies developed at that time-the knight was defeated by the infantry 's use
of old techniques and weaponry. Similarly, it was the use of unsophisticated

contact mines that caused the u.S. Navy to focus again on mine warfare -a
paradigm shift for the U.S. Navy to again be seriously concerned with a lesser
technological threat. And the Strategic Defense Initiative (SOl) explored the
use of optical sighting of incoming delivery systems.

Are there other capabilities and mature technologies that could be resurrected

and used in modem warfare? Might not some of these "obsolete" methods of
warfare result in a new revolution in military affairs ? If the threat from non-state
armed groups continues to develop, what good will existing theories of warfare
be? Is this not a revolution in military affairs?

Even if one were to accept the leading role of technology in a revolution in

military affairs, emerging technologies do not necessarily need to be developed

from independent original research funded by every service. The Navy and
Marine Corps can and should borrow liberally from technologies developed by

others, such as those developed by one combat arm for use by another-or
borrowed by one nation from another. All services should look at doctrine
developed by other types of forces for similar problems. Advocates of a current
revolution in military affairs appear to suggest major new research programs,
even though existing knowledge might be sufflcient if applied in an innovative
manner.
For example, modem stealth bomber doctrine could capitalize on the

doctrine for the employment of equally covert submarines searching for and
attacking important defended targets. Similarly, modem submarines planning

to operate in closer proximity to underwater terrain might learn from the

doctrine and technological needs of infantry. When Karl von Clausewitz stated
that the means of protecting long lines of communication were very limited, he
considered a standard solution to this dilemma at sea-the convoy-only a
18
special means to be employed ashore. Perhaps Clausewitz might have learned
something from studying naval models. In short, rather than focusing attention
on emerging technology in the researc h labs, military services might better
beneflt from fleld technology deployed elsewhere.
By focusing on unexploited technologies, nations might skip entire develop
ment cycles, thus avoiding the need to develop their own revolution in military
affairs technology base. For example, there was some degree of borrowing of
American technology that stimulated the Soviet revolution in military affairs
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brought on by the marriage of long-range delivery systems and nuclear war
heads.

On the other hand, it is not clear that a military can advance from one basic

form of warfare without fIrst passing through the next stage. Could navies have
moved from boarding and close-in battle directly to fast carrier battle groups
without fll'St having passed through the artillery stage? Can navies move from

technology-based warfare directly into a fourth generation of idea-based war
fare without fll'St mastering maneuver warfare?1 9

An underlying assumption about revolutions in military affairs and paradigm

shifts is that nations will undertake actions to capitalize upon new technologies.
Hence, if the technology "genie" gets out of the bottle, we need a technology

"fIx." A more detailed study of technological opportunities that have been

known to nations strongly indicates alternative models of national behavior.
For example, by the mid- 1930s, the Imperial Japanese Navy

(UN)

recog

nized that, despite all of the technological and industrial efforts being made to
upgrade the fleet, its projected capabilities would not be suffIcient to meet the
rapidly improving U.S. Navy in a decisive battle at sea-both sides preferred
doctrine for war at sea. The UN, therefore, gave impetus to the development of

night tactics and eventually formed specialized night combat groups (yasengun)

that could weaken the U. S. PacifIc Fleet to such a degree that, subsequent to
night battle between main fleets, daylight battle would be an assured victory
20

for the Japanese.

Thus a technological threat was met with a doctrinal, not a technological,

solution that theoretically negated the new technologies. In fact the UN fought
exceptionally well at night during World War n, frequently bettering the U.S.

Navy, until the U. S. PacifIc Fleet mastered radar. This prowess, however, was
insufficient to offset the advantages that the Allied powers brought to the war
in the Pacific.

For another example, as the United States developed new technologies that

could be used to enhance long-range nuclear missiles, the preferred solution of
the Soviet Union was to ban the new technology with an arms control agree

ment. The Soviets displayed similar behavior as the U.S. explored sm. Most,

but not all, nations have agreed to keep the chemical and biological warfare
"genie" in the bottle. and they have not used such weapons.

Another model for responding to new technologies is to ignore them. Nations

with the clear ability to participate in a revolution in military affairs have not
always chosen to do so. Sweden, for instance, has yet to develop its own nuclear
weapons, although it clearly has the potential to become a nuclear power? )
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There are also examples of revolutions in military affairs that probably have

no foundation in new technologies. For example. Napoleon Bonaparte caused

a major paradigm shift in ground warfare when he successfully mobilized

citizens to fight for ideas and not money. 22 The shift to mass armies caused a

shift in the basic object of warfare ashore from seizure of territory to defeat of

the enemy army. Under this paradigm. both sides in World War II considered

certain parts of the enemy economic base as legitimate military targets due to

whole nations generally being mobilized for war.

Did technology play a role in causing this major paradigm shift in warfare.

a shift to considering the entire nation as being in arms. or did technology merely
react to a new vision for warfare? Certainly. modem industrial capability was

required for such an effort. as technology allowed for attacking the full breadth
and depth of an enemy nation and population. While some consider the nation

in arms as a legitimate revolution in military affairs. it is not at all certain that

the Napoleonic revolution in military affairs was caused by technology.

There are cases where technology has been given the opportunity to lead the

way in developing new fonns of warfare. but introduction of the new technol

ogy was hampered because it was developed outside of the government, without
an internal advocate. In such cases. where a new vision of a future battle space

is advocated by someone "outside the system." assoc iated technology develop

ment is often opposed by those in the government. When there is an absence of
an internal constituency for systems for which a doctrinal or other need has not

been established. paradigm shifts and revolutions in military affairs take longer

to occur.

For instance. the technological opportunities afforded by the development

of the light-weight radial aircraft engine were not appreciated by the Royal

Navy during the interwar years. Because of this. Great Britain. and the Fleet

Air Ann in particular. were found wanting early in World War n. Indeed. it

was not until late in the war that the Royal Navy changed its concepts of

operation to center around the aircraft carrier. altering the paradigm of warfare
at sea.

On the other hand. the U.S. Navy capitalized on the development of the

light-weight radial aircraft engine. and interwar peacetime doctrinal develop
ment for carrier warfare outpaced all other nations.23 In the 1 920s and 1 930s.

the U.S Navy laid the basis for a doctrinal change from decisive battle centered

around the battleship to the ability to engage the enemy battle fleet as well as

influence the shore with the aircraft carrier. This change was permitted by the
development of the radial aircraft engine and of new concepts of operations by

a group of heretical officers who believed in the potential of naval aviation.24
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Paralleling the technological innovation was a series of organizational
developments that permitted the upward mobility of aviation officers into
command positions during World War II. Similarly, the Bureau of Aeronautics

was created to sponsor conceptual and technological development. These
organizational changes facilitated fleet experimentation with the new technol
ogy. Fleet exercises were paralleled by the development of concepts of opera
tions that were tested at the Naval War College. Hence, when the main battle
fleet was sunk on 7 December 1 94 1 , the U.S. Navy was able to respond quickly

to the requirements of war with a new Pacific Fleet centered around the aircraft
carrier. This reconstituted force was able to use the airplane as its main striking

arm because of the pioneering work that was done between the wars by a few

believers in naval aviation. The revolution in military affairs at sea that
paralleled the blitzkrieg was inculcated into the U.S. Navy.
It is worthwhile to take note here that doctrinal rigidity can have a marked
negative influence on a military service's appreciation of the new warfighting
23
opportunities that may be afforded by a revolution in military affairs.
An
organization can overcome the tendency to ignore new ideas if its focus is a
shared vision to create improvement. The relationship between doctrine and
new technologies and how it might lead to a revolution in military affairs is a
critically important topic for investigation.

The Need for a Theory of
"Revolutions in Military Affairs" and Paradigm

Shifts

Since revolutions in military affairs and paradigm shifts do not happen
instantaneously, theory is needed to help them reach fruition. Although it
perhaps no longer takes centuries to understand and shape current or future
revolutions in military affairs. it does probably take decades. At a minimum. a

theory of revolutions in military affairs and paradigm shifts should assess the

integration of anticipated different and emerging technological opportunities
into existing bureaucratic organizations. Military services should understand
the general method by which they change and the role that various groups and
organizations play in causing successfu l change.
New theory will need to address cases where new technologies are
countered by doctrinal solutions alone-absent a revolution in military
affairs or even a major paradigm shift. A theory of change in military
services must also address the many cases where they benefit from new and
visionary approaches to warfare by gifted specialists, contributing to a
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revolution in military affairs or paradigm shift. A theory will also have to make

use of case studies
in military affairs .

of failed paradigm shifts as well as successful revolutions

Among the last, a very interesting case study is that of the interwar develop

ment of the dirigible. The Navy first developed concepts for warfare in the
Paciftc under the then-revolutionary organization of a joint Anny-Navy war
planning staff. The story of the brilliant work done in developing War Plan

Orange and the subsequent Rainbow Plans is well known. As part of that overall

effort, the Navy recognized the need for long-range reconnaissance and sur
veillance of Japanese home waters. The inadequate technology of the time
dirigibles with on-board fighters-however, did not meet the needs of the fleet.
Fulfilling the requirement for distant surveillance had to await the development
of long-range patrol aircraft, subsurface, and space assets .
The excellent ideas developed by Major Earl H. Ellis, U.S. Marine Corps,
for expeditionary amphibious operations across the Pacific in support of War
Plan Orange languished on the shelf until the intervention of Commandant
of the Marine Corps, General John Russe ll. General Russe ll retired senior
offtcers who were unwilling to make the shift to amphibious warfare . The
Marine Corps needed only to borrow the technology from Japan that per
26
mitted the development of modem amphibious landing craft and ships.
This case represents both a failure to change the parad igm and a subsequent
success.
Another case study of a changed paradigm involves the World War II U. S.
Navy submarine service. Although a group of submarine officers explored
alternative concepts of operations for their combat arm prior to the outbreak of
war, submariners in general entered the war prepared to be integrated with the
battle fleet; to be used against combatants; and with a doctrine that assumed
27
their antisubmarine adversary would be able to sink them if he attacked.

During the initial period of the war in the Pacific, these

three

conditions

changed. The submarine operated independently on long and distant patrols,
and the targets for submarine attack shifted to merchant ships that generally did
not fight back. Finally, submariners learned that enemy antisubmarine
capabilities were not as good as expected, and that their own ships stood up
well to attack. The sum of these

three

major changes was that the submarine

could be used in a manner not necessarily well exercised before the war
boldly, on the surface at night, with immediate re-attacks rather than attack
and hide. The submarine service offtcer corps went through a catharsis

during the war, and commanding offtcers who were unable to adapt to the
bold, new wartime paradigm were reass igned.
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In general, the three major concepts in a paradigm shift are:
•
•
•

The idea
The messenger
A senior officer who permits its development.

The first American to understand that the striking power of aircraft at sea
could equal that of the battleship was Lieutenant Commander Henry C. Mustin,
U. S. Navy. Like Ellis, Mustin needed senior flag and general officers within
the established organization to protect his new ideas and allow them to grow.28
Mustin found his protector in the form of Rear Admiral William Moffett, U.S.
Navy, just as Ellis had found General John Russe ll for amphibious operations.
The experiences of Spanish Vice Admiral Jose de Mazarredo Salazar
strongly suggest that just having the good idea is not enough. De Mazarredo
was the author of excellent doctrinal works and many good recommenda
tions for improving the Spanish fleet prior to the defeat at Trafalgar ( 1 805).
Although de Mazarredo was never defeated at sea and thus had the
credibility of a proven warrior, his outspoken criticism of the state of the
fleet and its lack of combat preparedness, as well as his audacity in ques
tioning Spanish foreign policy, doomed all of his good ideas to the history
books. He therefore did not cause any actual improvement in the combat
29
potential of the Spanish navy.
Even with gifted personnel in the various levels of the bureaucracy, the
organizational climate within the bureaucracy itself can doom good doctrinal
development and therefore advancements in revolutions in military affairs or
changes to paradigms. For example, the distinctly secondary place afforded to
the UN led directly to the lack of sound warfare capabilities development.
Coupled with a number of missed opportunities, this lack of good doctrinal
development eventually led to the defeat of Japan in World War 11.30 Had the
UN, or similarly the Royal Navy in the case of carrier aircraft development,
been allowed to pursue what warfare specialists knew were important mission
areas, the performance of these services during World War II would have been
better.

Relationship of Military Doctrine to "Revolutions in
Military Affairs" and Paradigm Shifts
The basic model of a revolution in military affairs, which gives a leading
role to technology, is incomplete. Revolutions in military affairs and paradigm
shifts are not wholly responsive to technology-they can also be stimulated by
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doctrinal development New doctrinal concepts can create a can start a cycle
during which doctrine pulls the future development of technology. Advances
in technology then result in subsequent alterations to organization and to
doctrine.

In such an alternative

case, military leaders ftrst outline a vision, concepts,

or doctrine for warfare and then refme the vision in tenns of capabilities
desired-a concept-based requirements system. The role of industry under this

approach to a revolution in military affairs is to respond to these visions,
concepts, and doctrinal development. President Ronald Reagan's visionary
speech on the

SOl is a classic example of such an approach.

Unfortunately, a

leader's vision is often thwarted by the bureaucracy's failure to exploit emerg
ing technologies. Hence, there must be a theory for translating leaders' visions
into change within large organizations. Military services should draw upon the
excellent work that has been done by business schools and management
consulting ftnns in their investigations of "learning organizations" and the
31
special skills required of leaders in such organizations.
A good example of military doctrine leading technology was shown by the
Japanese during the interwar years. The UN's doctrine called for deep ocean
battles, preferably in a short war of annihilation, and the UN generally insisted
on technological superiority in each weapon system that it produced. This
resulted in a search for new technological opportunities to carry out the
preferred vision of the future battle space. As a result of their doctrine's leading
role, the UN ftelded the Yamato-class super-battleship and the Mitsubishi Zero
ftghter-two of the numerous examples of good doctrine that led to the ftelded
32
technology that was useful in war. This is essentially the same model for the
relationship between doctrine and technology that has governed U.S . Navy
programming since World War II.

The U.S. Army also appears to accept this exact model of doctrine that leads
revolutions in military affairs. The U.S . Army Training and Doctrine Command

(TRADOC)

recently issued a new pamphlet,

Force XXI Operations, TRADOC

Pamphlet 525-5, which attempts to shape the on-going revolution in military
33
affairs with a visionary statement of the future battle space. Following this
pamphlet is one that is more authoritative, with an introduction signed by the
Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army. 34
These examples are intended to show that the rudimentary, albeit popular,
model of a revolution in military affairs is flawed in its fundamental assumption

that doctrine depends upon technology as its major input and output. For
example, the Napoleonic revolution in military affairs was certainly more a
product of political, social, and economic conditions than of a speciftc military
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technology. Hence, we need to look at these other factors that impact on doctrine
in order to understand how doctrine influences revolutions in military affairs

and paradigm shifts.

How Doctrinal Inputs Influence "Revolutions in
Military Mfairs" and Paradigm Shifts
A review of where doctrine originates, or what influences doctrine, informs
3.1
Others include

us that technology is merely one of many possible inputs.

current policy, available resources, current strategy and campaigns, current
doctrine, threats, history and lessons learned, strategic culture, geography and
demographics, and forms of government. If doctrine follows merely the push
or pull of new technology, then it misses the opportunity to develop new
concepts of combat operations-and new doctrine-based upon all other
inputs. Let us consider some good examples of factors other than technology
that have recently changed doctrine.
First, nations often make major changes to doctrine and organization after
reviewing newly published policy and strategy, without giving consideration
to new technology. This is what happened when the U.S. Navy and Marine
Corps founded the Naval Doctrine Command

(NOe)

after publishing their

major white paper, ..... From the Sea." The United States shifted its interests in
the world from a primary focus on containment of communism and the USSR

to more diverse and regional interests. With this change in interests came
alterations in the focus on different types of warfare. Similarly, the U.S. Navy
changed its orientation from open-ocean deep water operations to joint opera

tions in the littoral and maneuver warfare. With changes to policy alone came
new doctrine and organization, such as NOe, and interest in new technologies

to support new warfare interests. If there is an on-going revolution in military

affairs, it will be affected by the current interests of the U . S . Navy and Marine

Corps in maneuver warfare doctrine.
Normally, when a new technology is introduced into the military, an existing

organization acts as its sponsor. Later, as the technology is refined and a
doctrine is formulated, a separate organization is created, whose central identity
is the new technology. This occurred with the creation and evolution of offices

within the U.S . Navy that were responsible for aviation during the interwar
years. These new offices evaluated the new aviation technologies within the

framework of the doctrine for their intended use in the fleet. 36
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In cases where a doctrinal concept precedes a demonstrated technology, it
may occur that an organization will manage both doctrine and technology
development. A good example is the Strategic Defense Initiatives Office

(SOlO), which was charged with developing the doctrine for war in space in the

absence of an organization dedicated to this purpose. Today, we see a series of
doctrine organizations, centers, and commands created by the anned forces, all

charged with improving how to fight. None of these new organizations came
into being to manage new technology; all have the license to develop new
doctrinal concepts to shape the development of new technology.
Second, there is ample evidence that nations make major changes in doctrine
after understanding the latest decisions in resources to be made available to the
military services-resource decisions that are not dependent upon new tech
nologies. The 1993 changes in U.S. Anny doctrine from the AirLand Battle
version of FM 100_537 were a direct result of a drastic change in the amount of
resources that were going to be allocated to the Anned Forces, and not due to
technological opportunities. Correspondingly, the U.S. Air Force is exploring
the concept of maneuver warfare as a result of similar budget decisions.38
Hence, budgetary reasons have caused these two services to change their
doctrine, and this new doctrine influences their view on any on-going revolution

in military affairs. Very simply, if we cannot afford ample new technology,
must we also postpone any on-going revolution in military affairs?
Third, another "trigger" for changes to doctrine is newly published military

doctrine and campaign concepts, some of which result from existing, not new,
technology. As the Naval Doctrine Command publishes its multiservice
doctrine for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, it will have a direct impact on
service-unique doctrine issued by each of those military services. A case in
point is the maneuver warfare doctrine found in

Naval Warfare, NDP- l . First

adopted as part of the multiservice naval doctrine, the concept of maneuver
warfare will next find itself articulated in doctrine for the U.S. Navy.

Similarly, new joint doctrine will impact on multiservice naval doctrine. As

joint campaign concepts are developed by the new U.S. Atlantic Command

(USACOM), they will affect all forms of joint, multiservice, and service-specific

military doctrine. The doctrine of the U.S. Air Force has been influenced

directly by the exploration of maneuver warfare concepts by the U.S. Anny.

Should the U.S. Anny succeed in developing its vision for mobile strike forces,
such new doctrine would obviously again affect air power doctrine. Hence,

142

Tritten * Revolutions
doctrine from outside one military service can have an enonnous effect on the
desire for a revolution in military affairs.

As long

as the services have primary control over programmatics, they will

retain the development of programmatic doctrine, i.e., doctrine that supports
programming and is not necessarily reflective of how they will actually fight.
Operational combat doctrine, however, is the province of joint doctrine. For
example, the U. S. Marine Corps has fully embraced maneuver warfare doctrine,
but such doctrine is not yet a part of joint or multinational doctrine for actual
warfighting. If only the services embrace a revolution in military affairs, we

will not necessarily see a change to operational combat doctrine.

Recent attempts to make the chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff more

directly responsible for a military programmatic input to the annual budgetary
debate constitutes a major change in U.S. defense practices and will enhance
the influence of joint doctrine. Efforts being made by Admiral William Owens,
vice chainnan, include an enhanced role for the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council

(JROC) to set overall military programming priorities.39 Until now, in

the programmatic world, service doctrine has been dominant. If joint doctrine

is to predominate over service doctrine, then major changes in joint doctrine
must address future, not just current, warfare concepts .
Fourth, a major cause of revised military doctrine can issue from reviews of
actual and emerging threats, especially those not foreseen during earlier

prog rammatic deliberations. Before any war, there is an anticipated enemy for
which military doctrine is designed. When the intelligence community mis
represents the capabilities of the enemy, it is likely that prewar doctrine will be
deficient. Naturally there are difficulties with capabilities versus intentions
estimates. Hence, it is likely that the correct doctrine for actual warfighting
depends largely on accurate intelligence (along with a solid understanding of
the capabilities and intentions of one 's own forces). It follows, then, that
opportunities will be lost for revolutions in military affairs unless the military
services fully back programming in support of intelligence.
Today, the expected enemy has changed dramatically. The U. S . no longer

faces the Soviet Union and cannot treat all other threats as lesse r included cases.

The threat challenge is complicated, as is the challenge to attempt to model the
behavior of the wide diversity of potential actors with whom the U.S. will have
to interact in the future. In the past, American defense planne rs had the luxury

of a well-developed concept of operations by the expected enemy and the

benefit of campaigns and operations planned by a long-standing alliance
structure. Today, they lack the internal resources to predict accurately the
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behavior of every potentiaJ enemy. Military commanders will have to deal
increasingly with non-governmental organizations, including private volunteer
organizations and an aggressive and technologically sophisticated media not
dependent upon government for information. In such an environment, will

doctrine by based on old familiar threats. generic new threats, or threats based

on someone's estimate of the "most likely" future threats? Is it safe to assume

that the real new revolution in military affairs will allow Americans to plan to
be able to do almost anything militarily that they want to do against a Third

World enemy?

A fifth manner in which doctrine changes is by reviewing the lessons of

history. For instance, the doctrine for military planning was changed in many

nations of the world once they reviewed the victories of Pruss ia in the Seven
Weeks War ( 1 866) against Italy, Austria, Hanover, and Bohemia, and in the
Franco-German War ( 1 870- 1 87 1). Dramatic and rapid campaigns of annihila
tion brought about intense anaJyses of the Prussian victories with a consensus
that the General Staff had been. to a large degree, responsible.40 This in tum
led to a worldwide imitation of the Pruss ian General Staff-a major paradigm
shift.

Although one might assume that all nations review their military history

before doctrinal development, in fact, doctrine has been developed prior to such
studies. When nations start up new doctrine centers and commands, they have
the opportunity to take a comprehensive look at previous military history and
extract the lessons of past attempts at doctrinal development. When full ap
preciation of prior lessons is available to current doctrine writers, this can lead

to a new vision of how best to create concepts of warfare which, in tum, can
stimulate a "revolution in military affairs."

Sixth, one would expect doctrine writers to make full use of the prior studies
of nations' strategic cultures before preparing their doctrine. In recent times,

we have witnessed newly emerging nations created out of old nations, wherein
the strategic culture of that new nation does not necessari ly reflect immediate
history. In such cases, because of the changes in population, geography (bor

ders). or government, the new nation has the opportunity to make significant

doctrinal changes. Even modifications in government alone have afforded
nations the opportunity to embody major doctrinal changes. An excellent

example of this is the change in navy doctrine that France incorporated

following the replacement of the Vichy regime by the Fourth Republic.41
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In the days when the Soviet Union faced NATO and saw itself essen
tially encircled by imperialism, its mil itary doctrine was appropriate for
its high-technology adversary. Today, Russia can afford to develop a series
of parallel military doctrines, making the assumption they are technologically
inferior in the western theater of military operations but superior in the
southern theater.42 This change in threat has nurtured new doctrine, perhaps a
doctrinal revolution similar to that proposed above.
Fonnal navy doctrine encountered a setback with the introduction of new
technologies and the end of the Anglo-Franco wars during the age of sail.
Doctrine was developed and refmed frequently during the wars between Britain
and France over hundreds of years. During the age of sail, there were long
periods of warfare with essentially the same technology. Hence, improvements
to navy warfare occurred via other avenues of advancement. Additionally,
modem recruitment techniques had yet to be discovered, hence, improvements
in personnel and leadership was not yet the method for improving combat
potential. Advances in the naval art had to arise from doctrine. Debates over

doctrine and the existence of written doctrine was nonnal practice. As navy

doctrine advanced, so did combat potential. 43
Since the early part of the nineteenth century, two events have had a profound
effect on the nature of navy doctrine: technology and the frequency and
participants of war. From the time that the ironclad was introduced, navy
technology has changed

so

quickly and

so

often that navies have seldom had

the time to deal with doctrinal issues for forces on hand. By the time of the
Battle of Lissa ( 1 866), between Italy and Austria, warship designs were
advancing before navy doctrine could be reevaluated and rewritten. Navies
turned more of their attention to dealing with improvements to naval art and
combat potential by improving technologies and programming rather than
learning to fight "smarter."

M

any non-technological factors that often result in new concepts for
military doctrine can have major impacts on revolutions in military

affairs. All of these issues must be considered by doctrine commands and
centers if there is to be a true doctrinal renaissance that makes poss ible a
revolution in military affairs. As navies become more comfortable with the
concept of centralized written doctrine, they will have many opportunities to
develop new doctrinal concepts with ideas that originate outside the realm of
technology.
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More often than we would like to admit, there has been no accepted military

doctrine for the

use of newly introduced technologies. Increasingly, therefore,

improvements to combat potential were attributed to effective programming

skills rather than skills that assess warfighting doctrine. Today, the focus should

shift from introducing new technologies to other, less expensive, methods of
improving combat potential, namely. navy doctrine as a force builder. The

continued searc h for "silver bullets" in new technology threatens to distract
professional officers from perfectly good solutions that may make possible
advances in the next revolution in military affairs.

The difficulty in changing paradigms. doctrine, and recognizing revolutions

in military affairs can best be studied in the detailed and fully developed case

studies that result from specific lessons learned. For example. Stephen Rosen's

Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military. is an excellent

examination of change in military organizations.44 It contains a number of cases

that provide the military doctrine supervisor with a quick overview of the
problems of change during peacetime as well as during war.

To get to the heart of change, however, more in-depth, book-length in

dividual case studies should be consulted. One such study of an organization 's

attempt to come to grips with a new technology is Harold R. Winton 's To

Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armored
Doctrine, 1 927-1 938. 45 After studying such cases, one can more easily accept

the need for recommendations contained therein, such as, support at the top, a
mechanism for the building of consensus, and a "learning organizational"

climate that accepts rational analysis as the basis for doctrine and force
structure.

In learning organizations, individuals "continually expand their capacity to

create the results they truly desire, [it is] where new and expansive patterns of
thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people

are continually learning how to learn together." Learning organizations also

have a shared vision of the future-indeed a shared vision is one of the five

cornerstones necessary for such organizations.46 The German Army was a
"learning organization" during World War I when it assessed recent combat

experience and then made changes to their doctrine as the war progressed . An

untold story is how the U.S. Navy learned from its combat experience and
changed its doctrine during World War JI'7 -the German Army is not the only
military "learning organization" that has existed.

Whether or not there is a current and on-going revolution in military affairs

is still being debated. What the next paradigm will be has yet to be decided. We

do know, however, that revolutions in military affairs and paradigm shifts will
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occur. We need to manage these changes and create processes and organizations

to deal with these issues; Naval Doctrine Command is an organization that is

concerned with managing change. Good doctrinal development can create
revolutions in military affairs.

It is time for the Navy to become a learning organization that holds a shared

vision of the future as well as a shared vision of continued improvement.

Leadership in such an organization is similar to that required of process

designers, stewards of the vision, and teachers who foster learning. This new
type of leader is charged with building an organization "where people continual
ly expand their capabilities to understand complexity, clarify vision, and
improve shared mental models . ..48

For the next paradigm we must question if it will be a logical outgrowth of
the ongoing revolution in military affairs, recognizing the importance of affor
dability or the opportunities permitted by stealth. Will this paradigm result from

new technological opportunities, such as unmanned air and subsurface

vehicles? Unmanned systems allow distant decision making, reduced costs, and

subsequent changes in cost versus risk calculations. Will a new paradigm be
oriented on speed-hypersonic vehicles? Increased speed will again reduce
decision times and make fundamental changes in basing requirements. In

creased range supports the more grandiose theories of air power once advocated
by Alexander DeSeversky and Billy Mitchell. On the other hand, is the new
warfare paradigm framed by ideas and the information explosion? It is very
likely that fourth generation warfare, idea-driven or information-based warfare,
is indeed a major paradigm shift away from warfare based upon technologies.

Whatever the new paradigm, one must not overlook the leading role that
doctrine can play to stimulate technological development.

The model for doctrinal development in support of paradigm shifts and
revolutions in military affairs instructs that the fIrst step is to communicate a
vision of the future battle space, then develop concepts for operations, and then,
after testing those operations by interactions with the fleet and analytic com
munity, develop prototype doctrine. Approved doctrine can result in hardware

and software requirements as well as direct improvements to combat potential,
irrespective of technological change.

The introduction of new ideas into the military and the management of
change to a new paradigm are dimcult tasks requiring both combat leadership

skills and experience as well as the administrative and bureaucratic skills of the
Washington "in-fIghter." Critical thinking, the temperament of combat-ex
perienced leaders, and the administrative competence are needed to ensure that
the most promising ideas are accepted and implemented by the Navy.
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